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CH A'P TERI 
INTR0DUCT10N 
One ofI-the difficulties in the'way of historical 
study is the practice of attaching "labels" to men" and 
policies. We read öf the "forward" policy on the North- 
West frontier of India and, by contrast, of the-policy 
which is variously"described as the "non-intervention" 
or the "backward"-policy or, in' Wyllie's phrase, the 
policy*of "masterly inactivity". 'We read of the Punjab 
School and the Sind School. Sometimes it is almost made 
to appear, for journalistic convenience, ` as though there 
could be only two possible policies for the British and 
Indian governments to pursue in respect of the North-West 
frontier and Central Asia; that these policies retained 
their identity in all circumstances; and that a man who 
had elected to follow one - who had, so to speaks picked 
his side - was certain to follow it for the rest of his 
life. 
The history of British rule in India affords' evidence 
enough of the influence which one man or a small group of 
men could exert. The decision to crush Tipu Sultan, for 
example, was very much the personal decision of Wellesley. 
(2) 
But it was a decision which he took after considering 
facts which he believed or knew to exist. Political- 
policies are seldom, if ever, advanced for the sake of 
advancing them. Men embark on policies because they 
believe in them; not, as they might tell a story or make 
a joke, to provide amusement or pass the time. The facts 
on which they base their policies may be wrongly under- 
stood and variously interpreted; the deductions from 
them may differ widely. These considerations are 
relevant to an assessment of the wisdom of a particular 
policy; but it is quite another thing to suggest, as is 
sometimes done, - that the non-intervention and the forward 
policies were the creation, the patent or the whim of 
certain individuals; of Lord Lawrence and Lord Lytton, 
for example. It is equally idle to be dogmatic about 
schools of opinion. John Jacob's plan for the British 
occupation of Quetta is often regarded as the first sign 
of the re-emergence of the forward policy after the 
disasters of the first Afghan War; and since this plan 
was also substantially that of Frere and Green, both Sind 
men, it is regarded as the peculiar mark of the "Sind 
School" and therefore as antipathetic to the "Punjab 
School". And yet, as we shall see, it was also held by 
two very notable members of the "Punjab School", Edwardes 
and H. B. Lumsden. 
Another danger in dealing with the subject of this 
(3) 
thesis is to imagine that the problem of British relations 
with Afghanistan and Central Asia was sui generis, 
involving considerations which were utterly peculiar to 
it. Yet no Governor-General of India had an infinite 
choice of alternatives. The alternatives which came to 
be known as the forward policy and the non-intervention 
policy in respect of the North-West frontier existed, for 
example, in respect of Mysore in 1798-99. Indeed, they 
are among the most elementary of political choices. In 
an area so fluid as India in the eighteenth century a 
particular Power was bound either to go'forward or to halt. 
Each course-had its own dangers. This condition of 
fluidity existed-in respect of Afghanistan and Central 
Asia after it had ceased to exist in respect of India. 
The dangers anticipated from Russian intervention in and 
through Persia and Afghanistan were roughly paralleled by 
the dangers (to which Wellesley was so sensitive) of French 
intervention in and through Mysore. Those who later 
pointed to the difficulties which the Russians would have 
encountered in Afghanistan might have supported their case 
by a letter which Arthur Wellesley wrote to John Malcolm 
on 20th June 1803: 
"The more I see of the Mahrattas, the more convinced 
I am that they could never have any alliance with 
the French, The French, on their arrival, would 
want equipments, which would cost money, or money 
(4) 
to procure them; and there is not s. Mahratta in 
the whole country, from the Peshwa down to the 
lowest horseman, who has a shilling or who would 
not require assistance from them". 
The danger of thinking that policy in respect of 
Afghanistan differed from 
. 
policy_ in respect of every other 
country was very, strongly put by Henry Lawrence in his 
Defence of Macnaghten (1843). Lawrence was concerned 
to point out that what had happened at Kabul was not some- 
thing which could not happen anywhere else: it could 
easily, happen, for. instance, in Delhi. 
"I wish, moreover, 
"to 
point out that the mode of 
operation so pertinaciously styled "the Afghan 
system", and currently linked with the name of 
the late envoy, as if, with all iteerrors, it 
had originated with him, is essentially our 
Indian system; that it existed with all its 
defects when air William Macnaghten was in his 
cradle, and flourishes in'our own provinces now 
that he is in his grave". 1 
It is worth while observing, also, that the temptation to 
intervention or annexation is the greater if the supreme 
authority in the "victim" state is precarious or challenged. 
It-, Was the failure of the Peshwa to maintain his authority, 
especially after the death of Nana Farnavis in 1800, which 
led to the Treaty of Bassein (1802) and British intervention. 
It was the disintegration of the authority of Ranjit Singh 
which precipitated the first Sikh War after his death in 
1. J. L. Morison: Lawrence of Lucknow, p. 335 (1934). 
0 
(5) 
1839. The roles of puppet king and nationalist pretender, 
of Shah Shuja and Dost Moharmaad, were only too easy to fill. 
It will be obvious from what follows that the policy 
of the Indian government was bound to be affected, however 
indirectly, by what happened in countries as far removed 
as Poland and Armenia. It is important to remember, also, 
how much Indian policy was affected by British party 
politics; by the result of general elections in which India 
was not in the least degree an issue. If Peel's government 
of 1834-35 had lasted longer Lord Heytesbury and not Lord 
Auckland would have gone out to India as Governor-General. 
Both the first and the second Afghan Wars ultimately became 
important issues in British politics, and the policies 
followed, in the one case by a Whig and in the other by a 
" Conservative government, were none the better for that. 
-, There only remains one more point to make in this 
introductory chapter. The wisdom of a policy depends upon 
what could be known or reasonably anticipated at the time 
when the policy was formed or executed. The mere fact that 
Auckland was in error in 1838 does not necessarily mean that 
Lytton was in error in 1878. The growth of the Russian 
empire in Central Asia, the development of railway communi- 
cation in India - these and many other factors make it 
necessary to judge every policy on its merits as they 
existed at the time. 
c6 i 
0HAPTER2 
BRITISH RELATIONS WITH PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN, 1798 - 1838 
When in 1809 Theophilius Metcalfe arrived. in Calcutta 
it was to find his brother Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe 
"negotiating with a semi-fabulous chieftain on the edges 
of Central Asia". The phrase is that of the most recent 
biographer of Lord Metcalf el and it is not clear whether or 
not it was ever used by Theophilius Metcalfe. But it has 
the merit, since Charles Metcalfe's mission was to Ranjit 
Singh, of taking the Punjab-out of its later geographical 
context as part of British India and putting it in its true 
contemporary place as part of the Central Asian structure. 
This structure was as fluid, and therefore as menacing 
or as alluring, from the British point of view as that of 
Central or Southern India had ever been. The two major 
powers at the end of the eighteenth century were Persia and 
Afghanistan, and although_a detailed history of their 
relations is. unnecessary here, a brief survey of them is 
desirable. In 1747 Nadir Shah of Persia - "terrible to 
Asia and the undoubted arbiter-of the. East", in the words 
of-the English traveller, Jonas Hanway - was murdered. His 
conquests, of Herat, Kandahar, 'Kabul, Peshawar, Sind, 
I. Edward Thompson: The Life of Charles, Lord Metcalfe, 
p. 104 (1937). 
(7) 
Bokhara and Khiva, had restored and extended Persian power 
sufficiently to justify Hanway's phrase; and he had raided 
successfully as far as Delhi. In his later years an Afghan 
contingent had been among his most loyal supporters and it 
was very much in the hands of these men, on their return to 
Kandahar, that the choice of an Afghan ruler lay. The 
choice fell on Ahmad Shah of the Abdali tribe, a name which 
he forthwith changed to Durani, and the rise of Afghanistan 
as a nation can properly be dated from his reign. l 
The immediate consequence. was a drastic change in the 
balance of power in Central Asia. Ahmad Shah, after 
securing Kabul, Ghazni and Peshawar, attempted an invasion 
of the Punjab in 1748, only to be defeated at Manipur. A 
second and more successful attempt in 1748-49 led to his 
securing the promise of tribute. In 1750-51 he captured 
Herat, Meshed and Nishapur and a third invasion secured him 
the cession of the Punjab and Multan in 1751-52. To 
Afghanistan, however, the Punjab was at best a tributary 
kingdom which might be ceded, lost, conquered and re-conquered 
but could never be securely held. By 1757 it had fallen 
under the sway of the Mahrattas, and although Abmad Shah 
defeated them at Paniput in 1761, the ultimate gainers from 
1. Sir Percy Sykes: A History of Afghanistan, 2 vols., (1940); 
cited as Sykes, Afghanistan. 
a 
(8) 
that battle were rather the East India Company than the 
Afghans. Meanwhile, there hail been growing up in the 
Punjab, from the later fifteenth century, the power of the 
Sikhs; at first as a religious and then, under persecution, 
as a military sect. Ahmad Shah defeated the Sikhs in 1762 
but on his inevitable retirement they gradually rallied and 
although he retained Peshawar he, in effect, abandoned the 
central Punjab to them. 
When Ahmad Shah died in 1773 he was succeeded by Timur 
Shah during whose twenty years' reign Afghan power weakened 
and contracted, notably by the virtual independence gained 
by Sind. Nevertheless, his successor, Zaman Shah, was the 
ruler of an empire which included Kabul, Kandahar, Kashmir, 
Peshawar, Lahore, Balkh, Kulu, Multan and Herat, with claims 
over Kalat, Baluchistan and Sind. He invaded the Punjab in 
1796 and 1797 and, so far as it is possible to assign a date 
to such developments, it is from this time that we may date 
the beginning - the very tentative beginningl - of British 
policy in Central Asia., 
1. "8o incurious was the Government of India about the North 
that the Himalayas remained unexplored until 1810, and the 
official map-makers, down to and including Major James 
Rennell, relied almost entirely upon the reports of Jesuit 
missionaries. The geography and politics of Persia and 
Afghanistan were similarly neglected ... " H. W. C. Davis, "The Great Game in Asia (1800-1844): 
Proceedings of the British Academy, 1926, p. 228. 
(9) 
Wellesley, the Governor-General, was always sensitive 
to any. "outside's threat and in his view such a threat seemed 
to be developing when in 1798 Zaman Shah desired, or rather 
required, British co-operation in the Punjab, where he had 
reappeared. 
"He should consider our not joining his royal 
standard, and our not assisting him in the 
restoration of Shah Alluni and in the total 
expulsion of the Mahrattas, _in 
the light of 
an act of disobedience and enmity". 
1 
Wellesley, who quoted thus, had his own plans, shortly to 
be put into execution, for dealing with the Mahrattas; and 
they were not meant for the benefit of Afghanistan. Zaman 
Shah he regarded not as a potential ally but as a potential 
enemy, who might very well try to penetrate as far as 
Lucknow. In Wellesley's view the Sikhs, the Rajputs and 
even the Mahrattas could form a useful barrier against 
Afghan designs. But another obvious check to Afghanistan 
was Persia, and Wellesley employed Mehdi Ali Khan, the 
Company's resident at Buchire, to induce Persia to distract 
Zaman Shah's attention. Enough was done by Persia, which 
aspired to recover Herat and Kandahar, for this purpose 
and in January 1801, two Anglo-Persian treaties were con- 
cluded through the agency of John (afterwards Sir John) 
1. M. Martin: Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of The Marquis Wellesley, Vol. I, p. 262. Wellesley to Sir James 
Craig, 16th September 1798 (5 vols., 1838-37). 
(10) 
Malcolm. ' One was commercial. The other was designed 
against both the Afghans and the French. If ever the King 
of the Afghans should "show a resolution to invade India" 
the Persian army "overthrowing mountains, furnished with all 
warlike stores" would lay waste the Afghan dominions: 
should any Afghan or French power commence war against 
Persia, Britain should send "as many cannon and warlike 
stores as possible" to one of the Persian ports: should a 
French army attempt to attack Persian territory a "conjunct" 
Anglo-Persian force would attack it. 
2 
In point of fact the Afghan threat to India was dimin- 
ishing. Zaman Shah's appointment of Ranjit Singh as 
Governor of Lahore in 1799 was an admission of failure and 
in the following year Zaman Shah himself was blinded and 
deposed. Mohammad Shah, his successor, had reigned only 
three years when he was defeated and deposed by his brother 
Shuja ul Mulk, the Shah Shuja whose fortunes were to be so 
long and so disastrously entwined with those of the British. 
As the civil war between the members of the reigning Saddozai 
family prepared the way for the victory of the Barakzai the 
1. 
2. 
1769-1833. Entered Company's service 1782; secretary to 
the Commander-in-Chief 1795-98; missions to Persia, 1799 - 1801,1808,1810; Governor of Bombay 1826-30; author of a History of Persia (1818) etc. 





danger to be apprehended from Afghanistan diminished in 
British eyes. But that from France seemed to be growing. 
In 1807 Napoleon I planned a highly ambitious design against 
India, which was to have included land expeditions through 
Central Asia and Egypt and a sea expedition round the Cape 
of Good Hope. For the land expeditions the help of Persia 
was essential and, to secure it, a mission under General 
Gardane was sent to Tehran. To Persia, the immediate 
danger was Russia, which had acquired Georgia in 1801. 
Since Russia was also, as a member since 1805 of the Third 
Coalition, an enemy of France, Gardane's arrival was opportune 
and his reception gratifying. On 7th May 1807 he was able 
to conclude the Treaty of Finkenstein by which Napoleon 
guaranteed the integrity of Persia and undertook to try to 
secure the restoration of Georgia: the Shah, on his part, 
binding himself to break off relations with the British and 
thus, in effect, join the Continental System. But when the 
Treaty of Tilsit was concluded shortly afterwards without any 
reference to Georgia it gradually became apparent to the 
Persians that they were being used as the mere tools of the 
French. 
To the British, Tilsit, with its combination of a French 
and a Russian threat, was ominous; and in 1808 four missions 
were despatched to the several parts of the vast area 
(12) 
involved. One of them, that of Alexander Seton to Sind, 
calls for little mention here: it produced the Treaty of 
22nd August 1809 by which the authorities of Sind bound 
themselves not to allow the settlement of "the tribe of the 
French" in their territories. ' Metcalfe's mission to 
Ranjit Singh made his reputation and was recognized to be 
a success of the first order. The substantive provision of 
the Treaty was contained in Article I- "the British 
Government will have no concern with the territories and 
subjects of the Rajah to the northward of the River Sutlej". 2 
By implication this allowed the Company to extend its 
protection over the Cis-Sutlej chiefs. 
Malcolm was the obvious choice for the mission to 
Persia but when he arrived he found that Persian hopes of 
French assistance had not been entirely dissipated and he was 
prevented from entering Tehran. This left the field open 
to Sir Harford Jones, representing not the Company but the 
British Crown, who, biding his time, presently secured the 
admission denied to Malcolm. The immediate result was the 
Treaty concluded on 12th March 1809.3 This was specifically 
described as a preliminary Treaty and was followed on 14th 
March 1812 by a "definitive" treaty, negotiated on the part 
1. Aitchison, Treaties, Vol. VII, pp. 34,35. 2. Ibid., V01.11, pp. 237-238. 
3. Ibid., Vol-VII, pp. 117-121. 
(13) 
of His Majesty's Government by Sir Gore Ouseley, Harford 
Jones' successor. There is no need to set out the detailed 
provisions of those two treatiesl since they were embodied 
in or superseded by those in the definitive treaty of 25th 
November 1814, This last treaty was concluded in the year 
after, and had to take account of, the Russo-Persian Treaty 
of Gulistan which ended the war of 1811-13 and inter alia 
cost Persia territory on the shores of the Caspian: its 
provisions are sufficiently important for some of them to 
be set out. 
Article I 
"The Persian Government judge it incumbent on them, 
after the conclusion of this definitive treaty, to 
declare all alliances with European nations in a 
state of hostility with Great Britain null and void, 
and hold themselves bound not to allow any European 
army to enter the Persian territory, nor to proceed 
towards India, nor to any of the ports of that 
country, and also not to allow any individuals of 
such European nations entertaining a design of 
invading India, or being at enmity with Great Britain 
whatever, to enter Persia. Should any of the 
European powers wish to invade India by the road of 
Kharizen, Taturistan, Bokhara, Samarkand, or other 
routes, His Persian Majesty engages to induce the 
kings and governors of those countries to oppose 
such invasion, as much as is in his power, either by the fear of his arms or by conciliatory measures. " 
Article 4 
"It having been agreed by an Article in the prelim- 
inary Treaty concluded between the high contracting 
parties that in case of any European nation invading 
1. Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 121-127. 
(14) 
Persia, should the-Persian government require 
the assistance of the English, the Governor 
-General of India, on the part of Great Britain, 
shall comply with the wish of the Persian govern- 
ment by sending from India the force required, 
with officers, ammunition and warlike stores, or, 
in lieu thereof, the English Government shall pay 
an annual subsidy, the amount of which shall be 
regulated in a definitive Treaty to be concluded 
between the high contracting parties; it is 
hereby provided that the amount of the said subsidy 
shall be two hundred thousand (200,000) Tomans 
annually. It is further agreed that the said 
subsidy shall not be paid in case the war with 
such European nation shall have been produced by 
an aggression on the part of Persia; and since 
the payment of the subsidy will be made solely 
for the purpose of raising and discipling an 
army, it is agreed that the English minister shall 
be satisfied of its being duly applied to the 
purpose for which it is assigned". 
Article 5 
"Should the Persian government wish to introduce 
European discipline among their troops, they are 
at liberty to employ European officers for that 
purpose, provided the said officers do not belong 
to nations in a state of enmity or war with Great 
Britain". 
Article 6 
"Should any European power be engaged in war with 
Persia when at peace with England, His Britannic 
Majesty engages to use his best endeavours to 
bring Persia and such European power to a friendly 
understanding. If, however, His Majesty's cordial 
interference should fail of success, England shall 
still, if required, in conformity with the stipu- lations in the preceding Articles, send a force 
from India or, in lieu thereof, pay an annual 
subsidy of two hundred thousand Tomans for the 
support of a Persian army so long as a war in the 
supposed case shall continue and until Persia shall 
make peace with such nation". 
(15) 
Article 8 
"Should the Afghans be at war with the British 
nation, His Persian Majesty engages to send 
an army against them in such force and 
in such 
manner as may be concerted with the English 
Government. The expense of such army shall 
be defrayed by the British Government in such 
manner as may be agreed upon at the period of 
its being required". 
Article 9 
"If war should be declared between the Afghans 
and Persians, the English Government shall not 
interfere with either party unless their 
mediation to effect a peace is solicited by 
both parties". 
It does not require a very close reading of this treaty of 
18141 to see that the advantage lay with Britain. Persia 
was bound to go to war if the Afghans were at war with 
Britain: Britain was not bound to go to war, indeed was 
explicitly prevented from going to war, with the Afghans 
if they were engaged in hostilities with Persia. Persia 
was bound to prevent any European army passing through 
Persian territory towards India: Britain was not bound 
to assist Persia in the event of hostilities with a 
European power if such hostilities had been produced by 
Persian aggression. It is perfectly clear that Britain 
was not prepared in 1814 to regard Persia as a buffer-state 
against Russia or as a counterweight to Afghanistan by 
1. Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 127-134. 
(16) 
defending Persian territory in any circumstances. Article 
3, indeed, described the purpose of the treaty as "strictly 
defensive", "aggression" as "an attack upon the territories 
of another State" and Russian and Persian territories as 
being determined "according to the admission of Great 
Britain, Persia and Russia". 
To return to the missions of 1808. ' The fourth of 
them, that of Elphinstone to Shah Shuja, was not allowed to 
proceed further than Peshawar: 'its fruit was a re-insurance 
treaty directed against a possible Franco-Persian combination 
which Shah Shuja engaged to prevent from passing through his 
territory; Britain bearing the cost of such opposition. ' 
It is interesting to observe that he was designated not as 
the King of Afghanistan but simply as the "King of Cabool" 
and that the rulers of Sind and Lahore were treated as 
independent sovereigns, without any mention of their remote 
allegiance to Afghanistan. It would seem that the Afghan 
state was regarded as non-existent, except perhaps in the 
treaty with Persia: at the same time Britain was obviously 
disinclined to'commit herself very far for or against any of 
the three powers of Russia, Persia and Afghanistan. 
While Elphinstone was at Peshawar, news came of the 
capture of Kandahar by Mohammad, whom Shuja had spared from 
1. Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 34,35. 
(1? ) 
execution and who had afterwards escaped. It was followed 
by the news of the defeat of an army sent to restore Afghan 
authority in Kashmir. A direct clash between the forces 
of Shah Shuja and those of Mohammad was now inevitable. It 
took place at Gandamak in 1809 and resulted in the defeat of 
Shuja and the restoration of Mohammad to what may be called 
the throne of Afghanistan. Shuja, after many vicissitudes, 
including a spell of imprisonment by Ranjit Singh at Lahore, 
sought asylum in British India while 'atheh Khan ruled 
Afghanistan in the name of Mohammad. He was successful in 
restoring Afghan authority over Baluchistan, over Kashmir 
and, for a time, over Sind. In the operations in Kashmir 
the Sikhs assisted the Afghans and, not receiving their 
promised reward, seized Attock in lieu; defeating an Afghan 
force under Dost Mohammad. It was Dost Mohammad who was the 
occasion of his brother, Fatheh Ali's, fall. In 1816, 
Firoz ud-din, a brother of Mohammad, who had been governor of 
Herat since 1800, appealed for help against the advance of 
Persian forces. The help came, under Fatheh All, but Dost 
Mohammad, who was with his army, violated the harem of the 
governor. In consequence of the anger aroused at Kabul, 
particularly on the part of Mohammad's son, Kamran, Fatheh 
All on his return was disgraced, blinded and eventually 
flayed alive. The revulsion against this act led to the 
(i8) 
downfall of the Saddozai dynasty in 1818; save that 
Mohammad and Kamran found sanctuary in Herat. The rest of 
Afghanistan fell into the hands of the Barakzai, Dost 
Mohammad and his brothers. 1 Dost Mohammad succeeded in 
establishing himself at Kabul. Kaye, after balancing his 
merits and defects, pronounced him as "towering above" his 
contemporaries: "no Affghan prince in the present century 
has shown himself more fit to govern". It is essential, 
however, to understand that Dost Mohammad was not at this 
time King of Afghanistan in the sense in which George IV 
was King of England: he was one of the chiefs of the 
reigning (and strictly speaking usurping) family; at the 
best primus inter pares, constantly threatened by the 
treachery of his brothers and by the efforts at restoration 
on the part of the exiled Shah Shuja. 
The foregoing narrative is both tedious and complicated 
but it may serve to indicate the extremely complex situation 
to which the British had to adapt a policy. Of the four 
states with which the Company was immediately concerned, 
Sind, the Punjab, Afghanistan and Persia, the first was 
1. Sykes, Afghanistan, Vol. l, C. XXVII; and v. an article by 
Sir John W. Kaye in the Calcutta Review, Vol. VII, pp. 5-66, 
January 1847, on "Dost Mahommed Khan". Fatheh All was 
the eldest and Dost Mohammad the twentieth son of Paianda 
Khan, chief of the Barakzai who had risen to high authority 
under Timur Shah but had been executed by Zaman. The 
blinding and deposition of Zaman was primarily an act of 
revenge for the death of his father on the part of Fatheh 
All. 
(19) 
suspect and the other three in a condition of violent 
activity. In 1826, Persia went to war again with Russia, 
her action in doing so being sufficiently "aggressive" to 
exempt Britain from participation under the treaty of 1814. 
She was obliged to conclude the humiliating Treaty of 
Turkomanchai in 1828. Thereafter, as was only natural, 
Russian influence grew in Tehran as British influence 
declined. It was apparently the object of Russia, at this 
stage, to use Persia as a catspaw or what would be called 
today a "puppet". That, at least, is the view of Kaye, who 
spoke of the Russian design 
"to use the resources of the Persian State in 
furtherance of its own ends without overtly 
taking possession of them, and thus bringing 
itself into collision with other powers". 1 
Kaye was a sober historian and if he believed, as he did, 
that the Persian expedition against Khorassan in 1832 was 
probably instigated by and certainly coincided with the 
wishes of Russia, he was not reflecting the view of an 
isolated alarmist. Alarm deepened when in 1833 Mohammad 
Mirza prepared an attack on Herat. It was interrupted for 
the moment by the death of the Shah, who was succeeded, after 
1. J. W. Kaye: History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. I, p. 154. 3 vols., 1878. This is the fourth edition, the first being published in 1851. Cited as Kaye, Afghanistan. 
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a very short intervening reign, by Mohammad 
Mirza, a Russo- 
phil, himself. In 1835 Palmerston instructed Ellis, the 
Minister at Teheran, "to warn the Persian Government against 
allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war against the 
Afghans""; l but there was no obvious way of making that 
warning effective. 
To the east the situation was complicated not only by 
the internal anarchy of Afghanistan after 1818 but by 
the 
course of relations between the Afghans and Ranjit Singh. 
Metcalfe's treaty of 1809, whether by accident or design, 
had diverted Ranjit Singh's ambitions to the north. In the 
ensuing years the Sikhs had established themselves in Attock 
and Multan, to some extent in Kashmir and had twice, in 1818 
and 1823, seized Peshawar. On the second occasion Ranjit 
Singh had left an Afghan governor there. The Sikh 
possession of Peshawar was one of the two or three most 
important factors in the situation. There were many who 
believed that it entailed more risk and expense than Ranjit 
Singh cared for and that he might well have been willing at 
any time to entrust it to a tributary governor. At the same 
time it provided a standing temptation for him to support a 
claimant to supreme authority in Afghanistan who, as the price 
of that support, should guarantee him continued possession 
1. Kaye, Afghanistan, Vol. I, pp. 159,160. 
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(whether through an Afghan governor or not) of the city. 
It was also arguable, from the British side, that the 
further Ranjit Singh became committed in Afghanistan the 
less was he likely to interfere in Sind or to the south of 
the Sutlej. A claimant to the throne of Afghanistan 
existed in British territory in the person of Shah Shuja, 
living at Ludhiana on a pension of £5,000 a year paid by the 
Company. At Ludhiana, too, was the British resident, 
Captain Claude Wade, l whose residency was in effect. the 
advanced diplomatic headquarters for relations with Afghan- 
istan and the Punjab; Persia being the immediate concern of 
the Foreign Office. 
There were, broadly speaking, three alternative lines 
for British policy in the north-west of India in the 
eighteen-thirties. Metcalfe, who became Acting Governor- 
General in 1835, represented the views of the Wellesley 
school which may be summarized as the extension and 
consolidation of British power to the south and east of the 
Sutlej. This had been shown, in the course of the wars 
1. J. D. Cunningham's A 
-History of 
the Sikhs, contains a great deal of first-hand material, based on letters written by 
and to Wade; to whom Cunningham was appointed assistant in 1837. Wade's admiration for the Sikhs and for Ranjit Singh is strongly reflected by Cunningham. The first edition of the book was published in 1849. The edition used here and cited as Cunningham, Sikhs, is that of 1918, edited by H. L. O. Garrett. 
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against Tipu Sultan and the Mahrattas, to imply the subjug- 
ation of any native state that stood in the way, but it did 
not imply a policy of indefinite expansion. Incidentally, 
Metcalfe illustrates very well the danger of using such a 
word as "interventionist" or "annexationist" as though it 
were an accurate and permanent description of some human 
species. He had been an annexationist and an intervention- 
ist in his day in respect of certain states but by 1830-he 
had a clear limit in his own mind and was not to be 
frightened out of it. In October of that year he wrote as 
follows: 
"Twenty-two years ago the writer of this minute was 
empowered to negotiate an alliance against a French 
invasion with a Native State beyond our north-western 
frontier. A French invasion was our bugbear then, 
as a Russian one is now. Abdullah Mehrou, at the 
head of a French army, was reported to have reached 
Ispahan. But the Spanish insurrection broke out. 
Sir Arthur Wellesley beat the French at Roleia and 
Vimiera. The vision of Abdullah Mehrou and his 
legions vanished, and we thought no more of a French 
invasion. If, therefore, I were asked what is 
best to be done with a view to a Russian invasion, 
I should say that it is best to do nothing until 
time shall show us what we ought to do, because 
there is nothing that we can do in our present 
blind state that would be of any certain benefit. "1 
It may very well be that such a man as Metcalfe, who 
had been in India continuously since 1801, did not appreciate 
1. E. Thompson, op-cit., pp. 283,284. The exact date 'of the Minute is not given. The opinion of the commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Pane, in 1837, was almost exactly the same as Metcalfe's. v. Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 497(1929). 
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the full force of the Russophobia which was developing in 
England. This is not a criticism of his views but-there 
may be ground for criticism on another point. Metcalfe 
seemed to assume the existence of a Sikh state which would 
be both stable and friendly. Ranjit Singh, On the whole, 
had observed his treaty of 1809 loyally; but he would not 
live for ever and it was very difficult to say what would 
happen in the Punjab or what would be the course of Sikh 
ambitions after his death. 
The second possible line of policy, based on an 
admission of the danger from Russia and on unwillingness to 
depend indefinitely on the goodwill of the Sikhs, would have 
adopted Dost Mohammad as the ruler of an Afghan buffer-state 
and a protection against Russo-Persian designs. This policy 
has, in retrospect, certain obvious merits but they were not 
quite so obvious at the time. Dost Mohammad was not yet the 
ruler of Afghanistan: he was only one among the candidates 
for that distinction; support of him might be wasted and 
might alienate some other candidate who was ultimately to be 
successful. In the second place, it was almost certain that 
he would want to recover Peshawar; and British assistance in 
or condonation of such a project would probably involve a 
breach with Ranjit Singh who, whatever might happen to him in 
the future, was very much to be reckoned with in the present. 
(24) 
It was not outside the bounds of possibility that some 
agreement might be made through British mediation on the 
subject of Peshawar. But this would have demanded the 
most delicate negotiation; just as the discovery of Dost 
Mohammad's merits in the early 'thirties would have demanded 
an unusual degree of penetration. 
But could the policy of using Afghanistan as a friendly 
buffer-state be framed in such a way as to accord with Ranjit 
Singh's own designs? Or, to put it another way, could 
Ranjit Singh be given encouragement in designs which would 
keep him to the north of the Sutlej and would, at worst or 
at best, result-in no more than a continuance of the anarchy 
in Afghanistan? Something like this line of reasoning 
appears to have been adopted in respect of Shah Shuja's 
attempt to recover his throne in 1833-34. The ex-King had 
first to buy off the Ameers of Sind and Ranjit Singh, which 
he did by promising the one their formal independence 
(though for all that he had eventually to fight his way 
through Sind) and the other the continued possession of 
Peshawar. But he also needed money. He was now allowed 
an advance of a third of his annual pension and no warning 
was given him, as had_beeldone in 1832, that if he failed 
(25) 
he could not return to British territory. 1 
"Such an act", Sir Henry Durand was to write later, 
"could not fail in the East of being construed into a 
material and effectual countenance of the Shah's designs". 
2 
It certainly could not, in the East or anywhere else. The 
scheme as a whole provided the basis for that of 1838, just 
as the treaty concluded between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja 
provided the basis for the better-known Tripartite Treaty of 
1838. In justice to Lord Auckland it is only fair to 
remember that the policy of 1833-34 was that of his predec- 
essor, Lord William Bentinck. To describe it as a policy, 
indeed, is to praise it beyond its merits: it was no more 
than a piece of opportunism and like most of such actions it 
was only half-heartedly supported, as though its sponsors 
were ashamed of it. The question which it naturally 
occurred to Dost Mohammad to ask Wade was whether the first 
1. Cunningham, Sikhs, p. 198. Cunningham makes it clear how 
anxious the Company was to divert Ranjit Singh from Sind, 
e. g. p. 203. The opening-up of the Indus to commerce was 
one of the fashionable ambitions of the day. 
2. Sir Henry Durand: The First Afghan War and its Causes (1879), 
p. 19. This book was written rather over thirty years before 
its publication and constitutes one of the most trenchant 
criticisms of British policy and operations in Afghanistan. 
Durand himself had taken a distinguished part, as an 
engineer officer, in the earlier stages of the operations. 
He subsequently became private secretary to Lord Ellen- 
borough, political agent at Gwalior and in Central India 
during the Mutiny, member of Council in 1859, foreign 
secretary in 1867 and lieutenant-governor of the Punjab 
from 1870 to his accidental death in the following year. 
v. Sir Mortimer Durand. 
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evidence of British support of Shah Shuja was to be followed 
by others and more substantial ones. "Wade replied that 
the Government of India had taken no part in the expedition 
but that Shah Shuja had their best wishes". 1 
In these circumstances Dost Mohammad could only conclude 
that his rival would get no more support from his backers 
and might be opposed with impunity so far as the British 
were concerned. Shah Shuja, after defeating the Ameers of 
Sind in January 1841 and making his way through the Boolan 
Pass, was besieging Kandahar when Dost Mohammad's relieving 
army appeared. In the ensuing battle Shah Shuja was 
defeated and fled, ultimately finding his way back to 
Ludhiana. Dost Mohammad's prestige was correspondingly 
increased but it is significant that he did not yet feel 
himself in the position when he might properly be proclaimed 
king; he contented himself with taking the title of Ameer- 
ul-Muminin, "Commander of the Faithful". The precarious 
nature of his power was soon made evident. Ranjit Singh, 
taking advantage of Shah Shuja's incursion, had occupied 
Peshawar again. Dost Mohammad set out on an expedition to 
re-conquer the city but his army melted away as his sardars 
yielded themselves to the bribes offered by Ranjit Singh 
1. Sykes, Afghanistan, Vol. I, pp. 395,396. Sykes describes Wade's reply as "a most improper letter for a British 
official to have written". 
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through the agency of an American. adventurer, Harlan. Dost 
Mohammad was obliged to retreat and although his son, Akbar 
Shan, turned on a Sikh force and defeated it at Jamrud in 
1837, Peshawar remained in Sikh hands. 
Thus threatened by the Sikhs on the east and, more 
remotely, by the Persians on the west, with the most flagrant 
evidence of disloyalty and enmity all around him in Afghan- 
istan, it was not surprising that Dost Mohammad should seek, 
despite the late activities of Shah Shuja, to place himself 
on good terms with the Government of India. He wrote, 
therefore, to Lord Auckland on 31st May 1836. 
"The late transactions in this quarter, the conduct 
of the reckless and misguided Sikhs and their 
breach of the treaty are well known to your lord- 
ship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest 
itself to your wisdom, for the settlement of the 
affairs of this country, that it may serve as a 
rule for my guidance". 1 
Auckland's reply was written on 22nd August 1836. It was 
in part a plain refusal to offer advice or accept responsib- 
ility of any kind. 
"You are aware that it is not the practice of the 
British government to interfere with the affairs 
of other independent states; and indeed it does 
not immediately occur to me how the interference 
of my Government could be exercised on your behalf". 
So far, perhaps, so good, but Auckland added that he would 
1. Kaye, Afghanistan, Vol. I, p. 170; Parl. Papers, (1839) (2), 
Vol. XL, p. 3. 
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probably soon "depute some gentleman" to discuss certain 
commercial topics with Dost Mohammad. 
l Here, if neutrality 
were really his aim, the Governor-General was proceeding 
into dangerous ground: he must at least make sure that the 
"gentleman" despatched to Kabul was one who would restrict 
the range of his discussions. The agent selected was 
Alexander Burnes, who arrived in Kabul in September 1837. 
The character and merits of Burnes have been very 
variously assessed. The scandalous and indefensible action 
of the Whig Government in omitting from the Parliamentary 
Papers published in 1839 communications from Burnes favour- 
able to Dost Mohammad and thus favourable to the accuracy of 
Burnes's judgment has created a natural desire to do full 
justice to a man whose actions were misrepresented. 
"I cannot, indeed, suppress the utterance of my 
abhorrence" - said Kaye - "of this system of 
garbling the official correspondence of public 
men - sending the letters of a statesman or 
diplomatist into the world mutilated, emascul- 
ated - the very pity and substance of them cut 
out by the unsparing hand of the state-anatomist. 
The dishonesty by which lie upon lie is palmed 
on the world has not one redeeming feature ... The character of Dost Mahomed has been lied away; 
the character of Burnes has been lied away. 
Both, by the mutilation of the correspondence 
of the latter, have been fearfully misrepresented - both have been set forth as doing what they did 
not, and omitting to do what they did ... The 
1. Kaye, Afghanistan, Vol. I, pp. 170,171. 
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cause of truth must be upheld. Official 
documents are the sheet-anchors of historians - 
the last court of appeal to which the public 
resort. If these documents are tampered with; 
if they are made to misrepresent the words and 
actions of public men, the grave of truth is 
dug and there is seldom a resurrection". 
1 
Every word of this is true but it does not mean that Burnes 
was a man whose life and career were beyond reproach. Kaye 
noticed his instability. 
"He was a man of an eager impulsive temperament; 
the slightest vicissitudes of the political 
atmosphere readily affected his mercurial 
nature; and he'did not always think before he 
spoke. Hence it is that auch varying opinions 
have been attributed to him - all perhaps with 
equal truth". 2 
A man who, though capable of sharp flashes of insight (as 
Burnes was), is yet fundamentally unstable, was the last man 
in the world to be sent on such a mission as that to Kabul in 
1837; or, perhaps, to be given serious diplomatic work at 
all. it was a grave reflection on the government of India 
that they chose Burnes; an almost equally grave reflection 
if they had no one else to send. They were now paying the 
penalty for not having built up a body of reasonably accurate 
knowledge about trans-Indus affairs: the result was that they 
were only too eager to snatch at such information as was 
offered them and at the services of men who seemed to possess 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 203,204. 
2. Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 173,174. 
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that information. As late as 1828 the reports of such 
travellers as Moorcroft had been neglected: Burnes's 
accountl of his travels through Afghanistan to Bokhara and 
Tehran made him a marked man. It stimulated his immense 
ambition, the ambition which led him to defy and reverse 
his own judgments and to magnify the importance of the 
activities in which he was engaged. 2 
The situation which Burnes found at Kabul needed the 
coolest judgment because it abounded in factors which were, 
superficially, of the gravest import. A Persian army was 
on its way to the siege of Herat, which opened in November 
1837. The sardars of Kandahar, chief among them Kohun Dil 
Khan, a brother of Dost Mohammad's, were known to be in 
1. Travels into Bokhara, 3 vols., 1834. 
2. Thus, Burnes, after presenting a point of view favourable 
to Dost Mohammad, accepted the appointment of assistant to 
Macnaghten as political agent in an expedition designed to 
drive Dost Mohammad from power. On his arrival at Kabul 
in 1837 Burnes almost immediately transformed his mission 
from a commercial to a political one and, in the opinion 
of Sir Henry Durand, a bitter critic, performed his duties 
deplorably. "Burnes's conduct at Kabul was no less wanting 
in decorum, which in a Mussulman country is seldom departed 
from, than in diplomatic caution and reserve. His behav- 
iour in this respect, coupled with his undignified bearing, 
speedily lost him the respect of the chiefs and people". 
Durand cites Masson (whom he met in January 1839) to the 
effect that the Afghans would have been ready to laugh at Vitkevich's pretensions had not Burnes himself taken them 
so seriously. The First Afghan War and its Causes, p. 42 
and n. Cited as Durand, First Afghan War. 
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communication with the Persians. On 19th December 1837, a 
Russian officer, Captain Vitkevich, entered Kabul, in the 
character of an official Russian agent; a character which 
was afterwards repudiated and which, very probably, he never 
possessed. Throughout the winter of 1837-38, Dost Mohammad, 
now engaged in negotiations with Burnes from which all 
commercial pretences were removed, was trying to get sub- 
stantive assistance from the British on one point or another. 
Herat, it would seem, was not his most immediate concern, 
since it was held by his enemy Kamran; he was more interested 
in Kandahar and still more in Peshawar. By March 1838 his 
demands were rising: he wanted British protection of Kabul 
and Kandahar from Persia and the surrender of Peshawar by 
Ranjit Singh. Burnes's conduct of his mission had been such 
as to encourage Dost Mohammad in the belief that some 
tangible evidence of British support would be given him, but 
it was now evident that Burnes had acted without instructions 
or in excess of them. He was empowered to offer nothing 
tangible and on 26th April 1838 he concluded a mission which 
had merely raised expectations that could not be fulfilled. 
It was natural that Dost Mohammad should turn, in some 
degree, towards the Russians and the Persians; however 
reluctantly. 
This was a moment when British India needed, above all 
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else, a ruler who would impose his intellectual and moral 
authority. It did not possess such a ruler in Auckland. 
Sir Henry Durand, in a telling phrase, described Auckland 
as "afloat on a sea of conjecture". This was true and 
there were men enough to supply the conjectures - Burnes, 
Wade at Ludhiana, Macnaghten, Colvin and Torrens in the 
secretariat. Other conjectures, suggestions, warnings, 
came from the Home government, now extremely anxious over 
Russo-Persian machinations; and, in the background there 
was a widespread fear, vague but real, that British power 
in India, in default of some positive and strikingly success- 
ful action, was in danger of catastrophe. 1 
In the face of this apprehension a policy of pure 
neutrality in trans-frontier affairs was not easy, certainly 
for such a man as Auckland, to maintain; although it seems 
1. cf. Cunningham, Sikhs, p. 218. "The rumours of a northern 
invasion were-eagerly received and industriously spread 
by the vanquished princes of India, and the whole country 
vibrated with the hope that the uncongenial domination 
of the English was about to yield to the ascendancy of 
another and less dissimilar race. The recall of Capt. 
Burnes from Kabul gave speciousness to the wildest state- 
ments; the advantages of striking some great blow became 
more and more obvious ... ". Cunningham adds, in a note to the same page, "The extent to which this feeling" (of the impending fall of the British) was prevalent is known to those who were observers of Indian affairs at the time, and it is dwelt upon in the Governor-General's 
minute of the 20th Aug. 1839". 
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to have been his policy at least as late as February 1838.1 
In a sense that, was Wade's policy too, but, for him neutrality 
meant not mere inaction but a constant (and possibly unscrup- 
ulous) balancing of forces. Wade had no particular 
objection to Dost Mohammad retaining Kabul but if he showed 
signs of greater aspirations then, in Wade's view, "friendly 
assurances to the Kandahar brothers, and a hint that the 
Sikhs were at liberty to march on Kabul, would have given 
Dost Mohammad a proper sense of his insignificance". 2 . The 
danger, to which this policy might lead arose from the very 
different positions of Dost Mohammad and Ranjit Singh: the 
one was weak and only a remote threat to British India; the 
other was strong and might constitute a real threat if he 
chose to turn his. attention to the south of the Sutlej. it 
was not beyond the bounds of possibility that some modus 
vivendi might have been arrived at between Ranjit Singh and 
Dost Mohammad over Peshawar but the Indian government would 
not take the risk of putting pressure upon Ranjit Singh to 
this end. Except in so far as Dost Mohammad might serve as 
a barrier to Russo-Persian designs the Government of India 
appears to have had no particular use for or interest in him 
l., v. his letter of 8th February 1838, Parl. Papers, 1859 (2) 
XXV, 283. 2. Cunningham, Sikhs, p. 218 and note, referring to blade's letters of 15th May and 28th October 1837. 
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at this time. The possible exception brings us 
back to 
the subject of Herat. 
It was widely assumed, both in England and in India, 
that Herat represented a position from which a successful 
attack could be launched upon Afghanistan and, through 
Afghanistan, upon India. Unfortunately, the belief that 
Persia, in attacking Herat, was supposed to be acting in the 
interests of Russia, blinded many contemporaries to what 
would be called today the "logistics" of the situation. 
The more they thought about Herat the more important it 
seemed. 
"The advance from the figurative opinion of the 
British envoy in April 1836, who thought Persia 
a Russian first parallel of attack against 
India, to the assumption in April 1837 of Herat 
as our western frontier, marks the rapid progress 
of diplomatic alarm and rashness". 
., 
So Sir Henry Durand wrote some ten years later. He went on 
to argue that the Persian attack on Herat, though it might 
be unpalatable to Britain, "could not legitimately be 
construed into a hostile breach of a definitive treaty" and 
that Herat was useless to Persia. It took the Shah's 
forces, he pointed out, three months to reach Herat from 
Tehran. From Herat to Kandahar the distance was 370 miles, 
from Kandahar to Ferozepore 870 miles. Durand's conclusion 
was perfectly clear. 
i 
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"Fortresses so much in advance of the main 
territories and strength of a country as are 
Ghorian and Herat, with respect to Persia, 
add neither to the offensive nor defensive 
powers of a State, but compromise a certain 
portion of its strength in men and means by 
isolating them at a vast distance from support 
in the midst of a hostile country". 
l 
But only a man of singular strength of mind would have 
cared to imperil his reputation and his career in 1837 by 
arguing, either in London or Calcutta, that the fate of Herat 
was irrelevant to British interests in India. McNei112 
(Ellis's successor) from Tehran, Burnes from Kabul, Leech 
(one of Burnes's assistants) from Kandahar, Palmerston from 
the Foreign Office, Auckland from Calcutta, alarmed 
1. First Afghan War, pp. 31,63-65. Durand quoted at length 
(pp. 27,28) from a despatch sent by Ellis, Minister at 
Tehran, on 15th January 1836. Ellis was convinced that 
"Herat, once annexed to Persia, may become, according to 
the Commercial Treaty, the residence of a Russian consular 
agent, who would from thence push his researches and 
communications, secret and avowed, throughout Afghanistan. 
Indeed, in the present state of the relations between 
Persia and Russia, it cannot be denied that the progress 
of the former in Afghanistan is tantamount to the advance 
of the latter and ought to receive every opposition from 
the British Government that the obligations of public 
faith will permit". On the other hand, Ellis held that 
Britain had no rights of interference under the treaty 
of 1814. 
2. Sir John McNeill (1795-1883); A Company's surgeon in 
Bombay 1816-36; appointed to Tehran 1836; negotiated 
treaty of 1841; concerned with the supervision of the 
Scottish Poor Law 1845-78; one of the commissioners to 
enquire into the conduct of operations in the Crimea, 
1885. 
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themselves and each other into a state of the utmost excite- 
ment and indignation. Contrary to Ellis's opinion of 
January 1836 and contrary, as far as one can see, to the 
plain words of the treaty of 1814,1 McNeill and Palmerston 
had convinced themselves that the Persian action was a breach 
of that treaty, and on 13th April 1838 McNeill presented 
himself at the Persian camp before Herat and told the Shah 
that the Persian proceedings constituted a breach of treaty. 
Great Britain would be justified in denouncing the treaty 
and "in taking active measures to compel the withdrawal of 
the Persian army from Herat". The despatch on 19th June of 
a force from Bombay which seized the Persian island of 
Karrack was evidence that Palmerston and McNeill meant what 
they said but for the moment McNeill's influence faded before 
that of the Russian Minister, Count Simonich, who had 
1. v. the Articles of that treaty quoted supra. No European 
nation had invaded Persia; the Afghans were not at war 
with Britain; and in the case of a war between the 
Persians and Afghans Britain was bound to abstain from 
interference unless its mediation was sought by both 
parties. It was doubtful how far the Persian attack on 
Herat was an attack on the "Afghans". From the Persian 
point of view Herat was Persian and in any event Persian 
territories were to be determined, according to Article 
3 of the treaty, "according to the admission of Great 
Britain, Persia and Russia". Kamran, the nominal ruler 
of Herat, was at enmity with the reigning dynasty in 
Afghanistan and some members of that dynasty, the chiefs 
of Kandahar, were in favour of Persia. 
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followed him to Herat and, after his departure in the first 
week of June, put for the moment some life into the siege. 
' 
Such was the political and military situation in the 
trans-Indus region which Auckland had to consider in the 
early summer of 1838. In May of that year he was at Simla, 
where he was-deprived of the advice of his Council and, in 
1. Simonich's actions may well have been dictated and, in 
part, justified by the fact that an English officer, 
Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger of the Bombay army was in 
Herat, assisting, so far as he was allowed, in the 
defence. Pottinger's personal intervention may have 
saved the situation on the occasion of the Persian 
assault on 24th June. Otherwise, his advice was 
seldom asked and more seldom taken. Pottinger 
subsequently succeeded to the position of political agent 
at Kabul after Macnaghten was murdered and, having been 
made a hostage, escaped with his life in debacle of 
January 1842; only to die in the following year. The 
siege of Herat in 1837-38 was casual and ill-conducted on 
the Persian side and the Afghan defence was not a great 
deal better. 
An appendix in "Itinerary of the Route from Candahar to 
Herat", prepared by Captain Edward Sanders, Royal Engin- 
eers, in 1839, throws an interesting light on contemporary 
ideas of the importance of Herat. "The city of Herat is 
capable of being better fortified. This place, in the 
hands of Persia, would, from its geographical position, 
have a great influence over any expedition sent from 
Russia in the direction of India as an ally. It would 
keep in awe the peoples of Bokhara, Balk and Kandahar, 
and, by preserving its communications with the rear, 
permit it to advance without fear to conquest, but occupied 
by an enemy it could cause insurmountable obstacles". (p. 12). 
An editorial note to this passage says that "this view of 
a political position seen as existing some years ago in a 
country with which we have since had so much to do is by 
no means destitute of retrospective interest". The 
Itinerary is in a bound volume of Tracts on Afghanistan (n. d. in the Library of King's College, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
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all probability, thrown upon that of his secretariat, of 
whom Macnaghten was the chief. On 12th May 1838 Auckland 
set out in a Minute the views which he had come to hold. 
Of what he regarded as the three possible courses before 
him 
"The first to. confine our defensive measures to 
the line of the Indus and to leave Afghanistan 
to its fate; the second to attempt to save 
Afghanistan by granting succour to the existing 
chief ships of Caubul and Candahar; the third 
is to permit or to encourage the advance of 
Ranjit Singh's armies upon Caubul, under counsel 
and restriction, and as subsidiary to his advance 
to organize an expedition headed by Shah Shooja, 
such as I have above explained. The first 
course would be absolute defeat, and would leave 
a free opening to Persian and Russian intrigue 
upon our frontiers. The second would be only 
to give power to those who feel greater animosity 
towards the Sikhs, than they do against the 
Persians, and who would probably use against the 
former the means placed at their disposal; and 
the third course, which in the event of the 
successful resistance of Herat would appear to be 
most expedient, would, if the State were to fall 
into the hands of the Persians, have yet more to 
recommend it, and I cannot hesitate to say that 
the inclination of my opinion is, for the reasons 
which will be gathered from this paper, very 
strongly in favour of it ... "l 
The first assumption here is that Afghanistan had to be 
"saved" from the Persians and the Russians. It might have 
been more prudent to wait to see the effect of the expedition 
against Karrack which was to be launched in June and of 
1. Kaye, op. cit., pp. 318,319. 
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Palmerston's representations conveyed through McNeill but it 
is only fair to Auckland to say that he was not alone in 
suffering from the contemporary Russophobia and that the 
Home Government had shown no signs of attempting to wean him 
from it or of warning him that Russians and Persians were 
not politically synonymous. But if Afghanistan had to be 
"saved", what wps the objection to "saving" it by assisting 
the Afghan rulers of Kabul and Kandahar? The thin one that 
they would be more likely to use assistance granted them 
against the Sikhs than against the Persians. Then, was some 
other Afghan chief to be supported, who could be trusted to 
be more hostile to the Persians than to the Sikhs? Shah 
Shuja was the obvious candidate for this role but it is to be 
observed that his expedition was only to be subsidiary to the 
main expedition, that of Ranjit Singh; and that the expedit- 
ions were to be sent even if the resistance of Herat was 
successful. The introduction of the Sikhs was probably the 
result of Wade's influence: his suggestion that "a hint that 
the Sikhs were at liberty to march on Kabul would have given 
Dost Mohammad a proper sense of his insignificance" comes at 
once to mind. But two changes had come over policy since 
Wade wrote. A subordinate expedition under Shah Shuja was 
to be substituted for "friendly assurances to the Kandahar 
brothers" and the events at Herat, as well as the ground-swell 
(40) 
of discontent in India, had both enlarged the scope of 
the 
project and given it an air of necessity and urgency. The 
effect of the Russian threat on Auckland's own mind is amply 
illustrated by what he said in a letter to Hobhouse, 
President of the Board of Control, on 13th October 1838. 
"It will be for others to judge of my case and I 
will say nothing of it except that I could have 
made it stronger if I had not had the fear of 
Downing Street before my eyes, and thought it 
right to avoid any direct allusion to Russia". 
l 
The 'base" to which Auckland referred in this letter was the 
so-called "Simla manifesto" of lst October 1838 and it is 
necessary to go back a little to see how this came into 
being and what had happened in the months between Auckland's 
Minute of 12th May and its issue. From 31st May to 13th 
July Macnaghten was in attendance on Ranjit Singh. According 
to Kaye, Macnaghten tended to deprecate the existence of any 
palpable danger to be feared from the Russians, the Persians 
or the Barakzai sardars and attempted to inveigle Ranjit 
Singh into acting alone. This Ranjit Singh, who was not 
enthusiastic about the project and doubted whether his Sikhs 
would advance from Peshawar through the Khyber Pass, declined 
to consider. Macnaghten then agreed that there should also 
be an expedition under Shah Shuja, and the Tripartite Treaty 
1. Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 498, citing B. M. Add. 
MS$, 37694, f. 69. 
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was prepared. l 
There is, however, a passage in Cunningham's History of 
the Sikhs2 which must be noticed. "It was not", said 
Cunningham, referring to Ranjit Singh, "until he was told 
that the expedition would be undertaken whether he chose to 
share in it or not, that he assented to a modification of his 
own treaty with Shah Shujatl; and in a note Cunningham added, 
"That Ranjit Singh was told he would be left out 
if he did not choose to come in, does not appear 
on public record. It was, however, the only 
convincing argument used during the whole dis- 
cussions, and I think Major Mackeson was made 
the bearer of a message to that effect". 
Kaye tones this down to a statement that Ranjit Singh was 
told that the British might have to undertake the restoration 
of Shah Shuja themselves if the Sikhs failed to offer their 
co-operation. 3 It is not easy to reconcile the view that 
independent British action was used as a threat to secure 
Ranjit Singh's co-operation with the view4 that Ranjit Singh 
got the better of Macnaghten and got the British committed to 
the major share in the enterprise. What is clear, however, 
is that Ranjit Singh took a great deal of persuading into 
doing anything at all. 
1. Kaye, OP-cit., pp. 321-331. 
2. p. 220. 
3. op-. cit.,, p. 329 n. 
4. Advanced in the Cambridge History of India, Vol. V., p. 495. 
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Eventually, however, the draft of a treaty was agreed 
upon between Ranjit Singh and Macnaghten on 26th June 1838. 
It purported to revive and add to "with the approbation of 
and in concert with" the British Government the treaty 
concluded between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja in 1833. It 
bound Shah Shuja (who had not hitherto been consulted on the 
question of its revival) to disclaim title to all territory 
on either bank of the Indus which was possessed by Ranjit 
Singh, including Kashmir and Peshawar, and pay a subsidy of 
two lakhs of rupees for the maintenance by the Sikhs of a 
supporting force in Peshawar after "the attainment of his 
object" (Articles L. 16). Shah Shuja was also bound, by 
Article 13, to relinquish all claims to supremacy and arrears 
of tribute on the part of the Ameers of Sind, on condition of 
their payment to him of a sum to be settled by the mediation 
of the British Government. Article 17 precluded him from 
attacking or molesting the ruler of Herat, his nephew, and 
Article 18 from "entering into negotiation with any foreign 
state, without the knowledge and consent of the British and 
Sikh Governments" and obliged him "to oppose any power having 
the design to invade the British and Sikh territories by 
force of arms, to the utmost of his ability". l 
1. The text of the treaty is given by Aitchison, Treaties, 
Vol. II, pp. 251-256; by Kaye, o . cit., Vol. I, pp. 332-335; 
and by Cunningham, op. cit., pp. 389-393. 
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It is not too much to say that the'treaty consisted 
mainly of obligations or restrictions upon Shah Shuja in 
favour of his allies and it is not surprising that when 
Macnaghten, who arrived at Ludhiana on 15th July, began to 
read the draft the Afghan's comments were, in Kaye's words, 
"frequent and emphatic". He objected to the cession of 
Peshawar and still more to the obligation to pay two lakhB 
of rupees to the Sikhs, its possessors. But the temptation 
of regaining his throne, combined with Macnaghten's bland- 
ishments, led him to accept the treaty within two days. 
It was signed by Auckland at Simla on 25th July but in 
the interval of Macnaghten's absence, first at Lahore and 
" then at Ludhiana, the project had had the benefit of further 
discussion to which Burnes, Wade, Colvin and Torrens contri- 
buted. Burnes was still in favour of supporting Dost 
Mohammad but, since official opinion had set hard against that 
policy, he accepted the alternative of the consolidation of 
Afghanistan under Shah Shuja. His views prevailed over 
those of Wade who believed that an unconsolidated Afghanistan 
was better from the British point of view. The resources of 
Shah Shuja were only too obviously inadequate to the important 
role cast for him, even though he would recruit his contingent 
in British India, and Burnes suggested that the Indian govern- 
ment send two of its own regiments as an "honorary escort". 
(44) 
Burnes did not expect that they would have to fight: their 
purpose was to make fighting unlikely by showing the Afghans, 
beyond any possibility of doubt, that Shah Shuja had British 
support. It was apparently from this suggestion that direct 
British participation in the Afghan enterprise is to be 
traced, though even Macnaghten may have realized that it was 
necessary if such an alliance as he had constructed was to 
have any effect. In any event, as soon as British military 
participation was considered the opinion of the commander-in- 
chief became decisive. Sir Henry Fane, as we have seen, had 
expressed himself against trans-Indus enterprises in the 
previous year. But now that the decision in favour of such 
an enterprise had been taken and British troops were to take 
part in it, it fell to him to decide how many were necessary. 
He had little difficulty in securing Auckland's acquiesence 
and on 13th September he issued a general order for a rendez- 
vous of the corps selected at Karnal. On lst October 
Auckland followed with his manifesto. 
It began by representing the original object of Burnes's 
mission to Kabul as purely commercial, designed to gain the 
aid of the de facto rulers of Afghanistan in the opening of 
the Indus to navigation and commerce. But immediately, it 
appeared, Burnes had been obliged to turn aside to deal with 
political difficulties. One of these arose from the "sudden 
(45) 
and unprovoked attack" by the troops of Dost Mohamrnad on 
those of "our ancient ally, Maharajah Runjeet Singh". The, 
other arose from the actions and. intrigues of Persia. Dost 
Mohammad, instead of accepting British mediation in his 
quarrel with the Sikhs had, on the contrary, advanced "the 
most unreasonable pretensions"; "chiefly in consequence of 
his reliance upon Persian encouragement". He had also 
"avowed schemes of aggrandisement and ambition injurious to 
the security and peace of the frontier of India" and had 
"openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call 
in every foreign aid which he could command". As long as 
the Barakzai chiefs, disunited and unpopular as they were, 
had refrained from "proceedings injurious to our interests 
and security" the British Government had respected their 
authority. When their conduct dictated a different policy, 
that of having "on our western frontier an ally who is 
interested in resisting aggression's, the choice naturally fell 
on Shah Shuja, whose cause the Governor-General from the 
sense of a "pressing necessity, as well as every consideration 
of policy and justice" had resolved to support. The position 
of Ranjit Singh as well as his "undeviating friendship 
towards the British Government" made it just and proper that 
he should be offered participation in the contemplated 
(46) 
operations. The result of Mr. Macnaghten's mission had been 
the conclusion of a "triplicate" treaty. "His Majesty, 
Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk will enter Afghanistan, surrounded by 
his own troops, and will be supported against foreign and 
factious interference by a British army". When he should 
be secured in power "and the independence and integrity of 
Afghanistan established", the British army would be with- 
drawn. The security of British territories had dictated 
these measures but the Governor-General would "be enabled 
to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the 
Afghan people". ' 
It is scarcely necessary to attack a document which no 
historian has come forward to defend. In its day it 
established the record, perhaps, in sophistry and disingen- 
uousness. Macnaghten, who signed it, paid for his lies, or 
Auckland's lies, with his life. Yet one last chance of 
abandoning the project was offered, when the news came that 
the siege of Herat had been lifted, on 9th September. There 
is no need to try to determine whether the British seizure 
of Karrak and McNeill's formal warnings to the Shah of the 
consequences of his action were the cause of the Persian 
withdrawal or only an excuse for it. The fact of the 
1. v. Kaye, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 369-374 for the full text. 
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withdrawal was more important than the reasons for it. The 
question was whether the confirmation of it would lead 
Auckland, at the eleventh hour, to reconsider his policy. 
The answer to this question was contained in an Order 
published on 8th November. 
" "In giving publicity to this important intelligence, the Governor-General deems it proper at the same 
time to notify, that while he regards the relin- 
quishment by the Shah of Persia of his hostile 
designs upon Herat as a just cause of congratul- 
ation to the Government of British India and its 
allies, he will continue to prosecute with vigour 
the measures which have been announced, with the 
view to the substitution of a friendly for a 
hostile power in the eastern province of Afghan- 
istan, and to the establishment of a permanent 
barrier against schemes of aggression upon our 
north-west frontier". 1 
The only amendment in Auckland's plans caused by the news 
from Herat was that effected by Fane, who reduced the number 
of troops to be employed and entrusted Keane, in lieu of 
himself, with the command of the forces. It was not to be 
expected that the political strategy would be altered or 
abandoned. Neither Auckland nor Macnaghten had the type of 
mind which can divide a problem into its several parts and 
assess the importance of each. " They had apparently 
convinced themselves, if they had not convinced the world at 
large, that "justice", "necessity", consideration for the 
1. Kaye, OP-cit., Vol. I, pp. 383,384. 
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"frontier" and for "the security of the possessions of the 
British Crown" dictated the policy on which they had embarked. 
If they were right, if they were using such terms accurately, 
they could not be expected to turn aside because one factor 
in the situation no longer existed. It is quite possible, 
indeed it is likely, that Auckland and his immediate 
advisers had by this time come to the conclusion that the 
restoration of Shah Shuja would have the effect of the waving 
of a magic wand; would interpose a barrier against Russia 
and Persia; would harmonize and stabilize British relations 
with Ranjit Singh; and would restore the prestige of the 
government in British India. They had become, in fact, the 
victims of their own propaganda. 
(49) 
C 'H APTER3 
ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1815-36 
The despatch of 25th June 1836 which instructed 
Auckland to "raise a timely barrier against the encroach- 
"ments of Russian influence" was typical of the attitude of 
the Home Government at the-time. The fear and suspicion 
of Russia which prevailed in Britain in the eighteen- 
thirties does not excuse the ends which Auckland and 
Macnaghten sought. Still less does it excuse their means; 
but it does make their actions intelligible as actions which 
might be described as defensive in respect of Russia. 
The degeneration of Anglo-Russian relations in the 
twenty years after Waterloo was one of the most obvious 
facts in European politics. Britain's long struggle against 
Napoleon had been maintained with the object of preventing 
ariy one nation-from dominating the continent. The great 
1. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, p. 203 
2. "Yet the tri 
(1923). 
umph of Russia was evident and complete. 
Simple human nature had this time proved greater than any military organization; endurance under reverse showed itself more powerful than genius ... Russia was taken to possess something that made her stronger than the empire of Napoleon. From this followed in Europe an altogether extravagant estimate of her power". Sir Bernard Pares: A History of Russia, p. 305 (New edition. n. d. ). Cited as Pares, Russia. 
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part played by Russia in the events of 1812-14 had left a 
legacy in the shape of an exaggeration of Russian military 
strength which was to persist until the Crimean gar: there 
was little gain in freeing Continental grope from the 
domination of Napoleon if he was to be succeeded by the 
Czar. The project of Paul I in 1800-01 for the invasion of 
India by a force of Don Cossacks starting from Orenberg in 
conjunction with a French expedition under Uassenal from the 
Danube might be dismissed as the idea of a madman. Even the 
Treaty of Tilsit might be regarded as a ruse on the part of 
Alexander I to gain time and, so far as it contained implic- 
ations hostile to British power in India, they had been 
developed by the French rather than by the Russians. On 
the other hand, the attempt of Russia to secure a position 
in the Mediterranean, such as the Ionian Islands, had 
disturbed British diplomatists and the project of Alexander 
at Vienna to compensate Prussia with the whole of Saxony had 
momentarily driven Britain, Austria and France together. 
The Holy Alliance, moreover, introduced an incalculable and 
unnecessary factor into European politics. On the other 
hand, it was Alexander who, more than any other man, insisted 
on carrying the Allied forces into Paris in 1814: Russia, as 
1. Pares, Russia, p. 284; Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, "The 
Shadow of India in Russian History", History, Vo1. XIV, 
p. 220 (October, 1929). 
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a signatory to the Treaty of Chaumont, was a pillar of 
the 
European system; and Alexander's generous treatment of 
Poland seemed to point to him as the leader of liberal 
nationalism and to distinguish him sharply from Metternich. 
On the whole, although those most closely in contact with the 
Czar were bound to regard him as very much of an enigma, 
Russia emerged from the Napoleonic War with a substantial 
capital of favour standing to her credit in the British mind. 
How was this capital dissipated? 
Most obviously in relation to Turkey but even here it is 
not to be supposed that the strongly-held and clear-cut views 
with which Britain at large entered the Crimean War existed 
in such distinctness thirty years earlier. The Greek revolt 
excited much interest and sympathy in Britain, especially 
among the classically-educated upper classes, and the attitude 
of Russia could be interpreted as a desirable breach on her 
part with the Holy Alliance and the principle of legitimacy. 
Stratford Canning was one of those who at this time were so 
strongly sympathetic to the Greek cause as to be unperturbed 
about Russia: George Canning was perturbed but he believed 
that the best way of binding Russia and of restraining her 
from dangerous independent action was to work in conjunction 
with her. The result was the Treaty of London of 6th July 
1827 and, perhaps, the battle of Navarino but even if Canning 
(52) 
had not died so soon as he did it is unlikely that his 
policy of "binding" Russia would have succeeded in view of 
the established tradition of penetration of the Black Sea 
coasts. As lately as 1812, after the Russo-Turkish war of 
1806-11, Russia had-obtained Bessarabia by the Treaty of 
Bucharest and in April 1828, largely owing to Turkish 
provocation, war began again. This meant that Canning's 
policy, at least as interpreted by his successors, had 
failed. Neither Russia nor Turkey wanted Britain as a 
mediator. In these circumstances the British government 
decided to adhere to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as 
an objective but to take no practical steps, such as war with 
Russia, to protect that integrity. ' A brilliant though- 
hazardous campaign in 1829 brought the Russians to Adrianople 
and the Sultan, moved as much by fear for the internal 
security of his regime as by fear of Russia, concluded the 
Treaty of Adrianople on 14th September of that year. Russia 
gained the command of the Danube delta; the free passage of 
merchant ships through the Bosphorus; "independent national 
governments" whose "prosperity" she would "guarantee" in the 
1. cf. Aberdeen, Foreign Secretary - "The existence of Turkey 
as a European power was essential to the preservation of that balance of power in Europe" - with Peel - "When Turkey gave Russia a fair justification for hostilities 
on what account could we interfere? " H. Temperley, England 
and the Near Rast: the Crimea, p. 54 (1936). Cited as Temperley, Cr_ imea0 
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principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; a similar 
independence for an enlarged Serbia; and, for herself, Poti 
and Anapa, with some adjacent territory, on the south-eastern 
(Circassian) coast of the Black Sea. In addition, Turkey 
adhered to the Treaty of London of 1827 and the Protocol of 
22nd March 1829 in respect of Greece and recognized the 
territorial cessions made to Russia by Persia in the Treaty 
of Turkomanchi of 22nd February 1828.1 
The most alarming feature about the Treaty of Adrianople 
from the British point of view was not so much the territ- 
orial gains which Russia had made as the very strong position 
which she had secured for future action in respect of the 
semi-independent Balkan states and the way in which she had 
tied together her gains at the expense of both Turkey and 
Persia. 
In 1722-23 an expedition of Peter the Great had carried 
him as far as Baku on the Caspian but in 1732-35, in the hey- 
day of Nadir Shah, the Russian gains had been lost and the 
Russian frontier had been once more withdrawn to the Terek; 
though the possibility of a Turkish invasion of the eastern 
Caucusus had been checked. Appeals from Georgian Christians 
1. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. II, 
pp. 101-102; Temperley, Crimea, p. 56. 
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to Russia as the great Orthodox power, were renewed later 
in 
the century and eventually Georgia passed into Russian hands 
in 1801. As a result of the next Russo-Persian war Persia 
was obliged to recognize Baku and most of eastern Caucasia 
as Russian, while the war of 1826-28 resulted in the gain to 
Russia of the Azerbaidzhan highlands and Persian Armenia. 
Meanwhile the Russians had been moving from Tiflis against 
the Turks in the western Caucusus and by 1810 had absorbed 
the smaller Georgian principalities. By the Treaty of 
Turkomanchi the Russian frontier with Persia was advanced to 
the Araxes, only a hundred miles from Tabriz, while on the 
Black Sea coast Persia was left with nothing north of Batum. l 
The Russian policy which culminated in the Treaty of 
Adrianople was one of calculating moderation. It might have 
been possible for Russia to capture and hold Constantinople 
and European Turkey. There was a body of opinion in Russia 
in favour of that but for the moment the official course was 
different. Nesselrode, the Chancellor, expressed it in a 
letter of 22nd September 1879. 
Is the preservation of the Ottoman Empire hurtful 
or useful to Russia? ", he asked. 'The idea of 
hunting the Turk out of Europe and re-establishing 
the worship of the true God in St. Sophia is 
I. B. H. Sumner: Survey of Russian History, pp. 290-293 (1944). 
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certainly very fine and, if realized, would 
make us all live in history. But what will 
Russia gain by it? Glory, undoubtedly, but 
at the same time she would lose all the 
advantages offered by being a neighbour to a 
state weakened by a fortunate series of wars 
and she would have inevitable struggles with 
the chief Powers of Europe". l 
It was Russian policy, therefore, to maintain and dominate a 
weak Turkey rather than to force a break-up of the Ottoman 
empire in which other states, such as Austria and Britain, 
would demand to share. 
2 A similar policy was adopted in 
respect of Persia. 
The growth of the power of Mehemet All, the Pasha of 
Egypt, posed a problem both for Russia and Britain. Each 
had to consider the effect of an Egyptian success on the 
future of the Ottoman empire and each, though for different 
reasons, ultimately. decided to support the Porte. Russian 
assistance, however, was given first, and in a dramatic form. 
In October 1831 Mehemet Ali's forces under his son Ibrahim 
advanced against Palestine. In the summer of 1832 Ibrahim 
defeated the Turks at Homs and occupied Syria. At the 
1. Temperley, Crimea, p. 57. 
2. It is essential to remember that from 1829 to 1859 
the main preoccupation of Russia was the real, as distinct 
from the nominal, conquest of the western Caucusus. The 
Moslem mountaineers of Circassia, ably led by Shamil and 
with some assistance from the Turks, put up a long and 
spirited resistance. Shamil was captured in 1859 and the "pacification" was concluded by 1864. Sumner, op. cit., 
pp. 293-294. 
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beginning of November, between the battle of Homs and the 
still more severe defeat inflicted on the Turks at Konieh 
the request of the Sultan for British naval assistance 
reached London. Palmerston, the foreign secretary since 
1830, was not yet the strong Russophobe which he subsequently 
became; nor had he yet acquired his later belief in-the 
possibility of regenerating Turkey. The British reply to 
the Sultan, delayed until 7th March 1833, promised only 
diplomatic assistance and only in May were orders sent for 
a British naval squadron, in conjunction with a French one, 
to lie outside the Dardanelles. Before that the Sultan had 
sought and found help elsewhere. If Britain would not 
assist him, Russia would: in February 1833 a Russian squadron 
arrived in the Dardanelles and 15,000 Russian troops crossed 
to the Asiatic shore to prevent the advance of Ibrahim Pasha 
on Constantinople. On 8th July 1833 the Treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi, to last for eight years, was concluded between 
Russia and Turkey. It provided for the mutual defence of 
the dominions of the signatories and, specifically, 'for 
Russian aid to Turkey (if requested) against Mehemet Ali: 
a secret clause, soon revealed, bound Turkey to close the 
Dardanelles to armed ships when Russia was at war. 
The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was of decisive importance 
(57) 
in that it imbued two men of great energy and influence, 
Palmerston and Stratford Canning, with the anti-Russian and 
pro-Turkish sympathies which they never thereafter lost and 
which constituted one of the causes of the Crimean War. 
Palmerston's suspicions, not merely of the Treaty but of 
Russian policy as a whole, were strengthened by the Conven- 
tion of Munchengratz concluded on 18th September 1833 
between the representatives of Russia, Austria and Prussia; 
the Czar, -the Austrian 
Emperor and the Prussian Crown Prince 
being present. The Convention was primarily an agreement 
on the part of Russia and Austria to maintain the integrity 
of the Ottoman dominions against Mehemet Ali, though it also 
provided a basis for the concerted action of those two states 
should the Turkish empire break up despite their efforts. ' 
Palmerston was mistaken in thinking that the Convention was 
directed against Turkey - there he seized hold of the wrong 
end of the stick - but he was better justified in seeing it 
as the reunion of the "reactionary" eastern powers against 
the "liberal" Franco-British entente. Throughout 1834 
Palmerston's suspicions of Russia deepened until they were 
only less than those of such convinced Russophobes as David 
1. Temperley, Crimea, pp. 66-74; C. S. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian 
Relations, 1815-40" in the Cambridge Historical Journal 
Vol-III, No. I, pp. 46-73 (1929 ; cited as Crawley. 
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Urquhart' and Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador at 
Constantinople from 1833 to 1841. On 10th March 1834 
1. David Urquhart (1805-1877) gained his first acquaintance 
with the Near East in 1828-29 when he fought for the 
Greeks against the Turks. He acted as confidential agent 
for Stratford Canning at Constantinople in 1831-32 and on 
his return to England published his book on Turkey and its 
Resources (1833) which provided one necessary element in 
the formation of anti-Russian opinion, the belief that 
Turkey could and would become the kind of state which 
Britain could support with credit and profit. In August 
1833 Urquhart was officially supplied with funds for an 
extended tour in Central Europe and the Near East. In 
conjunction with Ponsonby he pressed on Palmerston the 
necessity of supporting Turkey against Russia and in 1834 
got in touch with the Moslem patriots in Circassia, for 
whom he drafted a declaration of independence. He was 
recalled in October 1834 and returned to London, still 
with Ponsonby's backing, to advocate his anti-Russian 
views in a pamphlet on England, France, Russia and Turkey, 
published in 1834, and later in a weekly, The Portfolio, 
which began publication in November 1835. By Ponsonby's 
influence Urquhart was appointed Secretary of Embassy at 
Constantinople and with Ponsonby's backing he encouraged 
a British ship, the Vixen, to trade with the Circassians 
at Soujouk Kale in the hope that the Russians would arrest 
it and so provoke an Anglo-Russian war. The ship was 
arrested but Palmerston and the Czar settled the trouble 
without war. In consequence of these activities and of 
his disagreement with Ponsonby (who accused him of "going 
native") Urquhart was recalled in March 1837 and his belief that Palmerston was at best a dupe and at worst a 
paid tool of Russia dates from this time. In his work The Foreign Affairs of Great Britain as administered by Lord 
Palmerston he described Palmerston as "the Minister of Russia" and he took advantage of his membership of the House of Commons from 1847 to 1852 to pursue his attacks. Urquhart's over-vehemence recoiled against him but he became notable for his efforts to interest the public at large, and especially working-men, in foreign affairs and foreign policy. v. Gertrude Robinson: David Urquhart (1920)" 
V. J. Puryear; England. Russia and the Straits Question ' (Berkley, California, 1931); G. H. Bolsover: "David Urquhart 
and the Eastern Question", in the Journal of Modern History, Vo1. VIII, pp. 444-467 (December 1936). 
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Palmerston sent to Ponsonby the famous "discretionary order" 
which authorized him to comply with any request of the Porte 
for protection "against any threatened attack of the 
Russians" by calling upon the Mediterranean squadron, whose 
commander was to comply "provided that, in a naval point of 
view, he should consider his force equal to the emergency". 
Nothing better illustrates the acute dread and suspicion of 
Russia which Palmerston and, to a lesser degree, his 
colleagues in the Cabinet felt at this time than this order 
which in effect allowed a man so pronouncedly anti-Russian as 
Ponsonby to involve Britain in a war with Russia at his own 
discretion. One of the first acts of Wellington when he was 
in temporary charge of the Conservative government in 1834 
was to cancel this order. When the Whigs returned to office 
in 1835 Palmerston furnished Ponsonby with a new "discretion- 
ary order" but this time advised discretion in its use and 
added the warning that there was no immediate danger. - 
A debate in the House of Commons on 19th February 1836 
afforded the occasion for a review of British opinion towards 
Russia. Lord Dudley Stuart, who moved for papers, drew a 
picture of Russia which, if it had been true, would have 
meant that she was invincible. He credited her with an army 
1. Temperley, Crimea, pp. 76-78. 
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of 700,000 men and with one thought animating the whole 
nation - "that of advancing the province of their country 
and its superior power over the rest of the world". '"If 
therefore they looked at the state of Russia now and in 1815 
would any man say that the balance of power continued? No, 
it was destroyed ... Our Indian empire was called an empire 
of opinion ... Let Russia take away that opinion, let her 
undermine it, let her lessen the hold England had upon the 
opinion of the people there and what would become of her? 
That empire would melt away and escape from her grasp". 
Stuart was supported, and indeed overreached by Thomas 
Attwood. "If the Government did go to war", Attwoocd said, 
"the people of England would support them". Palmerston, he 
held, ought to have "pawned the Crown jewels rather than 
suffer the character of this great nation to fall" - as he 
had done in 1833. "Let them have war rather than be trampled 
on by Russia. " No one else went so far as Attwood but only 
one member ventured to doubt whether Russia could invade 
India successfully and the rest of the speakers were all, to 
a greater or lesser extent, anti-Russian. Palmerston took 
a middle line. He did not want war, but he was not afraid 
of Russia and the "integrity and independence" of Turkey must 
be maintained. 1 This debate amply illustrates the point 
1. Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, xxxi, 614-669. 
(61) 
0 
made by Temperley that "the materials for a war were thus 
ready-made in public opinion. and henceforth. England depended 
on the discretion of her statesmen to avoid it". 
l Palmer- 
ton himself possibly reached the height of his suspicion of 
Russia, in this period, in 1833-34, through his anger at the 
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and the Convention-of Munchengratz, 
but his suspicion never really died down very far and, of 
course, it was fed by McNeill's reports from Persia. 
2 The 
despatch to Auckland of June 1836, noted at the beginning of 
this chapter, was entirely in keeping with Palmerston's frame 
of mind. 
It was not only, or perhaps chiefly, the actual or 
suspected designs of Russia on Turkey, Persia or India which 
worked upon the mind of the British public. In other than 
official quarters the events in Poland in 1830-32 had 
probablya greater influence. In British eyes one of the 
most popular acts of Alexander I had been the-creation of the 
"Congress Kingdom" of Poland in which the officials and the 
official language were to be Polish and which was only united 
to Russia in the sense that there was a common sovereign. 
1. Crimea, p. 74. 
2. McNeill's published contribution to the prevailing Russo- 
phobia, The Progress and Present Position of Russia in the 
East, appeared in 1836. 
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The constitution provided for an elected Diet and a Polish 
army; freedom of the press and of the person were guarant- 
eed. There is no reason to doubt Alexander I's initial 
sincerity though his enthusiasm for his creation was only 
sustained with difficulty during his lifetime and Russian 
opinion never approved of the settlement. Increasingly the 
Poles complained of infringements of their constitutional 
rights, especially by police action and surveillance. On 
the night of 28th November 1830 a rising broke out in Warsaw, 
actuated partly by the rumour that the Polish army was to be 
sent to France to fight against the new Orleanist regime. 
The withdrawal of the governor, the Grand Duke Constantine, 
and the fact that the Poles possessed a trained force allowed 
the rising to assume the dimensions of a large-scale revolt. 
After it had been crushed and Warsaw recaptured, the Organic 
Statute of 1832 abolished the Polish army and Diet and almost 
abolished the constitutional guarantees. The universities 
of Warsaw and Vilna were closed; the Russian language was 
introduced into both secondary and primary schools; Russian 
officials administered the country; and the Roman Catholic 
religion was subjected to persecution. 
' 
The Polish revolt only gradually dawned upon the mind of 
1. Pares, Russia, pp. 309-310,325-327. 
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the British public, which was preoccupied in 1830-32 with 
Parliamentary reform and it was not until Polish emigres 
began to arrive in considerable numbers in the later part of 
1832 that widespread sympathy awoke, both in Britain and 
France. Once created, this sympathy was shared to a remark- 
able degree by all parties and all classes. Thomas Campbell, 
the poet, was the leading literary supporter of the Polish 
cause, which was represented in the House of Commons and in 
society by such men as Lord Dudley Stuart and Cutlar 
Fergusson. Palmerston made the point to Russia that the 
"Congress Kingdom" existed by virtue of the Vienna settlement 
and that its abolition was a breach of that settlement. His 
representations and those of the French government produced 
no effect, except that of irritation, in Russia; and beyond 
pensioning some of the Polish emigres the British government 
could do nothing more. Its helplessness intensified the 
popular anti-Russian feeling in Britain, from which hardly 
anyone of note except Lord Durham and Richard-Cobden was 
exempt. The exigencies of diplomacy might from time to time 
dictate co-operation with Russia, as against Mehemet All and 
France but to the mass of the people the Russia of Nicholas I 
became and remained the police state par excellence, the 
enemy of the liberal civilization of western Europe. This 
feeling was to persist until it found its expression in the 
I 
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Crimean War. Coinciding from time to time with more 
material anxieties over Russian action in respect of Turkey, 
Persia, Afghanistan and India, stimulated by the works of 
Urquhart, McNeill, de Lacy Evansl and other publicists, it 
produced by the middle of the eighteen-thirties a state of 
mind in which any action that could be classed as anti- 
Russian, even that of Auckland, seemed to have a prima-facie 
justification. 
I. Evans (1787-1870) was a combination, rare in his day, of the successful professional soldier and the Radical 
politician. He served in India, the Peninsula, America 
and at Waterloo; commanded the British Legion in Spain, 
1835-37; and distinguished himself as a divisional 
commander in the Crimean War. For most of the period from 1830 to 1865 he was a member of the House of Commons. Hi ,ý LSE, c'. . -11 V 
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CHAPTER4 
THE LIQUIDATION OF LORD AUCKLAND'S POLICY 
It is not necessary to describe in detail the course of 
the first Afghan War. ' The decisive action in the first 
campaign was the capture of Ghazni on 23rd July 1839. This 
led directly to the falling back on Kabul both of Dost 
Mohammad's own forces and of those under his son, Akbar Khan, 
which had been opposing the passage of Wade, with his native 
levies and the Sikhs, through the Khyber Pass. Treachery 
among his followers made it impossible for Dost Mohammad to 
stand and fight before Kabul, which was occupied by the 
British forces, including Shah Shuja's troops, on 7th August; 
Wade's column joining on 3rd September. 2 
Auckland was now faced wits a direct issue of policy. 
Shah Shuja had been replaced on the throne of Afghanistan; 
Dost Mohammad was a fugitive. Were the British forces to be 
withdrawn? The Bombay column did, indeed, begin its with- 
drawal on 18th September but nearly all the Bengal troops 
remained. Why was not the opportunity taken at this stage 
1. The military history of the first Afghan War is dealt with in Sir John Fortescue: A History of the British Ar , Vol. XII, chapters XXII to XXIX (1927)p cited as Fortescue. 
2. Ranjit Singh died on 27th June 1839. 
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to make the British withdrawal complete? According to 
Macnaghten, Shah. Shuja had been received in Kabul "with 
feelings nearly amounting to adoration" and although no one 
else appears to have noticed this, there was point in the 
questions asked by one of Dost Mohammad's sons. 
"If Shah Shuja is really a king, and come to the 
kingdom of his ancestors, what is the use of 
your army and name? You have brought him, by 
your money and arms, into Afghanistan, leave 
him now with us Afghans and let him rule us if 
he can". 1 
The answer perhaps turns on what the word "king" 
signifies. Afghanistan was not a kingdom in the sense of 
being a highly centralized state with a long tradition of 
obedience to a strong monarchical power. Where such a 
power exists the capture of a very few men and the seizure 
of the central machinery of government can mean the effective 
control of the whole country. Afghanistan, however, was an 
utterly uncentralized country where such central power as 
existedxas only maintained on the fluctuating loyalties of 
individual chieftains and tribes. It had been so under Dost 
Mohammad and the treachery which made it impossible for him 
to defend Kabul was bound to operate against Shah Shuja. If 
Shah Shuja were dethroned in his turn the prestige of the 
1. Cambridge History of India, Vo. V., p. 501. 
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British, who had put him on the throne, would suffer. It 
is highly arguable, of course, that British prestige ought 
never to have been involved in the maintenance of a protege 
whose position was certain to be difficult in the extreme. 
It had been so involved, however, and there was a case for 
holding that it would be best to support Shah Shuja some 
little time longer, until the initial difficulties in his 
way had been removed and he could be left with a somewhat 
better chance of survival. Auckland's whole policy 
contained so many gross mistakes that it is easy to assume 
that every single decision of his was mistaken. Possibly 
the decision to retain a British force in Afghanistan over 
the winter of 1839-40 was not one of these. 
One reason for the retention of such a force was that 
Dost Mohammad was still at large. He had sought asylum with 
the Ameer of Bokhara and had been more fortunate than some of 
the enforced guests of that monarch in, making his escape. 
An expedition under Dr. Lord occupied Bamian and, as an out- 
post, Saighan. Dost Mohammad then succeeded in raising a 
small force and re-occupying Saighan; only to be defeated by 
Dennie in a fight at the entrance to the Bamian Valley in 
September 1840. After that action Dost Mohammad re-appeared 
in Kohistan and on 2nd November fought another engagement at 
Purwandana, where he gained some measure of success. But 
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very soon afterwards he surrendered personally to Macnaghten 
and on 12th November 1840 he left, as an honoured captive and 
a great favourite of the regimental messes, for India. 
Another reason for the temporary retention of a British 
force in Afghanistan was the activities of the Russians. 
The boundary of Asiatic Russia ran at that time up the Ural 
River to Orenberg, thence to Omsk and Semipalatinsk; roughly 
in the shape of an are of a circle. Within that circle was 
the Uzbeg kingdom or khanate of Khiva, against which the 
Russians had justifiable grounds of complaint for slave- 
raiding and attacks on caravans. An expedition against Khiva 
had been under consideration for some years. It was finally 
determined on in March 1839, to start not later than the 
spring of 1840. That date was fixed to allow of "the settle- 
ment of English matters in Afghanistan", so that Britain, 
having made "conquests" herself, would no longer have the 
right to demand an explanation of Russia's action. In the 
end, however, the expedition left Orenburg under Perovski as 
soon as November 1839; partly because it was thought better 
to traverse the steppes in winter than in the heat of summer 
and partly because of the Russian fear of British influence 
increasing in Central Asia. Great care appears to have been 
taken in fitting out the expedition but nevertheless it failed 
to make headway against the appalling weather conditions on 
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the Ust-Urt plateau between the Aral and the Caspian Seas. 
Perovski decided, on Ist February 1840, to turn back: on 
13th March the failure of the expedition was announced in 
the Russian Press and at once communicated to England by the 
British ambassador. ' 
The incident threw some light on views held on Anglo - 
Russian relations. Burnes, writing from Kabul in December 
1839, believed that the British occupation of Afghanistan had 
"hastened the great crisis". "England and Russia", he said, 
"will divide Asia between them and the two empires will 
enlarge like circles in°the water till-they are lost in 
nothing". Macnaghten, too, assumed the early and inevitable 
contact of the British and the Russian spheres. " "Had we 
not been here", he wrote on 15th April 1840, "they (the 
Russians) would by this time have established themselves - 
2 
without. Ahe slightest opposition or difficulty in' Afghanistan'. 
`Another view and-another policy were-those of Major Todd, then 
1. Sykes, Afghanistan, Vol. II, pp. 83-84; H. S. Edwards: Russian 
Projects Against India, chapters iv-vi. (1885). Edwards' 
was a "popular" work but he apparently drew freely on 
translations of Russian official papers. His references, 
however, are quite inadequate. Still, it does appear that 
the British intelligence service in Central Asia at this 
time was better than the Russian; British travellers being 
either more daring or having less basic hostility to 
encounter. 
2. Kaye, War in Afghanistan, Vol. II, pp. 37,45n. 
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engaged-in his mission to Herat. Todd appreciated that the 
Russians had good grounds for their expedition, quite apart 
from what the British had done in respect of Afghanistan, and 
he sent two officers in succession to Khiva, not to stimulate 
the Khan against the Russians but to try to induce him to 
remove the Russian grounds for complaint. He took a justif- 
iable pride in the outcome of his efforts. One of his 
officers, Shakespear, succeeded in having some four hundred 
Russian slaves and captives liberated and in conducting them 
personally to Orenburg; and in 1842 the Khan, by a treaty 
with Russia, bound himself to stop slave-trading and slave- 
raiding. For the moment Russia had got what it wanted and 
was not obliged to renew its attack on Khiva. . 
"Had we been 
satisfied with the tales of Sir Alexander's agents", Todd 
wrote, -"we should now have believed the Russians 300,000 
strong and to be. within a short distance of Kabul": 
1 
Unfortunately, there were not enough men as cool and judicious 
as Todd. 
Macnaghten and Burnes, by contrast, 'were in the fu11 
excitement of playing the "great game"; and for Macnaghten 
in particular the British position in Afghanistan was only a 
jumping-off ground. The internal government of the country, 
1. Kaye, loc. cit., Vol. II, p. 112n. 
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including the collection of revenue, was entrusted (with the 
most unhappy consequences) to Shah Shuja: Macnaghten was 
responsible for its external relations and for relations with 
disaffected or rebellious chiefs. His first act had been an 
expedition against Kelat, which was stormed by Willshire's 
force, on its way back to India, on 13th November 1839.1 
Mihrab Khan, the ruler, (who had befriended Shah Shuja in 
earlier days) was killed sword in hand and the incapable Shah 
Nawaz was set up in his place to rule territories diminished 
by the annexation of Shal, Mastung and Kachhi to Afghanistan. 
Further opportunities for Macnaghten existed in respect of 
Herat and Bokhara. 
The situation at Herat showed the utter unreality of the 
view by which that city appeared an outpost of Afghanistan 
and therefore, in a sense, of Britain against Persia and 
Russia. It was atrociously governed by the Vizior, Yar 
Mohammad, who was engaged on the one hand in trying to extort 
money from the British resident, Todd, and, on the other, in 
stirring up disaffected Afghan chieftains and in intriguing 
with the Persians. When he was discovered to be proposing 
to the Persian governor of Meshed a plan to expel the British 
mission and to seize Kandahar by joint action Todd terminated 
his mission and Macnaghten proposed to attack Herat and 
1. Fortescue, Vol. XII, pp. 98-100. 
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incorporate it in Afghanistan. But on this point at least 
Auckland was adamant. Todd was sent back, in disgrace, to 
his regiment and the strictures which Auckland visited upon 
him would have been better reserved for Macnaghten. 
"What we have wanted in Afghanistan" - Auckland 
wrote - 'has been repose under an exhibition of 
strength and he (Todd) has wantonly, and against 
all orders, done that which is most likely to 
produce general disquiet, and which may make our 
strength inadequate to the calls upon it. I 
look upon a march to Herat as perfectly imprqct- 
icable ... in the mean time, 
the state to which 
things have been brought is a cause of much 
anxiety and apprehension to me". 
Macnaghten was also meditating an expedition against Bokhara, 
where a British officer, Colonel 8toddart, had been detained 
by the pmeer since 1838. On 23rd February 1840 Macnaghten 
was judging an expedition against Bokhara "to be conveniently 
feasible if entered upon at the proper season of the year" 
and in the following April he was contemplating the annexation 
of Cis-Oxus provinces to Afghanistan". One of his questions- 
"Mayenot the contingency upon which the home authorities 
direct an advance, be said to have arisen should the Russians 
establish themselves at Bokhara? " - shows how far his 
imagination had ranged. 
l And Bokhara was not at the limit 
1" No expedition was sent to Bokhara but Arthur Conolly was 
sent to Khiva and later went on to Bokhara where both he 
and Stoddart were murdered at the order of the Ameer. 
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of it. "The Sikhs" Macnaghten wrote 
to Auckland on 20th 
July 1840, "should no longer be suffered to throw unreason- 
able obstacles in the way of our just and necessary objects"; 
and elsewhere he spoke of "macadamising" the Punjab. 
"We 
have a beautiful game on our hands". Macnaghten wrote in 
another letter, "if we have the means and inclination to'play 
it properly". The game was nothing less than the creation 
of a Greater Afghanistan, with Herat, Peshawar and Bokhara 
annexed to it; a state whose external policy Macnaghten 
would direct. 1 
It might be a beautiful game but Auckland, as he amply 
demonstrated in the instance of Herat, had neither the means 
nor the inclination to play it. What he wanted was "repose 
under an exhibition of strength"., There had been the 
exhibition of strength. It had not produced repose. In 
the summer of -1840 British forces were engaged, for the 
moment successfully, against the Ghilzais at Tazi and against 
the Kachis in the neighbourhood of Quetta. In August Kalat 
was temporarily re-captured by insurgents and at the very end 
of that month a. convoy was successfully attacked in the Bolan 
Pass. General Nott restored order and re-captured Kalat but 
it was evident that "repose" was a mirage in Afghanistan. 
1. Kaye, 1oc. cit., Vol. II, pp. 42-48. 
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Such was the situation when the news of the failure of 
the Russian expedition against Khiva was followed by Dost 
Mohammad's surrender. The issue of the future of the 
British occupation was clearer now than it had been a year 
before. There could be no immediate threat either from 
Russia or from Dost Mohammad. Had the time not come at 
length when the British forces could be withdrawn? The 
project was costing India some £1,250,000 a year and Auckland, 
unlike Macnaghten, was not anxious to make Afghanistan a 
Jumping-off ground for further adventures in Central Asia. 
The recent defeat of the Ghilzais and the re-occupation of 
Kalat left the British in a position when their withdrawal 
from the country could not be regarded as in any sense 
equivalent to expulsion: ' the surrender of Dost Mohammad 
might seem to provide the opportunity. In Durand's words, 
"No more striking event could be conceived for an 
honourable termination to the armed occupation 
of Afghanistan, and for the triumphant return of 
the Anglo-Indian army to its own frontier. By 
furnishing so unhoped an occasion Providence 
removed all reasonable ground of excuse or 
hesitation, and afforded the Indian Government 
the very moment which it professed to await". 
Of this'moment Auckland declined to take advantage and he 
still held. to his view at the end of March 1841 in the face 
1" Durand, op-cit., pp. 325-326. 
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of the very clear intimation of an opposite opinion on 
the 
part of the authorities in England. As late as the 
following September Macnaghten was calculating on an 
occupation to last fora few years hence" until "the present 
generation of turbulent intriguers" had been swept away and 
Shah Shuja was strong enough. to stand on his own feet. 
' The 
only effect of criticism from England was on the financial 
side and this, taking the shape of a drastic reduction in 
the amount of the subsidies paid to the Afghan chiefs, 
precipitated.. the outbreak of that widespread rising in which 
Shah Shuja and the British were engulfed. 
The outbreak, which began with a local insurrection in 
Kabul on 2nd November 1841, in the course of which Burnes was 
killed by a mob, had to be judged as a military movement to 
be met by a military counter-movement. But for this the 
British forces were singularly ill-placed2 and ill-led. 
They were too widely scattered and in Kabul they had 
neglected to occupy the one position, the Bala Hissar, which 
almost certainly would have ensured their safety. The 
I. Kaye, War in Afghanistan, pp. 146-152. 
2. Durand, OP-cit., pp. 247-248 notes, for the winter of 1839- 
40, the distribution of troops among the following posts: 
Kabul, Ghazni, Bamian, Jellalabad, Kandahar, Girishk, 
Kalat and Quetta. Fortescue emphasizes the constant 
interference with military policy of junior officers 
acting in a political capacity. 
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commanding officer, Elphinstone, was physically and there- 
fore morally unequal to his responsibilities. Perhaps the 
most striking thing was the speed of the catastrophe. At 
the beginning of November 1841 the British appeared to be in 
effective control of most of the country. When Lord Ellen- 
borough, Auckland's successor, landed at Madras on 21st 
February 1842 Macnaghten was dead, Shah Shuja was dead, 
nearly the whole of the Kabul force, with thousands of camp- 
followers were dead and Elphinstone was dying in captivity; 
sale was besieged in Jellalabad and, despite his reputation 
as a fighting-man., had been near surrendering it; Nott was 
under pressure at Kandahar; the garrison of Ghazni had been 
driven into the citadel and was on the point of surrender; 
Pollock, at Peshawar, was trying to bring into fighting trim 
the forces there, some of whom were still suffering from the 
effects ofa failure to force a way through the Khyber Pass 
in the preceding month. 
Yet by the end of the summer another change, almost as 
rapid, had taken place. On 5th April Pollock began his 
march through the Khyber Pass and on the 16th he reached 
Jellalabad. After a delay there to assemble transport he 
resumed his march and entered Kabul on 15th September. Two 
days later he was joined by Nott, who had marched from 
Kandahar, re-occupying Ghazni without opposition on the way. 
(77) 
On 12th October the British forces began their march back 
to India. The remarkable thing about these operations was 
the comparatively slight and ineffective nature of the 
opposition encountered. Carelessness was always likely to 
incur punishment, as it did during the final retirement 
through the Khyber Pass in October, but the only considerable 
engagement fought, was that of 13th September when Akbar Khan 
attempted to bar Pollock's way into Kabul. 
1 The little 
garrison of Kalat-i-Ghilzai held out with great spirit until 
relieved. It was evident that British and Indian troops, 
reasonably well led (and neither Pollock nor Nott pretended 
to be a military genius) and adequately supplied with 
transport could defeat-any Afghan army in the field. Did 
this mean that too much importance had been or was to be 
attached to the events of November 1841 to January 1842; 
that only a quite unusual combination of ill-luck and worse 
management could have produced those catastrophes? Not 
necessarily. , The task of an army unencumbered by political 
considerations, with no more than the duty of fighting its 
way to a particular point and then-returning, was far easier 
than that of static forces entrusted with the control of a 
country, which meant a considerable degree of dispersion and 
1. Fortescue, Vol. XII, pp. 264-280. 
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a subordination of military to political considerations. 
It might be admitted that British forces could fight their 
way into and out of Afghanistan when they cared to 
do so; 
provided, of course, that expense was no object. It did 
not follow that the occupation of Afghanistan for any length 
of time was practicable. If an active policy in Central 
Asia depended upon the occupation of Afghanistan, then such 
a policy was impracticable also. 
Lord Ellenborough, under whose governor-generalship the 
military successes of 1842 were achieved, had come to that 
office with much more experience of Indian affairs than most 
of his predecessors or successors. He had been President 
of 'the Board of Control under Wellington from 1828 to 1830 
and again under Peel in 1834-35. He had resumed that office 
when Peel came into power in 1841 and was appointed directly 
from it to the governor-generalship; taking with him to 
India, as a result of his official experience, a very strong 
prejudice against the East India Company and a firm belief 
that Indian affairs should be under the immediate control of 
the crown. No man could have been a more striking contrast 
to Auckland who, but for his mistakes, would have gone down 
to history as one of the most colourless of governors- 
general. Ellenborough, on the other hand, would have made 
himself known in the most obscure office. He was erratic, 
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but from the very strength of his impulses and not, like 
Auckland, from weakness and indecision. Above all, his 
policy, for good or bad, was his own. He would tolerate 
no Macnaghten as the power behind his throne. "I believe 
I can do now what I like in India", he wrote on one occasion; 
and, on another, "I will govern the country as if I were its 
sovereign". 1 
Ellenborough had given the question of relations with 
Afghanistan a considerable amount of thought before he 
returned to the Board of Control in 1841. Law's book 
contains (pp. 1-9) a "Memorandum on Afghan Affairs" dated 
23rd April 1839 in which Ellenborough argued that Russia had 
as much right as Britain. to cultivate political and commer- 
cial relations with Afghanistan and that 
"their proposition that neither-Tower should seek 
to establish influence there is one to which we 
must ultimately accede, or engage in a ruinous 
contest to be carried on thirteen hundred and 
fifty miles from our frontier". 
Any attempt on the part of Britain to retain Afghanistan 
would be met by the use by Russia of Persia and the Persian 
1. To the Earl of Clare, 3rd October 1842,26th March 1843; 
Sir Algernon Law, India under Lord Ellenborough, pp. 40, 
64 (1926); cited as Law. This book, as well as Lord 
Colchester's History of the Indian Administration of Lord 
Ellenborough (1874), contains some useful documents and 
letters but neither is really. satisfactory and Ellen- 
borough still awaits a biographer. 
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army. 
"To keep down the subjects of Shah Shuja of whom 
many would adhere to the family of Dost Mahomed, 
and at the same time to make head against a 
Persian army disciplined by Russians, would be 
required a force of 25,000 or 30,000 men". 
Reserves would bring this force up to 50,000 and the expense 
involved would paralyse our administration in India. He 
did not criticize the warning delivered to Persia by McNeill 
but, in his opinion, the proper measures to follow it would 
have been "pecuniary aid to the Chiefs of Kabul and Candahar 
in the event of their marching to the Chief of Herat"; a 
disclaimer of Shah Shuja; and "the offer of good offices to 
settle the disputes between the Afghans and Ranjit Singh". 
He had also attacked the policy of the government in the House 
of Lords on 28th February 1839 when he traced it to Shah 
Shuja's British-sponsored expedition of 1833-34 and called 
for papers on that subject. 
Ellenborough went to India, therefore, with the strongest 
prepossession against Auckland's policy and there was some 
danger that a man so impulsive, and placed in the circum- 
stances which he found in February 1842, would order a head- 
long retreat of all the British forces from Afghanistan, thus 
emphasizing the reverses they had already suffered. What he 
eventually did was different. He repeated his orders to 
Pollock and Nott to retire to India but he suggested that they 
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might feel disposed to conduct their retirement by a 
roundabout route which would take them by Kabul. Of this 
mode of issuing orders Kaye is bitterly critical. 
"Lord Ellenborough's instructions to the Generals 
were so worded - whether by accident or design I 
do not presume to determine - as to cast upon 
them all the onus of failure, and to confer upon 
the Governor-General, or at least to divide with 
him, all the honour of success. One thing at 
least is certain - the letter of the 4th of July, 
addressed to General Nott and signed by the Chief 
Secretary, ought not to have been written. It 
is either from first to last a masterpiece of 
Jesuitical cunning, or it indicates a feebleness 
of will - an infirmity of purpose - discreditable 
to the character of a statesman entrusted with 
the welfare and the hoour of one of the greatest 
empires in the world". -- 
It is only fair to point out, however, that it may be neither 
Jesuitical nor infirm to leave a general operating at a long 
distance to be, within certain limits, the judge of his-own 
actions and when Pollock said that he felt the full benefit 
of being unshackled there is no reason to suppose that he was 
speaking sarcastically. 
On Ist October 1842 Ellenborough wrote a manifesto, in 
the very room in which Auckland had written his four years 
before. The fact that it was dated 1st October, though not 
immediately issued, is practically a proof that Ellenborough 
meant to denounce his predecessor's policy in the most 
striking manner possible. In this he succeeded, though it 
1. Kaye, War in Afghanistan, Vol. III, pp. 288-289 and n. 
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is doubtful if British prestige gained by his grandiloquent 
censures. The two points which he emphasized were the 
ultimate invincibility of British arms and the utter impolicy 
and injustice of Auckland's actions. 
"To force a sovereign upon a reluctant people, 
would be as inconsistent with the policy as 
it is with the principles of the British 
government, tending to place the arms and 
resources of that people at the disposal of 
the first invader, and to impose the burden 
of supporting a sovereign, without the prospect 
of benefit from his alliance ... The enormous 
expenditure required for the support of a 
large force, in a false military position, at 
a distance from its own frontier and resources, 
will no longer arrest every measure for the 
improvement of the country and of the people". 
As for the future: 
"The Governor-General will leave it to the Afghans 
, 
themselves to create a government amidst the 
anarchy which is the consequence of their 
crimes ... The Governor-General will willingly 
recognize any government approved by the Afghans 
themselves, which shall appear desirous and 
capable of maintaining friendly relations with 
neighbouring states". 
This document did not escape, and could not expect to escape 
criticism. But it excited less than the famous proclamation 
of 16th November 1842, addressed to "all the Princes and 
Chiefs, and People of India" and beginning, 
"My Brothers and Friends, 
Our victorious army bears the gates of the 
temple of Somnauth in triumph from Afghanistan, 
and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed looks 
upon the ruins of Ghuznee'". 1 
1. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 378-381. 
A 
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In a long letter to the Secret Committee on 23rd March 
1843 E1lenborough defended his action. 
"I wrote that address not for England but for 
India. I spoke to men under the excitement 
of recent victories following unparalleled 
disasters". 
He went on to add a further consideration which did him 
honour. 
"I deemed it to be further necessary to endeavour 
at this time to give a new character of National- 
ity to the Government by identifying it with the 
national feeling - to prove by some decisive act 
that we sympathised with the people, and regarded, 
as we did our own, the Honor of Hindoostan ... 
The war in Afghanistan had assumed as no other, 
war had done, a national character. It had 
been my object to confirm that character and to 
give'to the transmission of the trophies through 
the centre of India the appearance not of a 
religious but of a National triumph". 1 
In any event, too much attention can be-(and was) 
directed to Ellenborough's words. The views which 
Wellington and he exchanged are of more importance. On 
30th March 1842 Wellington stated his opinion at some 
length. He believed that the first necessity was to 
"consider maturely our main position in Hindostan". 
"Looking at our position in the North-West, I see 
upon the river Sutlej a short line of defence, 
covered by the Punjab and its rivers, with the' 
1. Law, pp. 53-57. 
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Government of which country we are in alliance. 
It is true that the Sikh Government is in an 
unsettled state, and not what it was when 
governed by Runjeet Sing at the commencement 
of the war in Afghanistan. But the weakness 
of the government or the absence of all govern- 
ment in the Punjab, and the possibility of 
hostility in that part of the Sikh State, 
would be an additional inducement to attend to 
the defences of our weakest frontier, even if 
the consequences of the state of confusion in 
the government of the Punjab should eventually 
require the active interference of the British 
Government in order to settle the government 
of a country where tranquillity is so essential 
to its own protection and safety". 
Ellenborough's views on the role of the Sikh state were given 
in a letter to Wellington of 7th June 1842. 
"I have at the same time not discouraged another 
folly of theirs - that of advancing their 
frontier towards Cabul. I have not objected. - to their moving forward on the left bank of the 
Cabul River, and I have-. acquiesced in their 
wish to occupy Jellalabad when we leave it. If 
they accede to this arrangement, and endeavour 
to carry it out, we shall have placed an 
irreconcilable enemy-to the Afghans between 
them and us, and hold that enemy to the Afghans, 
occupied as he must be in defending himself 
against them, in entire subjection to us by our 
position upon the Sutlej, within a few marches 
of Umritsir and Lahore". 
His views on Sind he expressed in a letter to the Secret 
Committee of 26th June 1843. He had had, he said, to decide 
whether the armies should everywhere resume the positions 
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they -had occupied before the Afghan War and had decided 
that, although Afghanistan must be evacuated, certain 
positions on the Lower Indus should be held; partly on 
grounds of prestige since one retirement was enough and 
partly because he did not want to. leave open "to the 
ambition of the Sikhs or of a European Power that route 
of which we had demonstrated the practicability and 
importance". 
By the time this last letter was written the Ameers of 
Sind had been overthrown by Napier; and Wellington's letter 
pointed, if only indirectly, to a similar contest with the 
Sikhs. In view of these preoccupations and of the absence 
of any ostentatious advance eastward on the part of Russia 
it was not surprising that a definite policy towards Afghan- 
istan in the years 1842-53 can scarcely be said to have 
existed.. The internal history of Afghanistan during this 
period can therefore be dealt with shortly. 
The Afghan captives had been released when the British 
army reached the Indus and Dost Mohammad returned, not to the 
throne of Afghanistan but to the position of Ameer of Kabul. 
Kandahar was under the rule of his brother,, KohtAndil Khan; 
Herat under that of Yar Mohammad, the former Vizifr of Shah 
Kamran whom he had had murdered early in 1842. Dost 
Mohammad had emerged from his captivity with a remarkable 
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lack of bitterness against the British and a respect for 
British strength; but his son and Vizi4r, Akbar Khan, who 
added to his own ambition the reputation he had gained as 
the leader of resistance to the British forces, had other 
views and a strong popular following. . 
In 1846 Akbar Khan 
and Yar Mohammad formed a species of alliance directed 
against Kohundil Khan and indulged in negotiations with 
Persia, directed against the British. The death of Akbar 
Khan, however, allowed his father to regain his authority, 
which he asserted against the Ghilzai rebels in 1847. 
Previously, in 1845, Akbar Khan had sent a small force to 
assist the Sikhs in the first Sikh War. In 1848 Dost 
Mohammad was obliged, less from his own wish than from 
popular demand, to give further assistance to the Sikhs in 
return for the promise of the restoration of Peshawar and he 
himself took part, with a cavalry force, in the battle of 
GuJarat on 21st February 1848. The total defeat of the 
Sikhs put an end to the Afghan hope of recovering Peshawar 
but it did make possible the Anglo-Afghan treaties of 1855 
and 1857. These, as well as the Persian imbroglio, fall 
to be dealt with. later but it may be noted here that Dost 
Mohammad succeeded in annexing Kandahar after the death of 
KohUndil Khan in 1855 and in capturing Herat within a few 
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days of his own death in 1863.1 
It must remain doubtful whether it would have been 
possible, politically, to carry out the evacuation of 1842 
and to pursue the negative policy towards Afghanistan and 
Central Asia in general which marked the years 1842-53 had 
Anglo-Russian relations not improved. The failure of the 
Russian expedition against Khiva in 1839-40 and Russian 
preoccupation with the Caucusus were balanced against the 
British failure in Afghanistan and British preoccupation 
with Sind, the Punjab and, later, the Mutiny. Russian 
territorial gains to the eastward at, this time were small 
and local. Explorers reached the Aral Sea in 1844 and in 
1847 the fort of Aralsk was built where the Si, r Daria or 
Jaxartes River flows into that sea; in 1853 the Russians, 
pushing up the river, stormed'the Khokand fort of Ak Masjid 
but the subjugation of the surrounding district occupied them 
for the next eight years. It was not until 1854 that a 
major decision of policy was made, to connect the Siberian 
and Orenburg lines. This almost necessarily involved the 
subjection of Khiva, Khokanaand Bokhara but the execution of 
the project was postponed by the outbreak of the Crimean War. 2 
1. Sykes, Afghanistan, Vol. II, pp. 61-68. 
2. Sykes, Afghanistan, Vol. II, pp. 85-86; M. Romanovski: Notes 
on the Central Asian Question, Chapter I (Calcutta, 18707. 
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The comparative inaction of Russia in Central Asia at 
this time made Anglo-Russian understanding more easily 
possible but there were other and more positive factors 
working to the same end. Both the ambitions of Mehemet 
Ali and the determination of the Porte to resist them had 
increased since 1839. On 21st April 1839 a Turkish army 
crossed the Euphrates; on 24th June it was completely 
defeated by Ibrahim at Nezib; on 29th June the Sultan died 
and was-succeeded by a boy of nineteen; on 7th July it 
became-, known in Constantinople that the Turkish admiral had 
sailed his fleet into Alexandria and had handed it over to 
the Egyptians. At first it seemed-that the Five Powers 
(Britain, Russia, Austria, France and-Prussia) would act 
together but in the end it was only Britain, Russia, Austria 
and Prussia which concluded the Convention of 15th July 1840, 
binding themselves to compel Mehemet All to conform to their 
wishes; France was not a party to it-and in the summer of 
1840 there was a serious danger of an Anglo-French war. But 
action against the Egyptians was too speedy and too success- 
ful to allow of French intervention on their behalf. The 
forces of-the Convention Powers-- a British fleet, a handful 
of Austrian marines, Turkish land forces and Lebanese 
insurgents - carried all before them. 'T3eJ. R, t t was bombarded 
and captured on 9th October; on the 10th, Ibrahim was 
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defeated at Ardali; on 3rd November Acre was 
bombarded and 
captured; on 8th December Mehemet All yielded 
his uncondit- 
ional submission. France was thus faced with the alternat- 
ives of helpless isolation or adhesion to the Straits 
Convention of 13th July 1841; she took the course of 
adhesion. 
' 
The years 1839-41 had thus shown Britain and Russia 
acting in close co-operation in the major international 
question of the day and the Straits Convention abrogated the 
special position vis-a-vis Turkey which Russia had gained by 
the Treaty of Unklar Skelessi. There still remained in the 
background of the English mind a rooted distrust of Russia, 
which tended to increase rather than to diminish as time went 
on but it was less feverish than it had been five or six years 
earlier and it was discouraged by the British statesmen in 
power. The Whigs tried to defend Auckland's policy in 
Afghanistan and continued to abuse Ellenborough's. On 1st 
March 1843 J. A. Roebuck, the Radical M. P., moved for a 
Committee "to enquire into the circumstances which led to the 
late hostilities in Afghanistan, to report the evidence and 
their observations thereon". Lord John Russell, the Whig 
leader, made a weak reply but the Whigs were rescued by the 
Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, who refused a Committee. 
1. Temperley, Crimea, Chapters III V. 
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It is significant that one of his grounds for refusal was 
the "impolicy of disturbing the present friendly relations 
with Russia by again discussing the causes of jealousy which 
her conduct may have afforded to the English Government in 
bygone transactions". 1 
Those friendly relations were gratifying to Peel and 
his pacific Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, but the main 
impulse to them came from the Czar Nicholas I who showed 
himself, both during his visit to England in 1844 and in his 
famous "conversations" with the British ambassador, Seymour, 
in 1853, extremely - and apparently sincerely - anxious for 
the closest co-operation with Britain. It would be a 
mistake to describe even Palmerston as anti-Russian in the 
late 'forties. He looked upon Russia as one of the barriers 
against European revolution in 1848 and although he 
co-operated with France to protect the Hungarian refugees in 
Turkey in 1849 he had raised no objection to the despatch of 
a Russian army to assist the Austrians against the Hungarians. 
The Crimean War did not come out of a clear sky but it was 
not, on the other hand, the inevitable culmination of a 
steadily increasing Anglo-Russian tension. Until the eve of 
war Anglo-Russian relations were better than they had been 
1. Henry Law to Ellenborough, 13th March 1843. Law, pp. 60-61. 
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in 1833-38 and this was undoubtedly one of the circumstances 
which allowed of the negative policy pursued by Britain 
towards Afghanistan in 1842-55. 
(92) 
CHAPTER5 
ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS 1853-63 
Colonel H. B. Hanna's chapter on "The Genesis and Growth 
of the Forward Policy" in the first volume of his work on 
The Second Afghan Warl is perhaps responsible for tracing 
the origin or revival-of that policy to John Jacob's proposal 
of 1856 for the occupation of Quetta. Sir Henry Rawlinson's 
book England and Russia in the East, published in 1875, and 
his influence on the Indian Council may have had much to do 
with the inception of the second Afghan War. But it is an 
unhistorical way of looking at things to assume that the 
forward policy was bound to result in the actions of Auckland 
and Lytton and to imagine that such men as Jacob and 
Rawlinson deliberately sought the repetition of the events 
of 1839-42.. Jacob was very careful to say that 
"there is, nothing in the arrangements proposed by me in the least degree resembling our first proceedings in Affghanistan. History has now justly decided 
that the former measure was in itself at the veryi 
outset a great crime and a-great error". 2 
It is arguable that Jacob did not sufficiently distinguish 
1.1899. 
2. View; 
Cited as Ha 
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s Pelly, p. 383 
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(93) 
between what he thought of his own proposal and. what the 
Afghans might think, but it is unfair to read into his 
proposal in respect of Quetta the intention to subvert 
Afghan independence. 
Similarly, Rawlinson's first published contribution on 
the Central Asian questionl was not what one might have 
expected of a man afterwards known as a protagonist of the 
forward school. On the contrary, it contained a searching 
though temperate criticism of Auckland's policy. 
"The justice of the expedition seems now to be 
pretty generally abandoned; and the expediency 
of it, on which ground alone the defenders of 
the war are obliged to rest their case, is made 
to depend upon. the fact of an imminent danger, 
threatening the security of British power in 
the-East in 1838, which could be averted, or 
which at any rate seemed to be evitable, by no 
other means". 
The fall of Herat, he admitted, would have created "a certain 
amount of positive 'danger to India" and would have increased 
the internal agitation there; but the amount of danger did 
not justify a war, especially one which "violated all the 
acknowledged principles of military and political guidance". 
1. Our Political Relations with Persia, Calcutta Review, 
Vol. XII, 1849. The references to this and other papers, 
notably the memorandum of 1868, are taken from England and Russia in the East in which they were collected. Rawlinson (1810-1895) was one of the officers seconded to Persia in 
1830-39. He had then served as Political Officer in the 
later stages of the Afghan War and in 1843 had been 
appointed political agent in Turkish Arabia. 
(94) 
In any event the siege of Herat, which would have been 
raised without any demonstration on the part of Britain, was 
raised, to Auckland's knowledge, before the expedition 
started. The object which remained to Auckland, "the 
substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the Eastern 
provinces of Afghanistan", certainly had an abstract value 
but was "hardly more urgently needed in 1838 than in 1878, 
or than at any intermediate period". 
"We still cannot help suspecting, that it was 
owing in a great measure to the bureaucratic 
machinery of the Governor-General's camp, that 
the troops were finally set in motion". 
Rawlinson then went on to examine the progress made by 
Russia since the Afghan War and concluded that its slowness 
was due partly to the Caucusus entanglement and partly to 
the fact that Russia had drawn a salutary warning from what 
had happened at Kabul in 1841-42. As for the future, he 
concluded that Russia would continue for some years longer 
her same course of gradual advance: he did not anticipate 
any sudden or general action. 
"By what measures on the part of England the armed intervention of Russia in the north or in the east 
of Persia, if it ever should take place, would 
require to be met, would depend, not less upon the 
European combinations, to which in the meanwhile the election of Louis Napoleon to the Presidency 
of the French Republic, or other causes, might have led, than upon the state at the time of the finances of India, and upon the degree of fixity 
and security which might have been obtained for 
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our North-Western Frontier". 
1 
Assuming that a forward policy did not necessarily 
mean a policy of going forward indefinitely it could almost 
be deduced from what Rawlinson said that the establishment 
of a strong North-West frontier might remove one major cause 
for intervention in Afghanistan or Central Asia. It was 
to the problem of such a frontier that Jacob addressed 
himself but before we notice his proposals in more detail 
it will be convenient to give the story of relations between 
Britain and Persia and between Persia and Afghanistan up to 
date. 
Nasir-u-Din, who as a boy of sixteen had succeeded to 
the Persian throne on the death of Mohammad Shah in 1848, 
had for a few years the benefit of the services as Vazir of 
Amir-i-Nizam, whom Sykes describes as "the most remarkable 
Persian of his generation". 2 The murder of the Vazir early 
in 1852 had disastrous effects both upon the internal and 
the foreign policy of Persia. In the previous year Yar 
Mohammad, the ruler of Herat, had died. His son and 
successor, -8yed Mohammad, was a half-imbecile youth, who, 
when threatened by the Herat chieftains, appealed for support 
to Persia and offered his allegiance to the Shah. Rawlinson, 
at that time and later, considered that it would have been 
1. Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 56-59,67-69,78-79. 
2. Sir Percy Sykes: Persia, p. 127. 
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rather to the British advantage than otherwise that Herat 
should go to Persia but "conformably", as he said, "to the 
Foreign Office tradition ... the integrity of Herat was to 
be maintained at all hazards". 1 It was maintained by 
obliging Persia to conclude the treaty of 25th January 1853. 
By the terms of that treaty2 Persia was bound, so long as 
Britain did not interfere herself in-the internal affairs of 
Herat, not to interfere nor accept subjection or allegiance. 
Persia was also bound not to send troops "on any account" to 
Herat, except when troops from Kabul or Kandahar or "any 
foreign territory" should attack the place. This treaty 
was resented by the Persian Court* and the course which the 
Crimean War. took further lessened British influence in Tehran. 
The expected Anglo-Turkish offensive to aid Shamil in the 
Caucusus never took place and the capture of Sebastopol was 
far less important in Persian eyes than the failure to 
relieve Kars. * It was not unnatural, in these circumstances, 
that despite the treaty of 1853, Persian ambitions should 
again turn towards Herat. The desposition of Syed Mohammad 
1. Rawlinson, op-cit., pp. 84-85. Article on "Our Political 
Relations with Persia", written in 1874 as an appendix to the article of 1849 cited above. 
2. Aitchison, Treaties, Vol. VII, pp. 149-151. 
* It is believed that Russia delayed the evacuation of Kars to bring about the desired effect on Anglo-Persian 
relations. 
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at Herat and the substitution of Mohammad 
Yousuf, who had 
been a refugee in Persia, made the realisation of these 
ambitions easier. In December 1855 the British Minister, 
Murray, was obliged to leave Tehran after a series of 
insults and in March 1856 Persia sent an army to Herat which 
was admitted by Mohammad Yousuf. Very soon afterwards 
Mohammad Yousuf changed his mind, expelled the Persians and 
called for the assistance of Dost Mohammad. Eventually, 
however, on 25th October 1856, Herat was surrendered to the 
Persians. 1 
We shall have to note presently the effect of Persian 
action upon British relations with Dost Mohammad but for the 
moment it is better to pursue the narrative. The Persian 
occupation of Herat was followed by war with Britain. An 
expeditionary force from India, under Outram, landed on 
Karrak on 4th December 1856, went on to capture Bushire and 
defeated the Persian forces in two or three. not very 
desperate engagements. Peace was signed at Paris on 4th 
March 1857. Somewhat to the surprise of the Persians no 
indemnity was demanded and no territory claimed. Persia 
was obliged to withdraw from "Herat and every other part of 
Afghanistan", to relinquish all claims on those territories' 
and to accept British mediation in any disputes with 
1. Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 87-93. 
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Afghanistan and Herat. 
' Persia did withdraw her forces, 
in conformity with the letters of the treaty, but as the 
new ruler of Herat, Ahmed Khan, a nephew of Dost Mohammad, 
with whom he had quarrelled, reigned for the next five 
years as a vassal of the Shah, the result of armed British 
intervention was not obvious. 
It was the Persian threat to Herat which led Jacob, 
then Acting-Commissioner of Sind, to address himself to 
Lord Canning in 1856. The territory under Jacob's charge 
marched with Kalat. By the treaty of 18412 the Khan had 
bound himself to allow British troops to occupy any 
positions in Kalat in any force and to confide the conduct 
of his foreign relations to the Indian government; which, 
in its turn, guaranteed the integrity of his dominions and 
undertook to assist him in preserving internal order. This 
treaty had formed part of the diplomatic background of 
operations in Afghanistan and after they were concluded, 
although it was not abrogated, it was disregarded by the 
Indian government. The Khan, left unsupported, was unable 
to keep order, to protect British subjects or to prevent his 
own nominal subjects from raiding into British territory. 
1. Aitchison, Treaties, Vol. VII, pp. 155-160. 
2. Aitchison, Treaties, Vol. VII, pp. 75-76. Article I 
explicitly described the Khans of Kalat as the vassals of 
the Kings of Kabul. In the treaty of 1854 Kalat was 
treated as an independent state. 
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The policy of reviving or implementing the treaty was 
initiated by Jacob, with the approval of his chief, Sir 
Bartle Prere, Chief' Commissioner of Sind from 1850 to 1859. 
Lord Dalhousie, in a letter to Outram of 7th October 
1853, had expressed his disbelief in the expediency of 
"subsidizing the Khan, either in the hope of obtaining 
renewal of transit duties or to sustain his power". 
1 
Nevertheless, Jacob persevered and in the following year 
was empowered to meet the Khan. The result was the treaty 
concluded on 14th May 1854 and ratified on the 2nd June 
following. 2 The new treaty annulled that of 1841 and bound 
the Khan "to oppose to the utmost all the enemies of the 
British government ... and to enter into no negotiations 
with other States without its consent"; to allow the 
stationing of British troops in any part of-Kalat; to 
prevent plundering or outrage by his subjects in or near 
British territory; and to protect the passage of merchants 
between British territories and Afghanistan. The Indian 
government bound itself, so long as these agreements were 
observed, to pay the Khan an annual subsidy of 50,000 rupees. 
Two considerations arise from this treaty. Dalhousie 
1. A. I. Shand: General John Jacob, p. 186 (1900). 
2. Aitchison:, Treaties, Vol. VII, pp. 77-79. 
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was pleased with it and in a letter of 28th May said, 
"The 
treaty is a good treaty. I wish I could get as good a one 
from the Dost". 1 This accords with the view of relations 
with Afghanistan which, as will be shown later, he imposed 
upon John Lawrence. The more immediate point is that the 
treaty gave Jacob the opportunity to put forward proposals 
based on the right to station British forces in Kalat. 
Jacob's proposals were presumably those (or a shorter 
version of those) entitled-"Suggestions towards a Permanent 
Defence of the North-West Frontier of India" and "A Memo- 
randum of Proposed Arrangements in case of a British force 
being stationed-at Quetta, or at any other convenient spot 
above the Bolan Pass". 2 He began by assuming the intention 
of Russia to place Persia, her tool, in possession of Herat, 
Kandahar and a great part of Baluchistan, - an assumption 
upon which Rawlinson, with much more information at his 
disposal, had not made in 1849. If, Jacob went on, Russia 
succeeded in these designs, she "might then soon be in 
possession of the Punjaub and Sind". His plan for a strong 
North-West frontier was based on the argument that "at 
present, it appears to me that we are in a great measure in 
the position of a mighty army without outposts of any sort". 
1. Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie, ed. J. G. A. Baird, p. 301 1910 . 2. Views and Opinions, pp. 375-398. 
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The only two routes by which a foreign army could march 
into India were by the Bolan and the Khyber Passes: a 
British force at Quetta, in the territory of Kalat, could 
block the Bolan and also strike at the flank and rear of an 
army going through the Khyber. Once established at Quetta, 
with a good road made through the Bolan to Dadur and, 
ultimately, a railway from Dadur to the sea, the British 
might then "subsidize the Afghans with advantage so that 
they would come to consider their interests identical with 
ours". The result of this and of our much increased power 
to assist the Afghans at Herat and perhaps at Kandahar would 
be to gain "by moral influence a full control over Afghan- 
istan". We have noticed Jacob's disclaimer of reviving the 
policy of the first Afghan War; -but he argued, at the same 
time, that "we should not view this question with the eyes of 
men who served in Afghanistan during the Affghan War". The. 
changes in the last ten years, he believed, had removed the 
drawbacks to his policy which might have existed then. He 
concluded 
"You wish the red line of England on the map to 
advance no further. But to enable this red 
line to maintain its present position - to 
prevent its being driven back or erased from 
the map - it is, it appears to me, absolutely 
necessary to occupy posts in front of it". 
It was unfortunate for Jacob that the man whose opinion on 
his proposal Canning sought was one of those who had served 
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in the Afghan War and, more than that, the man who was 
perhaps the bitterest critic of Auckland's policy. Henry 
Durand had lately returned from England, where he had 
written the book published much later under the title of 
The First Afghan War. He was at this time soured by the 
official neglect which he believed he had experienced since 
his patron, Lord Ellenborough, left India and he no doubt 
welcomed the opportunity of being consulted by Canning. 
In his first memorandum, written on 8th October 1856, 
he put forward three objects to Jacob's proposal. If 
adopted, it would strip India of troops; Persia could be 
far more easily coerced by a sea borne attack than by an 
expedition to Herat; and "whatever the disposition of the 
Khan, every Afghan and Belooch will take a clear matter-of- 
fact view of our advance, and will know that once above the 
passes and in occupation of Afghanistan it will be a 
permanent military occupation". In a second memorandum, of 
16th October 1856, he argued that "to call things by their 
right names, the proposal is on the one hand the invasion of 
Persia and on the other the invasion of Afghanistan ... once 
launch armies into the heart of Persia or above the passes of 
Afghanistan, and events will entirely pass out of your 
control". These opinions Durand repeated in subsequent 
letters and conversations during the remainder of the year, 
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insisting that "the march of a British army across Afghan- 
istan, whatever our intentions, would be thoroughly 
unpopular, and would infallibly lead, sooner or later, to a 
collision with the Afghan people, and the occupation of the 
country""1 
Here was the fundamental difference between Jacob and 
Durand. Their interpretations of Afghan psychology differed 
radically. Jacob's reading of the lessons of the first 
Afghan War allowed of the Afghans coming to appreciate an 
identity of interest between themselves and the British and 
being helped to that appreciation by subsidies and assistance 
at Herat and Kandahar against the Persians. Durand's 
deduction from the first Afghan War was that the proclaimed 
purpose of the entry of British troops into a position in 
Afghanistan was immaterial, since two consequences would 
inevitably follow from their entry: their original purpose 
would be overborne by others; and the Afghans would look 
1. H. M. Durand: ý The Life of MaJor-General Sir Henry Marion 
Durandp Vol. Ip pp. 180-194 (2 vols., 1883). 
2. Wyllie, Essays on the External Policy of-India,, p. 92,, spoke 
of the "vitality of popular error" in the plans of Jacob 
and Green for the occupation of Quetta. His editor, W. W. 
Hunterp consulted and quoted one of the leading soldiers Izi 
India who agreed with Jacob to the extent that the Bolan 
ought to be defended from Quetta, which he regarded as far 
healthier for troops than any station in Sind. He consid- 
eredp howeverp that the case for the occupation of Quetta 
rested very much on the state of the communications behind 
it and that, as they were in 1856, they made Jacob's plan impracticable then. Loc. cit. 9 119n. 
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upon. them as invaders. Two other arguments could be urged 
against Jacob's suggestion of 1856. As the war in-the 
following year proved, Persia could be easily and effectively 
invaded by sea; and, until communications were much improved, 
the expenditure of resources in maintaining the garrison at 
Quetta would have been too heavy. 
In a letter of 18th October 1856 Canning set out his 
objections to Jacob's proposal; objections which, as Jacob's 
biographer admits, were "in the meantime ... unanswerable". 
Canning pictured the unhappy situation of 5,000 troops 
"isolated and at a distance of 200 miles from their 
resources", with "a difficult pass in their rear" and 
competing with the inhabitants for the scanty foodstuffs of 
the region. "Military occupation long continued in such a 
country", he added, "must carry with it civil government and 
civil government is sovereignty. The red line on the map 
would be again pushed further forward, and without finding 
so good a resting place as nowtr. l 
The administrators of Sind and those of the Punjab did 
not always see eye to eye and Jacob, on one occasion in 1854, 
in answer to a suggestion that a contingent from the Punjab 
should co-operate with the Sind Horse against the Murrees 
wrote, "All these people, military and civil, are minus 
1. Shand, op. cit., pp. 252-254. 
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quantities of large amount. Their proceedings now, close 
to us, are in defiance of all common sense ... Yet it 
is interesting to see that Jacob's views on thp"Bolan were 
echoed by two of the most notable of the "Punjab School". 
When H. B. Lumsden, of the Guides, was engaged in his mission 
to Kandahar in 1857-58 a good deal of correspondence passed 
between him and H. B. (afterwards Sir Herbert) Fdwardes, 
Commissioner of Peshawar. This correspondence will be 
quoted later on the subject of policy towards Afghanistan 
but the reference in point at present is to a lötter of 
Edwardes's to Lumsden of 20th April 1858.2 
"I am inclined to agree with you that it would be 
wise for us to occupy the Bolan. It is a greater 
strategical point I think than the Khyber, for 
it commands two lines of operations, to Herat or 
Cabul, and would enable us either to meet Russia 
or turn the Afghans. You would see, however, 
that it would be opposed by Sir John with all his 
might ... " 
The picture here is not quite the usual one of John Lawrence 
1. Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
2. Sir Peter S. Lumsden and G. R. Elsmie: Lumsden of the Guides, 
p. 242 (2nd edition, 1900). But later in 1858 Edwardes said 
he had learnt with regret and astonishment "that the 
authorities in Sindh. have advocated the friendly occupation 
of Quetta, above the Bolan Pass, as a preliminary to 
-subsidizing the Afghan nation and ultimately occupying 
Herat. So vast a pile of impracticable schemes seems more 
like some dream of conquest than a sober system of imperial 
defence". ibid., pp. 282-283. Edwardes's views could 
change quickly and were not always easy to reconcile with 
each other. 
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leading a solid body of opinion in favour of inaction and 
of Jacob leading another solid body in favour of a policy 
which was to terminate in the second Afghan War. The true 
picture is rather that of a number of men who wished to take 
a certain though not an indefinite move forwardl and of John 
Lawrence as a somewhat isolated opponent of all advance. 
Lawrence's position will be made clearer by an examination 
of policy towards Afghanistan under Dalhousie. 
The first point to be made about Dalhousie's policy is 
that it was not actuated by fear of a successful Russian 
invasion of India either in his day or in any future which 
chould be foreseen. "But for the bother of it", he wrote 
on 29th January 1854, "I don't care if they do come. They 
would get a precious thrashing ... i2 And on 13th June of 
the same year he wrote to the President of the Board of 
Control,. Sir Charles Wood, 
"That if Russia should invade India with all the 
power she can command at present, her army would 
be exterminated, even if it ever reached the 
borders of India, is quite certain ... "3 
It did not follow, for him, that no action with regard to the 
countries beyond the North-West frontier of India was 
1. Sir Charles Napier, the commander-in-chief, seems to have 
been alone (in 1849) in anticipating "the day, and come it 
will, when we shall conquer Afghanistan and occupy 
Kandahar". Sir William Lee Warner: The Life of the 
Marquis of Dalhousie K. T., Vol. I, p. 320 (2 vols., 1904). 
2. Private Letters of the Marquis of-Dalhousie, p. 285. 
3. Lee-Warner, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 72. 
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desirable; but it did follow that no action was so urgently 
desirable that it must be undertaken at all costs. His 
views were set out at length in another letter to Wood of 
31st May 1854. He believed that the Central Asian Powers, 
or one of them, might be made an effective natural barrier 
against Russia. The events of 1839-42 did not prove that 
Afghanistan might not be made such a barrier; they only 
proved "the error which wa_s cormitted in the way we went to 
work". Afghanistan was a defensible country with a 
fighting population: it would be worth while. going to some 
expense in keeping it in a condition when it might be 
serviceable to India, "The results of the policy which 
closed with 1843 disinclined us to have anything to say to 
the country in any way" but the revival of Persian designs 
upon Herat gave us the opportunity of coming to some form of 
agreement with Dost Mohammad. Such an agreement must be no 
cause for being drawn into the internal affairs of Afghan- 
istan and the more generalp the less detailed the agreement 
should be, the better. In the meantime Dalhousie saw no 
reason either to court or to bully Dost Mohammad. In 1850 
it had seemed that Dost Mohammad was about to make overtures 
for forgiveness for his participation in the second Sikh War 
and Dalhousie was pleased at the prospecto since he considered 
that "the absence of all relations between the Governments" 
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was mischievous in every way and especially in its effects 
on the border tribes. No further step, however, was taken 
at the time. In 1853 Dalhousie decisively turned down a 
suggestion to support an intrigue, if not positive action, 
against the Dost. He was careful, in fact, to keep a cool 
head and free hands, but ready to take advantage of a 
favourable opportunity for establishing relations on his 
own limited terms. ' 
It does not admit of doubt that Dost Mohammad's anxiety 
over Herat provided the opportunity: it is not clear from 
whom, on the British side, the first initiative-came. 
Dalhousie's biographer traces that initiative'to a letter 
of his to Edwardes of 7th February 1854; Lady Edwardes, in 
the Memorials of her husband's life', says (but" without giving 
any date) that-"he wrote'to Lord Dalhousie, and explained his 
views to him fully, asking-him to tell him how far they 
accorded with his own". 2- They accorded-reasonably well, 
though Dalhousie apparently, thought Edwardes-somewhat over- 
enthusiastic and over-optimistic. 
Such differences as there were between the views of 
Dalhousie and Edwardes were chiefly on tactics; Edwardes 
being willing to make overtures to Dost Mohammad and 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 77-82. 
2. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 82; Memorials of the Life and Letters of Sir Herbert B. Fdwa. rdes, Vol. I, p. 235 (2 vols., 1886 . 
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Dalhousie*at first unwilling. There wasp howeverp another 
opinion to be reckoned withp that of John Lawrence, Chief 
Commissioner of the Punjab. By Dalhousie's order Edwardes. 
corresponded with him-directlyt instead of through Lawrencep 
on the matter of the Afghan treaty;. but Lawrence was kept 
apprised of developments and there is no evidence that he 
was annoyed by this direct contact between his own chief and 
his own subordinate. In a letter to Dalhousie of 24th March 
1854 Lawrence argued that friendly relations with Dost 
Mohammad would be useful in border politics but that they 
were not essential, From the fact that they were not 
essential he went on to argue against "the extreme measure' 
of making overtures-to the Ameer". He added. advice against 
sending any Europeans to Kabul and against aiding DoBt 
Mohammad with money "in any circumstances". He suggestdd 
that Dost Mohammad be given to understandp "indirectly"g- that 
the Indian Government was "willing4to forget the past and 
enter-into friendly relationspýshould he desire it". In 
his reply of-11th April 1854 Dalhousie took broader ground. 
"It is-wise-for us to have regard to public opinion beyond 
the Five Rivers". ""In view'of that opinion it was also wise 
to make "some-exertion"; and he did not necessarily accept 
Lawrence's view that nothing should be done before a direct 
overture had been received from Dost Mohammad. Lawrence was 
not convinced. He saw that parliamentary opinion ought to 
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be conciliated but he grumbled that such conciliation ought 
not to entail any real sacrifice. He was still, on 4th May, 
against. subsidizing. Dost Mohammad and he did not believe that 
any subsidies could enable the Dost to defend Afghanistan 
against a determined Russian attack. 
l 
In March 1854 one Nazir Khairullah, a father-in-law of 
Dost Mohammad, presented himself to Edwardes and a channel 
of communication with Dost Mohammad was. opened. It was a 
channel that was nearly choked on several occasions during 
the next few months as various Afghan negotiators asked 
more from Edwardes - an offensive and defensive alliance, for 
example - than he was empowered. to offer. Another difficult 
matter was the desire of Dost Mohammad that the Indian 
government should give a guarantee never to have a represent- 
ative at Kabul. To this,, Dalhousie declined to agree: he 
was, however, prepared to repudiate all wish to have such a 
representative unless the representatives of other Powers 
should be admitted. The letter of 25th January 1855 in 
which instructions on this point were conveyed to Edwardes 
assumed that he would be empowered to negotiate the treaty 
1. The diSCUBBionB between Dalhousiep Lawrence and Edwardes 
can be followed fairly well in Lee-Warner, oP. cit. qVol. II. 
pp. 82-88; Memorials of the Life and Letters of Sir 
-Herbert B. Edwardepq Vol. Ip pp. 235-240 (2 vols.., 1886) end 
R. Bosworth Smith: Life of Lord Lawrence, Vol. 1, pp. 449-454. 
Unfortuxiatelyp Lady Edwardes was very sparing with dates 
in the Memorials. 
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and was accompanied by the draft 
terms. But when it 
appeared that Dost Mohammad had chosen his heir-apparent, 
Ghulam Hyder Khan, as his agent and had requested that he 
should deal with the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, 
Edwardes, who had worked so hard for a treaty, was obliged 
to yield place to Lawrence. 
' 
The negotiations began at Peshawar on 23rd March 1855. 
Lawrence had the advantage as a negotiator that he had no 
belief in the usefulness of a treaty and was all the more 
easily able to refuse Ghulam Hyder's suggestions for the 
restoration of Peshawar to Afghanistan or a guarantee of 
the Afghan title to Herat. 2 The treaty concluded, on 30th 
March 1855 and ratified on 1st May was a short and colourless 
document. In Article I Dost Mohammad was described at his 
own wish as the Walee rather than as the Ameer of Kabul. By 
Article 2 the Company engaged "to respect those Territories 
of Affghanistan now in His Highness's possession, and never 
to interfere. therein". Article 3 bound Dost Mohammad to a 
corresponding obligation in respect of the Company's 
territories and "to be the friend of the friends and the 
enemy of, the enemies" of the Company; no obligation parallel 
to the latter being undertaken by the Company. 3 On the 
1. Lee Warner, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 89-101. 
2. Bosworth Smith, oop. cit., Vol. I, pp. 455-462. 
3. Aitchison, Treaties, Vol. II, pp. 428-431. 
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surface, at least, the outcome was satisfactory. A treaty 
had been concluded but not one which implied any detailed 
obligations. The fact of the treaty was in accord with 
the initiative of Dalhousie and Edwardes: its contents were 
so negative as to satisfy John Lawrence. "The treaty has 
been signed", he wrote to Nicholson, "and there is no harm 
in it". 1 
Nevertheless, the treaty was important. There is all 
the difference between doing something on however small a 
scale and not doing it at all. A writer in the Cambridge 
History of India2 has drawn attention to the increasing 
degree of control which improved communications allowed the 
British government in the second half of the nineteenth 
century to exert over Indian foreign policy and has addedq 
"Unfortunately external policy was the one aspect of Indian 
political affairs which was capable of exciting interest in 
Great Britain". The Crimean War and the threat (however 
distant in Dalhousie's opinion) of Russian development in 
Central Asia had been the ultimate motives behind the treaty 
of 1855. Without substituting anything in its place it 
undermined, or the factors behind it underminedp the Anglo- 
Russian understanding of 1844 when it had been agreed that 
the khanates of Central Asia should "be left as a neutral 
1. Bosworth Smithq OP-cit-p V01.19 p. 462. 
2. H. H-Dodwell: Vol-VI, pp. 403-404 (1932). 
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zone between the two empires in order 
to preserve them from 
a dangerous contact". Those empires were still 
far from 
being near a dangerous contact but the resumption of 
the 
Russian advance eastward in the years after the Crimean 
War 
was bound to make such a contact more probable. So long as 
there was no binding Anglo-Russian understanding covering 
Central Asia matters were bound to be left very much to the 
accidents of geography and of individual policy. Time 
would show that the Russians had one great advantage: the 
khanates of Central Asia could not only be conquered but 
couldv as a political and military fact, be held. Afghanistan 
might be conquered by the British - not even John Lawrence or 
Henry Durand doubted that - but it would be difficult to hold, 
as a merely military operation, while a permanent occupation 
(involving as it must a very heavy drain on Indian resources) 
would be politically almost impracticable. 
In the meantime the course of events at Herat, which had 
provided the opportunity for the treaty of 1855, continued to 
draw the Indian government into closer relations with Dost 
Mohammad. Herat, as we have seen, passed into Persian hands 
in October 1856 and "at the close" of that yearl (as Lady 
Edwardes rather vaguely put it) Edwardes recommended that 
more active aid should be given to Dost Mohammad. This 
1. Memorials, Vol. I, p. 260. 
-------.---~----~- ---------------- - ---------
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recommendation was probably in answer to a regue~t from the
Dost made in the autumn of 1856 upon his return to Kabul from
the capture of Kandahar with his victorious but starving army.
At all events, Edwardes was in favour of further negotiations;
Lawrence against them. "It appears to me", wrote Lawrence,
"that we shall get nothing out of the Ameer except by paying
through the nose for it ••• Even if we give him twenty or
thirty lacs of rupees, we can feel no assurance what~ver, we
have no pledge that he will take an active part in the Herat
affair •••ltl These preliminary discussions appear to have
taken place just before the completion of the Persian
occupation of Herat but at a time when that event was
obviously imminent. vThen it happened, Edwardes went so far
as to suggest the immediate despatch of British troops to
KabUl and Kandahar. This gave Lawrence the opportunity to
state his views at some length both to Edwardes and to the
new Governor-General, Lord Canning.2
Writing to Edwardes on 25th November 1856 he deprecated
in strong terms the idea of sending a.force into Afgha.nistan.
He believed that Russia was at t:p.ebottom of the attack on
Herat but the battle of India, he said, was Uto be fought on
this side of the Soliman range and not on that". To Canning------------------------------------------
1. Bosworth Smith, op.cit., Vol.I, p.513.
2. Ibid., Vol.I, pp.514-517.
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he wrote on the following day at greater length. "It would 
be a fatal error", he said, "for us to interfere actively in 
Central Asia" ... He admitted that 
"the interests of the Afghans ares at presentq 
identical with ours but it does not follow 
that such will always be-the case ... If we 
send an army into Afghanistan, it must go* 
prepared for all contingenciess to meet all 
comers, to depend solely on its own means and 
its own resources, *and, at Heratv it would be 
many hundred miles from our frontier and from 
any effective support ... If we send a force 
to Candahar, it will eventually necessitate 
the re-occupation of the country. Afghanistan 
will then become the battle-field for India, 
and the cost of maintaining our position will 
render India bankrupt; and should we meet with 
reverses we shall have to retrace our stepso 
with an exhausted treasury and a dispirit , 
ed 
army. Whereas2 on the other hand., if we leave 
Afghanistan alone, we should meet an invaderp 
worn by toil and travailp with a weak Artillery 
and distant from his resources, as he debouched 
from the passes. Under such circumstances 
defeat would be certainp and defeat would be 
annihilation". 
The question which Lawrence left unanswered, was whether 
there was not some middle course between sending an. army into 
Central Asia and waiting for a foreign army to enter India; 
in other words, whether diplomacy could not. play some part. 
In point of fact, a middle course was being sought and through 
the agency (though not at the wish) of Lawrence himself, who 
had been instructed to meet Dost Mohammad. The meeting took 
place on Ist January 1857 and negotiations began at Peshawar 
on 5th January. Lawrence, who had previously opposed the 
payment of any subsidy to any Afghan, was now obliged to 
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consent to this course but by deflecting Dost Mohammad from 
his scheme for a large and therefore expensive attack on 
Herat and by insisting that the Afghans adopt a defensive 
policy towards Persia he'was able to keep the amount of the 
subsidy within reasonable limits. The subsidy was fixed at 
one lakh of rupees a month, beginning on lst January 1857 
and continuing, unless the Governor-General otherwise 
determined, until peace should be made between Britain and 
Persia. Dost Mohammad, on his partv was bound, to maintain 
a specified number of troops and to admit British officers 
to Kabuls Kandahar or Balkh to see-that the subsidy was 
applied to its proper purposes. They were, to be withdrawn 
when the subsidy ceased but thereafter "a Vakeel, not a 
European officer". could be sent by the Governor-General to 
represent him at Cabul. The question of British represent- 
ation, both. temporary and permanent, had been the only real 
source of difficulty at the Peshawar Conference. The 
Afghans represented that the presence of any British officers 
would outrage Afghan national feeling, especially if they 
were sent to Kabul. Lawrence insisted that the formal right 
to send British officers to Kabulp Kandahar or Balkh should 
be embodied in the treaty but he gave assurances that they 
shouldo in facty be sent only to Kandahar; and he was in 
agreement with the Afghans that British representation at 
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Kabul should be entrusted to a native Vakil and not to a 
European. He also promised that Afghanistan would not be 
"left in the lurch" when an Anglo-Persian treaty of peace 
was concluded. 1 
The British mission to Kandahar, composed of the Lumsden 
brothers, Harry and Peter, and Dr. Bellew was not despatched 
until 13th March 1857. In a letter of instructions to 
H. B. Lumsden, dated 19th January 1857, the Governor-General 
had told him, 
"You cannot impress too strongly upon every man 
you meet that the British Government does not 
desire to send into Afghanistan a single man, 
armed or unarmed, except with the full consent 
of the Afghans themselves; that you are there 
for a temporary purpose only, that of assuring 
your Government that the aid which it has bound 
itself to give is turned to good account, and 
that if the war were to cease to-morrow your 
mission would be at an end". 2 
The task of these officers was dangerous, for even at 
Kandahar, where fanatical hatred of the English was less 
than it was at Kabul, they were by no means safe. _ 
They 
appear to have had little or no opportunity of seeing how 
the subsidy was spent and, indeedv if the terms of the treaty 
had been strictly enforced on the part of the Indian govern- 
ment payment would have ceased when the Anglo-Persian treaty 
1. Ibid. y Vol. Ip pp. 517-523. The text of the treaty is given by Aitchisonp Treatiesp Vol. II, pp. 431-433. 
2. Lumsden and Elsmie, OP-cit., pp. 141-143. 
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of peace was concluded in March 1857. In 
fact, payment was 
continued until 30th September 1858p a sum of Z260,000 
being 
disbursed in all. 1 The outbreak of the Mutiny in the spring 
of 1857y however, was the best of reasons for the continuance 
of the payment. Even if it was a bribe rather than a 
subsidyý by that time it was a bribe very well worth paying 
since it assisted Dost Mohammad to maintain his resolve 
(much as he was pressed to abandon it) not to support the 
rebels in India or to invade the Punjab. 
Edwardes's own views were set out in a memorandum which 
he wrote on Lumsden's Report on the Candahar Mission. "I 
have myself", he said, "arrived very decidedly at the 
conclusion that our true military position is on our side of 
the passes just where an enemy must debouch into the plain". 
2 
He believed that this would remain true even if Russia 
absorbed all the territory between her present border and 
India, including Afghanistan. This view might well have been 
presented by Lawrence. It is, in fact, very difficult to 
1. H. C. Rawlinsony op. cit., p. 92. Laters Lord Lytton was to 
argue that Article 7 of the 1857 treaty, which provided for 
the withdrawal of the British officers when the subsidy 
ceased and the appointment of a vakil at Kabul wasv with 
the other provisions, transitory; and had lapsed with the 
lapse of timep so that the Indian government was not 
restricted to a non-European repre 
. 
V, 47ntative. Afghanistan, 
No. 1 Parl. Papers 1878-799 Vol. 56'.. p. 216. But the phrase 
"at the pleasure of the British government" implied a 
continuing obligationt andl to that extenty a restriction. 
2. Memorialsq Vol. 1, pp. 279,281. 
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attribute any fixed and final views to Edwardes on this 
matter. In 1856, as we have seen, he suggested that British 
forces should be sent to Kabul and Kandahar. On 18th March 
1858 he wrote to H. B. Lumsden, 
"I coincide in all your views as to the impropriety 
of retaining your mission so long after the 
specified time in Afghanistan, also in "the less 
we have to do with them the better" - i. e. that 
we are more likely to remain friends without 
any permanent political missions than with them. "1 
But this very letter suggested that there was an advantage in 
remaining friends with the Afghans, and presumably this end 
called for means of some sort. Lumsden's opinion (with 
which, according to Lady Edwardes, her husband was in 
agreement) was to the effect that 
"Afghanistan alone se6med still to be independent 
of Russia and to keep it so should be our aimo 
Friendly and intimate intercourse should be 
maintained with the de facto Government of Cabul. 
The internal administration should not be inter- 
fered witho the Afghans being left to manage 
their home affairs in their own way without 2 interference by Persia or by any other power". 
Obviouslyp againj some positive measures would be necessary 
to keep AfghaniBtan independent of Russia and to maintain 
"friendly and intimate in tercourse" with the Kabul government., 
Such a policy, howevertemperately pursued# was not the same 
thing as waiting for a Russian force to appearp ready for 





massacre., on the Indian frontier. The great difficultyg of 
coursep was in deciding how far a policy which was at all 
positive ought to go. By 1866, as we shall seep Edwardes 
was able to be somewhat more specific. 
The six years between 1857 and 1863 do not demand much 
examinationp so far as Afghanistan was concerned. ' Dost 
Mohammad may well hav6 felt that he had gained little in 
respect of Herat by the treaty of 1857 but he remained loyal 
to his engagements. ' Those engagements did not, howeverp 
prevent him attacking Herat himself; although the Indian 
government did not want him to do so and when he did so, in 
1862t withdrew its vakil from ]Kabul. Dost Mohammad neverthe- 
less persisted in his design and captured Herat, nine days 
before his own death in May 1863.1 At the end of November 
of the same year John Lawrence was told that he was to 
succeed Lord Elgin as Viceroy. With his landing at Calcutta 
on 12th January 1864 this chapter may properly close. 
H. C. Rawlinson, oP. cit., pp. 99-105 drew attention to the 
almost completely negative policy of Britain towards 
Persia in these yearsp evidenced by the British refusal 
to put-any pressure on Dost Mohammad (save by the with- 
drawal of the vakil at Kabul) or to offer mediation under 
Article 6 of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1857 in the 




THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LORD LAWRENCE 
However hard one may try to dismiss a phrase which has 
once lodged in one's mind it is not easy to do so completely, 
ancl the description of Lawrence's p0liCy. aB-, "masterly 
inactivity'll is bound to recur. But the temptation to ask 
whether Lawrence waBv or could be, inactive; whether his 
inactivity, if he achieved it, was masterly; whether 
inactivity could ever be masterly, and so on, is one to be 
resisted. It is-the plan of this chapter to set out certain 
specific developments in Afghanistan and Central Asia and 
then to describe Lawrence's policy with respect to them and 
1. The phrase was popularized, if not actually Inventedg by 
J. W. S. Wylie (1835-70) who finished his short career in 
India as Under-Secretary of the Foreign Department. He 
wrote three important articles: "The Foreign Policy of 
Lord Lawrence" (Edinburgh Review, January 1867); "Masterly 
Inactivity" (FortnightlX Reviewq lst December 1869); and 
"Mischievous Activity" (Fortnightly Review, lst March 1870); 
the last one a rather hasty criticism of Lord Mayo's policy. 
These articles, with others, were collected after the 
author's death and published under the title Essays on the 
External Policy of India (1875). The references given are 
to this book. It is perhaps significant of the way in 
which views on Central Asian policy were already beginning 
to run on party lines that Wyllie stood for Parliament as 
a Liberal and his essays were published in Liberal or 
Liberal-Radical periodicals while Rawlinson's article on "The Russians in Central Asia" was published in the 
Conservative Quarterly Review in October 1865 although he 
was still regarded as a moderate Liberal in politics. 
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the problems they raised. In some instances, for 
convenience, the developments will be traced to a date 
beyond 1869 and will form the background for the consider- 
ation of the policy of Lawrence's successors. 
Upon Dost Mohammad's death his heir designate, Sheer 
Alit had succeeded him but in April 1864 Sheer Ali's elder 
half-brotherst Mohammad Afzal and Mohammad Azimq rose in 
rebellion. They were defeated but in the spring of the 
following year there was another rebellion led by Sheer Ali's 
own brothersp Mohammad Amin and Mohammad Shareef. They too 
were defeated, at KuJbaz, in June 1865, when both Mohammad 
Amin and Sheer Alits heirg Mohammad Ali, were killed. 
Mohammad Shareef thereupon sued for peace and was pardoned: 
Mohammad Azim fled to British territory. Almost at onco r 
third rebellion followedl that of Abdur Rahmanp the son of 
Mohammad Afzalp who had fled across the Oxus in 1864 and now 
returnedq with assistance from Bokhara. Abdur Rahman, 
Joined by Mohammad Azimv captured Kabul in February 1866 and 
defeated Sheer Ali at Sheikhabad in May 1866. Following 
upon this Mohammad Afzal-- was released from captivity and 
proclaimed Ameer. In January 1867 Sheer Ali made an attempt 
to restore his fortunes but being defeated at Kalat-i-Ghilzai 
retired to Herat. Another attempt, based on Afghan 
Turkistan, was thwarted by Abdur Rahmau in September 1867. 
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In October 1867 Mohammad Af zal died and was succeeded by 
Mohammad Azim. Abdur Rahman., who had witnessed this 
without enthusiasm, set off on an expedition to pursue Sheer 
Ali to Herat but failed to effect hi_B purpose. Sheer Ali 
collected another force# aided by the unpopularity of 
Mohammad Azim, and his Bon, Yakub Khanp re-captured Kandahar. 
The tide turned Bo quickly that Mohammad Azimp receiving no 
help from Abdur Rahman,, fled from Kabul in August 1868. In 
the face of this Bome measure of co-operation between 
Mohammad Azim and Abdur Rahman was renewed but it was quite 
ineffective and their force*s were completely defeated by 
Sheer Ali at Zurmatj near Ghazni., in January 1869. Upon 
this Abdur-Rahman, accompanied by Mohammad Azim, (who diedj, 
however, in the course of their wanderings) set off on a 
long and hazardous journey which brought him to PerBia, Khiva, 
Bokhara and ultimately to-Samarkandp by-this time a Russian 
possession. He met the Russian commanderp General Kaufmann, 
and although he did not-receive the support he wanted he was 
given hospitality and resided at Samarkand from 1870 to 1880.1 
In March 1869 Sheer Ali, then relatively secure upon the 
throne of Afghanistan, met Lord Mayo, the Viceroy of India, 
at Ambala. In 1870 Yakub Khan., whom his father refused to 
recognize as heir-apparentp rose in rebellion and in May 1871, 
1. Sykes, Afghanistan, Vol. II, chapter xxxiv. 
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with the help or connivance of the Persians, captured Herat. 
His position therep howevery was even more precarious than 
that of his father at Kabul and in September 1871 a' 
reconciliation was effected between. father and song Yakub 
Khan being appointed Governor of Herat. 
The second factor which had to be taken into account in 
the formation of British policy was the advance of Russia 
into Central Asia. We have seen that before the Crimean 
War the Russians had established themselves on the shores of 
the Aral Sea, had built a fort at Aralsk (subsequently 
I 
re-named Fort No, l) and hado in 18539 captured Ak-Masjido 
higher up the Jaxartesp which was re-named Fort Petrofski in 
honour of its captor. Further penetration up the Jaxartes 
led to the'establishment of a fort at Julek in 1861. 
In the meantime a parallel development was taking place 
to the south-east, where Fort Vernoe was built in 1854 some 
fifty (English) miles to the north of Lake Issik-Kul. The 
years 1854 to 1862 were devoted to capturing or establishing 
a line of outposts westwards, or backwards# at first along 
the line of the River Chu and then along and behind the 
Talas. In the course of these operations the Khokand posts 
of Susak and Chulak fell into Russian hands but the 
extension of Russian power did not stop there. Turning 
southward, the Russians captured Hazret-i-TurkeBtan early in 
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1864 and then, moving Bouth-eaBtwards, Chemkend in October 
of that year. 
The extent of the Russian conquests was apparently 
sufficientp in the eyes of Prince Gortchakoff, to induce 
him to send, on 21st November 1864, a circular despatch to 
all Russian embassies and legations. Its object was to 
explain and justify the conquests and to reassure hostile 
critics of them. 
! 'La, poBition de la Russe dans ItAsie centrale est 
celle de tous les Etats civilise's qui se trouvent 
en contact avec-des peuplades a demi-sauvagesp 
errantes, sans organisation sociale fixee. . 
Il 
arrive toujoursp en pareil cass que 11interet de 
la securite des frontieres et celui des relations 
de commerce exigent que I'Etat plus civilise' 
exerce un certain ascendant sur des voisins que 
leurs moeurB nomades et turbulentes rendent fort , 
incommodes ... L'Etat se trouve donc dans 
ltalternative ou d'abandonner ce travail incessant 
et de livrer ses frontieres a des desordres 
- PEýrpetueýls qui y rendent toute prosperite, toute 
securite, toute civilisation impossibles, ou bien 
d1avancer de plus en pýus dans les profondeurs 1. % 
de contrees sauvages oul a chaque pas qutil 
accomplit,, les distances accroissent les 
difficultes et leB charges auxquelles il s'expose.. " 
Gortchakoff then likened the action of Russia to that under- 
taken by the French in Algeria and by the British in India; 
and went on to Justify the fortification of the line from the 
Aral Sea to Lake Issik-Kul. Finally he sought to make it 
clear that Russia had reached the limit of her territorial 
extensions - Itnous. accomplissons la premiere partie de cette 
tache en portant notre frontiere a la limite ou se recontrent 
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ceB conditions indispensables" - and appealed for the 
sympathy of other nations - 'Ile cabinet imperial ... a droit 
de compter Bur une appreciation equitable et loyale de la 
marche qu1il poursuit et des principes qui le guident". 
It very Boon became apparent, however, either that 
Gortchakoff had sought to practise deception with regard to 
Russian intentions or that the government at St. Petersburg 
was wholly unable to control its commanders on the frontier. 
In June 1865 Tashkent was captured; in 1668 Bokhara was 
brought under Russian control. In 1869 the Russians 
established a fortified position at Krasnovodsk on the 
eastern coast of the CaBPian andt after making the necessary 
surveys and reconnaisances., captured Khiva in 1873. By the 
treaty which the Khan was obliged to conclude on 12th August 
of that year Khiva, as Bokhara had donev placed its external 
relations in the hands of RUBsia, andt moreoverv ceded'tt)- 
Russia the right bank of the OXUB from Kuketili north to the 
Aral Sea. 
In view of the rapidity of the Russian advance the 
suggestion (made, for instances by Rawlinson) that the Oxus 
should form the frontier between the British and the Russian 
spheres of influence in Central Asia would now represent a 
concession on Russia's part. It was a concession which she 
was not in the least disposed to make and one which 
Gladstone's government made only the feeblest efforts in the 
(127) 
years 1869-73 to extort from her. The Russians agreedp in 
principle, that a neutral zone should exist between their 
sphere and that of Britain; but they claimed that Afghan- 
istan represented such a neutral zone and that they had the 
right to extend their area of control up to the Afghan 
borders. Their ultimate object does not directly concern 
us here. It might be an attack on India, but it is more 
likely that it was the power to put pressure on Britain by 
being in a position to threaten an attack on India. Thisp 
at least, is the clear implication of the instructions issued 
to the Ba'ron de Staal when he was appointed Russian ambasB- 
ador in London in 1884. 
"Great historical lessons have taught us that we 
cannot count on the friendship of England# and 
that she can strike at us by means Of continental 
alliances while we cannot reach her anywhere. 
No great nation can accept such a position. In 
order to escape from it the emperor Alexander II 
of everlasting memory ordered our expansion in 
Central Asiap leading us to occupy to-day in 
Turkestan and the Turkestan steppes a military 
position strong enough to keep England in check 
by the threat of intervention in Indialt. 1 
But whatever view is taken of the motives for the Russian 
1. Cambridge History of India.. Vol. VI,, p. 408. The Russian 
advance into Central Asia is treated, critically, by 
Rawlinsono op. cit. 9 chapters iii, v and viv and by A. 
Vambery in Central Asia- and the Anplo-Russian Frontier 
Question (1-8-79ý7. An account of the capture of Khivaj 
generally sympathetic to Russia, was given by an American journalistp LT. A. MacGahanp in Campaigning-on the Oxus. and the Fall of Khiva (1876), X also D. C. Boulger: Central Asian 
Questions (1885F and Ge eral Romanovskif op. cit. 
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advance into Central Asia it was arguable that British 
interest in Afghanistan was bound to increase, or, ought to 
increase, with every mile that Russia moved eastward. 
Wyllie's first articlep on "The Foreign Policy of Lord 
Lawrence"t published in 1667v was written in 1866 "at the 
express request" of Lawrencel himself. Bosworth Smithp 
writing laterv also had ample opportunities of discovering 
Lawrence's personal views; and the works of these two writers 
may be taken as being generally in accord with Lawrence's own 
opinions. They are, howeverv general descriptions rather 
than detailed expositionss and they make relatively little 
use of direct quotation. 
Wyllie's summing-up in his first article was as follows: 
"We do not shrink from the conclusion to which these 
arguments all point. We believe that with respect 
to Central Asia the Indian Government can do no 
wiser thing than fold its hands and sit still. By 
all means let it obtain information, detailed and 
accurate, regarding the course of events beyond 
the mountains; but let no decisive action of any 
kind be taken until England can see more clearly 
what there is she should do. The materials are 
not wanting for the formation of an effective 
intelligent department. There is a news-writer 
at Kabul, whose diariesp on the whole, give a 
faithful picture of all that passes in Afghan- 
istan; and, as regards tidings from the other 
States of Central Asia, there are Panjabi 
merchants and travellers, whose somewhat hyber- 
bolical accounts can from time to time be checked 
by the despatch of specially selected Scouts. 
1. Wyllie, o . cit., xx. 
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Presuming that Lord Lawrence must have already 
pressed these sources of information into his 
services we think there is nothing more at 
present to be done. We should be quiet now, 
in order that we may act with greater vigour 
when the time for action comes. Every day of 
peace and economy that India enjoys strengthens 
our moral and material hold on the country". 1 
A few pages earlier Wyllie had described three schools 
of opinion. There wasp in the first place, that which was 
actuated by "the vague alarm which a quarter of a century 
ago hurried Us into the blunderg-guilt and miserable 
discomfiture of the Afghan War" and now pressed for an 
'Immediate reoccupation of all Afghanistan". In the second 
place, there were "politicians of another and far. higher 
stamp" who, without seeing any proximate danger from RuSBia, 
feared the effect upon Indian opinion of a first-class Power 
established on the Indian frontier and dreaded that India., 
"won and held ... by an alien sword" should be a battle- 
1. Ibid., pp. 68-69. It is only fair to observe that whether T"inactivell is used as a term of praise or blame the policy 
of Lawrence's immediate predecessors had not been active, 
In the Minutes of Lord Canning and his Council of 5th 
February 1857 (published by Order of the House Of Commons, 
25th February 1879). it was said: "I trust the maxim that 
Herat shall remain in its own state of independence will 
not again be proclaimed as an object to be contended for, 
or even to be desired by the British Government. I believe 
the independence to be visionary and unattainable ... 11 And on Afghanistan: "I will go to the length of saying that 
under no circumstances can itv in my opinionp consist with 




ground. The members of this school, among whom Wyllie 
listed Jacobp Rawlinson and Sir Justin Sheil, l were convinced 
that "sooner or later we ought to occupy certain positions 
beyond our present frontier as outworks of the empire" 
Quettaq possibly Kandahar and Herat. 
"The majority of the British public". Wyllie 
continued, "appear to fa-, ýour a third view of 
the question. Under the inspiration of a 
generous optisism, rather than from any dis-, 
criminate appreciation of the dangers to which 
the Indian empire is exposed, they scout Russo- 
phobia as an exploded fallacy. In the interests 
of humanity they rejoice that a dayspring of 
Christian civilization is spreading through the 
horrible blackness of barbarism in which Central 
Asia has hitherto been wrapped and they posit- 
ively grudge the interval that must yet elapse 
before India can have a neighbour whose dealings 
with her will be conducted on the clear 
principles of European good faith, and whose 
settled goverment will offer new openings for 
trade. Their vision of the future is the Cossack 
and the Sepoy lying down like lambs together on 
the banks of the Indus". 2 
1.1803-71; secretary to the British legation in Tehran, 
1836-44; minister to Persia, 1844-54. 
2. Wyllie, op. cit. v pp. 60-64. Evidence of the "generous 
optimism" to which Wyllie refers can be found in a 
pamphlet entitled Russia, Central Asia and British TndiaO 
by a British Subject, published in London in 1865. The 
writer gave special emphasis to "the dawn arising in 
Russia", illustrated by the liberal and reforming regime* 
of Alexander II. He was anxious (p. 40 n. ) to "let bygones 
be bygones" with respect to Poland and argued (p. 41) that "Englishmen ought to study Russian progress in Asia; not, 
as now, in the mere military aspect, but in its effect in 
opening out roads for trade in the desert, bringing 
European light end civilizationp suppressing slavery and Mussulman intolerance". Wyllie was probably correct in 
saying that such views were held-by Ita majority of the (Continued foot next page) 
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It will now be-appropriate to consider what Lawrence 
did and did not do in respect of Central Asia and Afghan- 
istan during his vice-royalty. He did notq naturally, find 
a clean slate awaiting him. One important development had 
taken place before his arrival in India in January 1864. 
Upon his father's death Sheer Ali announced his own accession 
to Lord Elgin; doubtless with the hope that his. position 
would be strengthened by a cordial acknowledgment of it on 
the part of the Indian goverr=ent. No reply was sent until 
23rd December 1863 when the acting Governor-General, Sir 
William Denison (Lord Elgin having died in November) wrote 
to Sheer Ali. 
"I sincerely trust that under your rule Afghan- 
istan may possess a strong and united Government 
2. (continued from previous page). 
English public". cf. Quarterly Revie , April 1865: "It is assuredly a great boon to humanity that some of the 
most fertile countries in the world should be restored 
to life and touched by the breath of material progress. 
It is a matter of thankfulness that bad and cruel tyran- 
nies, held disgraceful among the Asiatic nations them- 
selves, should crumble to dust at the first blow from the, 
northern 
t 
giant". Even in India similar opinions existed. 
cf. Allen s India Mail, 6th April 1865 (quoted by "A 
British Subjectllý "Instead, therefore, of expressing 
either fear or regret at Russian progress in the East, 
it would be both more liberal and rational to rejoice 
that light is dawning in dark places, and to render every 
assistance in our power to develop a result as creditable 
as it will be beneficial to all concerned in bringing it 
to pass". 
(132) 
and that the-good understanding and friend: - 
ship which prevailed during the lifetime of 
the late Ameers your predecessor, may continue 
to gain strength and stability under your own 
administration". 1 
The delay in recognizing Sheer Ali was at the time and 
afterwards an object of strong criticism. Both the 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the-COMMiBBioner Of 
Peshawar had been pressing for earlier recognition. The 
latter, writing on 14th November 1863p had saidq 
"What appears to me the evil of, our not acknowl- 
edging the de facto ruler of the country is 
that the other Sirdarsp to whom the fact of 
our keeping the matter in suspense is well 
known, will be inclined to think that we have 
other intentionss that we have in fact selected 
some successor other than the present one whom 
we mean to favour; and such a belief can only 
foster distrust and dissension while it will 2 greatly weaken the present Ameer's hands". 
Wyllie defended or excused the delay on three grounds 
and although Lawrence had incurred no responsibility for it 
he must be taken, in view of Wyllie's close relations with 
him, to have assumed some responsibility for the defence. 
The delay, according to Wylliev arose partly from accidento 
"the length of time that necessarily elapsed before authentic 
information of the death and the dying WiBheB of Dost 
Mohammad could travel from the distant camp at Herat to the 
viceregal lodge at Simla" and "from the check which Lord 
1. Afghanistan, No. I Parl. Papers 1878-790 Vol. 56,, pp. 'cl--ý 
2. lbid. 9 p. 381. 
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Elgints mortal illness was then inflicting on every wheel 
of the state machiner". In the second place, the Indian 
government was under no obligation to recognise Sheer Ali or 
anyone else as Dost Mohammadts successor. In the third, 
delay in recognition of Sheer Ali's succession "had no more 
effect in rousing or quelling the force of Azim Khan's . 
revolutionary ambitions than it could have upon the motion 
of the planets in heaven". 
1 
This defence is not entirely convincing. That the 
machinery of state should be haltedy over an important 
matter, by the illness and death of the viceroy does not 
argue a very efficient machinery; while the delay in 
receiving authentic news from Afghanistan does not suggest 
such an efficient intelligence service as Wyllie had-spoken 
of. If the sources of news from Afghanistan were so slow 
or so poor that the Indian govermnent had to wait for six 
months to obtain information it could trusts its intelligence 
service was bad. It is doubtful, on the other hands if 
Elgin's illness and death were more than an excuse for delay. 
He himself had written to Sir Charles Woods Secretary of 
State for India, on 28th July 1863 to say that he was 
awaiting further information before acknowledging Sheer Ali 
as Dost Mohammad's successor. If good information had been 
1. Ibid., p. 377. 
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available or if there had been the will to use such- 
information as there was, recognition could have been given 
in July. Elgin's fu. -ther argument that the continued 
presence df the vakil at Kabul would show that the Indian 
government was disposed to recognize Sheer Ali does not bear 
examination. The vakil was not a diplomatic agent: his 
presence in Kabul did not constitute proof of the recog- 
nition of any Afghan ruler. As for the second of Wyllie's 
arguments, it is certainly true that the Indian government 
was under no legal obligation to recognize Sheer Ali; but 
this was a matter of policy and not of international law. 
In the third place, there is some evidence that the delay in 
recognition did encourage Sheer Ali's half-brothers to foment 
rebellion against him, despite the allegiance which they had 
pledged on the Koran; since it was during the period of non- 
recognition that Mohammad Azim made overtures to the Indian 
government. Finally, it has to be remembered that Dost 
Mohammad had, during the last and most successful part of his 
reign, been in treaty relations with the Indian government. 
This suggests the propriety of an early recognition of a 
successor who had been recognized as suchp fo ,r 
the moment, by 
other possible claimants and the AfghanB at large. 
It was not long before Lawrence had the opportunity of 
making amends for Elgin's or Denison's delay., In February 
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1864 Sheer Ali asked for the recognition of his son Mohammad 
Ali as his heir and a gift of 6,000 muskets. Recognition 
was. granted; the muskets were not. In April 1864, as we 
have seenp Sheer Ali was faced by the first of those 
rebellions against which he foughtp at first successfully 
and then unsuccessfully until this phase of the civil warB 
ended with his defeat at Sheikhabad in May 18661 and the 
installation of Mohammad Afzal as Ameer. Following upon 
that, Mohammad Afzal sought the friendship of the Indian 
government, Lawrence's reply, of llth July 1866., included 
the following passages: 
"But while I am desirous that the alliance between 
the two Governments should be firm and lastingg 
it is incumbent on me to tell your Highness that 
it would be inconsistent with the fame and 
reputation of the British Government to break-off 
its alliance with Amir Sher Ali Khan, who has 
given to it no offencet so long as he retains his 
authority and power over a large portion of 
Afghanistan. That Amir still rules in Kandahar 
and in Herat. My friend, the relations of this- 
Government are with the actual rulers of Afghan- 
istan. If your Highness is able to consolidate 
your Highness'B power in Kabulp and is sincerely 
desirous of being a friend and ally of the British 
Government, I Bhall be ready to accept your 
Highness as such; but I cannot break the existing 
engagements with Amir Sher Ali Khanp and I must 
1. In June and July 1864 Sheer Ali made three more requests 
for arms. HiB first letter was delayed- the second-and 
third were regarded as forgeries and no answer was Bent 
to his application. Wyllie, op. cit., p. 77. Once more, 
British intelligence about Afghanistan seems-to have been 
bad. 
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continue to treat him as the ruler of that 
portion of Afghanistan over which he retains 
control ... "l 
Lawrence's letter is said by Wyllie to have produced 
conBternation at Kabul, where the recognition of Mohammad 
Afzttl as the ruler of Afghanistan had apparently been counted 
on. If this is true, if the recognition of the Viceroy of 
I 
India could carry so much weightv it suggests that the long 
delay in recognizing Sheer Ali in 1864 must have been of far 
greater importance than Wyllie allows. on 10th September 
1866 Sheer Ali adressed yet another appeal to Lawrencep for 
money and 6vOOO muskets. This appeal was left unanswered; 
on the groundso according to Wyllie, that Lawrence "abided 
as firmly as ever by his determination to abstain from aiding 
either Sheer Ali against Azim Khan or Azim Khan against Sheer 
Ali, so long as each of them respectively maintained a 
similar quiescence towards British India". 
The year 186.7 was the nadir of Sheer Ali's fortunes in 
this period and it opened with his heavy defeat at Kalat-i- 
Ghilzai in January. On 3rd February British recognition was 
again sought for Mohammad Afzul and this time, with the 
support of Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, it was 
accorded in part; though in terms which were unflattering 
to its recipient. 
1. Wyllie, o . cit., p. 48. 
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Vy friend! " - Lawrence's reply of 25th February 
ran - "The British Government has hitherto 
maintained a strict neutrality between the 
contending parties in Afghanistan. ' R. umours,, I 
am tolds have reached the Kabul Darbar of 
assistance having been granted by me to Sher Ali 
Khan. I take this opportunity to request your 
Highness not to believe such idle tales. 
Neither men, nor arms, nor money, nor assistance 
of any kind have ever been supplied by my Govern- 
ment to Amir Sher Ali Khan. Your Highness and 
he, both equally unaided by me, have fought out 
the battle, each upon your own resources. 
purpose to continue the same policy for the 
future. If.. unhappily., the struggle for 
supremacy in Afghanistan has not yet been brought 
to a 'close, and hostilities are again renewed, I 
shall side with neither party. My friend! as I 
told your Highness in my former letter, the 
relations of the British Government are with the 
actual ruler of Afghanistan. Therefores so 
long as Amir Sher Ali Khan holds Herat, and 
maintains friendship with the British Government, 
I shall recognize him as ruler of Herat and shall 
reciprocate his amity. Butq upon the same 
principle, I am prepared to recognize your High- 
ness as Amir of Kabul and Kandaharg and I frankly 
offer your Highness in that capacity the peace 
and the goodwill of the British Government". 1 
A little later a messenger from-Sheer Ali brought to the 
Commissioner of Sind yet another request for assistance, 
coupled with the threat that, if assistance was refused Sheer 
Ali would be bound to look for it to Persia or Russia. The 
only answer was, to return by the messenger a copy of the 
letter to Mohammad Afzul. 
The September of 1867 Baw yet another defeat of Sheer 
Ali; in the following month Mohammad'Af zdl died and was 
1. Ibid., p. 99. 
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succeeded by his I=ther Mohammad Azim. On 13th November 
Lawrence formally recognized Mohammad Azim as Ameer of Kabul 
and Kandahar. He did so, before being askedp according to 
Wyllie, because he desired to have a representative of 
standing and not a mere vakil at Kabul and could not send 
such a man (Atta Mohammad Khan was his selection) until the 
government to which he would be accredited was recognized. 
Before another twelve months had passedp in August 1868p 
Mohammad Azim was a fugitive from Kabul and In January 1869 
Sheer Ali won the decisive victory of Zurmat. Upon thisq 
Lawrence not merely recognized Sheer Ali but sent him E609000 
and told him that if this money did not suffice a further 
supplyp including a certain amount of help towards the 
maintenance of a standing army would be forthcoming. 
ItI therefore wrote to the Amir" - said Lawrence - 
'land told him what were my views - that I was 
willing to help him still further in a moderate 
way; that I could not bind myself by any treaty, 
which would involve obligations on the part of 
Her MajeBtY's Government to aSSiBt him; but 
that I was willing, from time to timeq as circum- 
stances might suggest, and as his own conduct 
might show that he deserved it# to give him some 
further assistance hereafters as I had already 
done ... I suggested that my successor should- 
act on the same policy; that he should make no 
treaty or engagement by which we should be bound 
in any way, either directly or indirectlyg to 
interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan; but 
until the Amir should recover his authority, and 
consolidate his authority that we might from 
time to time assist him. '*,, 
I 
1. Wyllie, op. cit., pp. 134-136. 
(139) 
Wyllie, more fanatically devoted to the Lawrence policy in 
its purity than Lawrence himselfo complained, in his article 
of 18t March 1870, that Lawrence had violated his own engage- 
ment not to help one of two contending parties in Afghan- 
istan; and did not, moreover, recognize how far he had 
departed from his earlier principles. Logically, Wyllie 
was right. Lawrence, though he had continued recognition 
Of Sheer Ali as long as possibleo had refused to give him 
aid in 1864-66; he now gave him such aid, and promised him 
more when his position could not yet be assumed to be 
stronger than it had been at least in 1864-65. It might 
thus appear that there was not one "Lawrence" policy, but 
two; one of 1864-68 and one of 1869. Before we consider 
the validity of this view it is necessary to note two 
instances of what even Wyllie was bound to regard as the true 
Lawrence policy in its purity. 
In 1866 a variant of Jacob's plan for the occupation of 
Quetta was put forward by one of his pupils and disciples, 
Sir Henry Green, his successor in Sind. Green's suggestion, 
which was supported by Sir Bartle Freres at that time Governor 
of Bombayv was not for the direct and sudden establishment of 
a position at Quetta but for measures which should lead 
almost imperceptibly to such a position. In addition to the 
military reasons which Jacob had advanced for such a move 
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Green argued that British knowledge of what was happening 
beyond the mountain barrier would be slow and inadequate 
until a British position was established beyond the mountains. 
Green's memorandum of 16th August 1866 met with a 
discouraging reception. Lawrence said that he had fully 
considered Jacob's previous proposal and had concurred in 
the decision reached on it. He denied that the advance 
proposed bY Green would be productive of better or quicker 
information about Central Asia and he expressed his belief 
that 
"if the course of events should ever bring us to 
a struggle with the Northern Power on our Indian 
frontier, the winning side would be the one which 
refrained from entangling itself in the barren 
mountains which now separate the two Empires, 
and that the Afghans themselvesp foreseeing this 
result, were likely, in the endo to throw their 
weight on the. same side". 
The commander-in-chiefv Sir William Mansfield, expressed 
his disapprobation of Green's proposalp on military grounds. 
At the worsty in the event of a war with Ruseiap he believed 
that the Bolan could best be defended from its eastern and 
not from its western end. The occupation of Quetta would 
demand double the force which Jacob had originally estimated 
and such a force would be, some 257 miles beyond the nearest 
point on the Indus. It could not be reinforced or 
reprovisioned in the hot season and it would always be in 
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danger of having the Bolan Pass closed behind it. Finally, 
Mansfield believed that the occupation of Quetta would 
inevitably leaa to an attempt to occupy the whole of 
Afghanistan. 1 
The other instance of Lawrence's inactivity or his 
refusal to act. In January 1867 an emissary, from the Ameer 
of Bokhara presented himself to-Lawrence; seeking, on 
behalf of his master, who had been heavily defeated by the 
Russian forces in the preceding summerv an offensive and 
defensive alliance. That, at least, was his purpose but, 
according to Wyllie he scarcely made even a formal attempt 
to carry it out; having learnt on his journey that a similar 
request from the Ameer of Khokand had been refused three 
years earlier. He presirnably expectedv thereforey the 
reply which he received from Lawrence. 
"I am# thereforeo neither sufficiently well 
acquainted with the causes which have unfort- 
unately, produced a state of hostilities between 
Bokhara and Russia, nor with the present state 
of your Majesty's affairs to give your Majesty 
useful advice. And, therefore2 though I am 
willing to be on friendly termsp and am 
desirous of the peace of your dominionso and 
am anxious to hear of the prosperity of your 
Majesty's rule, I am not able to render you 
effective aid, either by advice or in any 
other form". 2 
1. Central Asia and Quetta: Porl-Papers, 1878-799 Vol. 77, 
2. Wyllie, OP-cit., pp. 92-96. 
pp-2-6t. 13-19. 
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There is little doubt that Lawrence's policy, at least 
until almost the end of his viceroyalty, met with the general 
approval of the Government and the public in England. The 
quotations given by Bosworth Smiths though they are undated, 
sufficiently prove the point as far as the opinion of the 
Government and of the governing class generally are 
concerned. 1 As for the attitude of the public and the 
Pressp there is the evidence of the Hungarian traveller and 
writer, Vambery. , In-a paper on 
"Fresh Advances of Russia 
in Central Asiallp published in 1868, he wrote: 
"Whilst, during the year 1867, the whole presel 
or*at any rate the greater part of the press 
in Englands and the official papers in Indiap 
indulged in somewhat violent expressions against 
my political viewsq and the Pall Mall Gazette 
honoured me even with the title of chief alarmist; 
nowp after the lapse of a year, since my paper, 
upon the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia 
has appeared in the columns of Unsere Zeitp a 
strange turn has taken place in political views - 
1. e. g. Sir Charles Wood -. "I am, altogether against-trying 
to set up a permanent influence, as it is called, at 
Cabul... Perfect neutrality and non-intervention are the 
rules I should act upon as much asyou can"; Lord 
Cranborne. (afterwards Lord Salisbury), Secretary of State 
for India, 1866-67, who approved "whole-hearteftly" of - 
Lawrence's Afghan policy; Sir Stafford Northcote (after- 
wards Lord Iddesleigh)x Secretary of State for India, 
1867-68 - "We are very reluctant to intermeddle in any 
way with these complicated civil wars, and hope you will 
adhere to your policy of entire neutrality". Bosworth 
Smithv OP-cit-9 V01.111 pp. 582-583; Lady Gwendolen 
Cecil: Life of Lord Salisburyq Vol. j. p. 206 (1922). 
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a turn which surprised me as much as it will 
do many of my readers. While the Times of 
January 1867 applauded the Indian VI-cerok's 
policy of "masterly inactivity'19 and ridiculed 
the plan then entertained of occupying Herat, 
we read in the same paper of 10th July the 
opinion 'It would be difficult for anyone to 
prove that the Russians had no designs on 
British India'; it is as if I were hearing 
the echoes of the words expressed by myself 
in 1864 and at that time ridiculed by this 
very Times ... It was the beginning of April 1868 that the slumbering lion began to show 
signs of, waking". 1 
Some Englishmen, however, though they were then in a 
minority, had shown signs of alarm befor6 1868 and the most 
notable of these was Sir Henry Rawlinson. Since his first 
written contribution to the Central Asian question in 1849 
he had establislied a solid reputation in the-learned NY(orldv 
both as an Assyriologist and a geographer; he had been made 
a K. C. B. in 1856; from 1858 to 1859 and again from 1865 to 
1868 he was a member of Parliament; he had served for a 
short time as a member of the Council of India and he was to 
be re-appointed to that body in 1868. The views which he 
expressed in an article on "The Russians in Central Asia", 
published in the Quarterly Revie of October 1865 were thus 
the views of a man whose opinion was bound to carry weight. 
He believed that the nearer approach of Russia to India 
1. A. Vambery: central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier 
Questionp PP. 104-105. This book-9 Published in 1875, 
consisted of papers published between 1867 and 1873. 
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was "not desirable in. the interests of either one country or 
the other". In particular, from the British point of viewv 
it was already creating uneasinesss and might create 
disaffection in the native mind. But how could further 
Russian advance be prevented? He did not consider that an 
agreement could be reached on the basis of immobility within 
present limits, because the native peoples of Central-Asia 
represented too incalculable a factor. Nor did he believe 
in the practicability of an agreement with Russia setting 
prospective limits to further advance. Such an agreement 
could not go beyond Prince Gortchakoff's circular letter of 
1864 and, in the second place, an agreement on the basis of 
Uti-possidetis would be manifestly unfair to Britain. For 
the moment, he thoughts and so long as Bokhara and Khiva 
preserved their independence, it might be enough for Britain 
to do no more than try to oblige Russia to implement-the 
promises in Gortchakoff's circular letter. But if these 
Uzbeg states were to fall under Russian controls then it 
would become a matter for serious consideration "whethers 
leaving Cabul and Ghaznip the scene of our old disasters, 
to struggle on in isolated agonyp it may not be incumbent 
on us to secure a strong flanking position by the reoccupation 




In June 1868 Rawlinson, still a member of Parliament 
(though he was very soori to resign his seat-on appointment 
to the Council of India) prepared a speech on Central-Asian 
affairs. As it happened, he had no opportunity for 
delivering the speech; and so he amplified his views in 
a memorandumg dated 20th July 1868, which he submitted to 
the Secretary of State for India. He arguedo in the first 
place that it must be taken for granted (despite Gortchakoff'B 
circular letter) that nothing could prevent the extinction 
of the three independent governments of Khokand, Bokhara and 
Khiva and the consequent extension of the Russian frontier 
to the Oxus. The resulting new distribution of power in 
Central Asia would be bound to affect British interests in 
India adversely, even while Britain and Russia were at peace. 
"Every chief throughout Northern India who either has. or 
fancies he hass a grievance, or who is even cramped or 
incommoded by our orderly Governmentv will at once commence 
intriguing in the hopes of relieving himself from our 
The deduction was that "Lord Auckland's oppressive shadow". 
1. OP. cit. 9 pp. 136-204, and especially pp. 200-204. The 
Quarterly Review of April 1865 had argued for an Anglo- 
Russian agreement upon certain limits to be maintained 
immutably by the moderation and mutual good understanding 
of the two countries. 
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famous doctrine of establishing a strong and friendly power 
on our North-Western frontier" had always been the true 
policy for India, "though of late years too often neglected 
and once fatally mismanaged in execution". To carry out 
this policy Sheer Ali should be secured to the British 
interest without delay. The price to be paid for this 
would depend upon the extent to which Sheer Ali was already 
entangled with Russia: it might vary from a subsidy and 
moral support to the furnishing of arms and officers and 
even an auxiliary contingent. The question of the re- 
establishment of a British mission in Kabul was one which 
must be decided on the spot. The diplomatic ground lost 
of late years in Persia must be recoveredp to prevent Russia 
using that country as a tool; and military communications 
to the Afghan frontier improvedo especially by the construct- 
ion of a railway from Lahore to Peshawar. , 
Finally, 
Rawlinson dealt with the question of the establishment of a 
forti fied position at Quetta. It would be a useful sign of 
activity on the part of Britain but it was an enterprise that 
ought to be subordinated to political considerations. it 
was not worth while carrying out if it alienated the Afghans 
as"it probably would: it might be worth while if they were 
sufficiently attached to the British interest already to 
look upon the occupation of Quetta as an assistance to them. 
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Ravilinson's memoranduml was sent by the Secretary of 
State to the Indian government and he believed, probably with 
justification2 that it played an important part in forming 
the last phase of Lawrence's policy. That consisted in 
the despatch of congratulations to Sheer Ali on 2nd October 
1868 and of the gift, in December of six lakhs of rupees. 
Lawrence also suggested to the Secretary of State that the 
Indian government might be authorized, at its discretion, 
to supply the de facto ruler of Afghanistan with armsj 
ammunition and pecuniary aid. 
0 
This last phase of Lawrencets policy, this apparent 
abandonment of "masterly inactivityllowas what moved the over- 
faithful Wyllie to protest. Yet a study of Lawrence's 
Political testament suggests that the departure of which 
Wyllie complained was more apparent than real; that if 
Lawrence's policy up to December 1868 had been the right one, 
it remained the right one after the gift to Sheer Ali in 
that month; converselyo that if it had been the wrong one 
its faults were not cured. 
2 In his final memorandum, or "covering despatch", 
1. Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 263-292. Edwardes, in a letter to Lawrence of 2nd July 1866, had pleaded for "a diplomatic 
understanding with Russiat that she might come up to the Oxus if she liked, and be welcome, so long as she left our Cabul ally alone" and for "taking some steps to mediate between-the contending children of Dost Mohammad". Lady EdwardeBv op. cit. p Vol. I. p. 286. 2. Bosworth Smith,, op. cit. 9 Vol. IIt pp. 584-585. 
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Lawrence reiteratedhis objection to "any. active inter- 
ferdnce" in Afghan affairs either by a British mission or 
by the occupation of any post in that country. Such 
measures would decrease the difficulties in the way of 
Russia, if she seriously thought of invading Indiap by 
compelling Britain to meet her half way, in the midst of 
an exasperated populdtion. In other words, the state which 
interfered last. with Afghanistan was the state which would 
profit most. Lawrence does not appear-to have regarded the 
present of the six lakhs of rupees to Sheer Ali in December 
1868, followed by a further gift of the same amount in 
January 1869p as constituting "active interference". He 
was careful to point outp in the letter of 9th January 1869 
which conveyed the promise of-the second gift, that it would 
lie with successive, administrations to determine, year by 
yearp what practical, assi8tance should be given. 
One question was this. The assistance given to Dost 
- Mohammad in 1857-58 had evoked some gratitude on the part of 
the recipient or had at least caused him to recognize that 
his interests were in part identical with the British. Was 
assistance to Sheer Alip-withheld when he so badly needed it 
in 1864-66 and now granted on what was explicitly a temporary 
basisp be sufficient to bind him to the British interest; 
especially in view of the great strides eastwards which Russia 
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had made in the last ten years and was still making? That 
question raises another. If Sheer Ali was to be bound to 
the British interest, would not substantial and permanent 
assistance be needed? Would not Britain be obliged to 
cultivate close relations with him than with a mere de facto 
ruler of Afghanistan? 
But could this be done at such a distance? Was not 
the establishment of a permanent British mission in Kabul 
necessary for the exercise of effective British--influence 
as well as for the collection of accurate and up-to-date 
information? In nothing was Lawrence more consistent than 
in his opposition to such a measure. But without such a 
measure could British influence in Afghanistan ever be 
effectively exercised? Was Britainp by declining to send 
or insist on sending a mission, not admitting either a bad 
conscience or acquiescence in a position of diplomatic 
inferiority? 
Vambery certainly thought so. In his paper of 1867 on 
"The Rivalry of Russia with England in 'Central Asia" he said: 
"The English are like a child who, when it has 
once burnt itself at the fire, will not for a 
long time venture to go near the warmth. The 
catastrophe of the Afghan campaignq and the 
thirty millions sterling which it cost, are even 
at the present day, after the lapse of quarter 
of a centuryp still so terribly alive in the 
memory of every Briton, that he trembles even 
at the idea of political influence beyond the 
Hindukush". 
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He went on to-point out that thousands of Afghans habitually 
crossed and recrossed the frontier of British India and that 
the Russians, sending ambassador after ambassador to the 
states of Central Asiaq somehow managed to secure respect 
for them. "The Afghans .. 4 so long as they are not brought 
into closer and peaceful intercourse with Englishmenp will 
never understand what England or Russia may be able to do 
for their weal or woe, and which friendship may be more 
conducive to their good". 1 
There was probably more risk in sending a. British mission 
to Kabul than Vambery imagined: the events of 1839-42 had 
not faded from Afghan memories. NevertheleBB, it was 
highly arguable that unless that risk was taken British 
influence in Afghanistan could never be effective; and the 
gifts to Sheer Ali in December 1868 and January 1869 did 
argue a wish that it should be effective. Moreover, it is 
difficult to resist Vambery'B conclusion that the terrible 
failure of Auckland's policy had become an idee fixee with 
both the British and the Indian governments. Certainly, 
there is no evidence that such men as Lawrence or Henry - 
Durand attempted to analyse Auckland's policy so as to see 
where and why it had diverged towards disaster. It could 
be argued, for instance, that where Auckland had been wrong 
1. op. citl. p pp. 42-51. 
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was not in helping an Afghan ruler but in choosing Shah Shuja 
as the object of his help and making an enemy of Dost 
Mohammad. The alliance with Ranjit Singh, moreover, had 
inflqenced British policy in 1838 in a way which could not 
be paralleled thirty years later. There was also the 
question how far the ultimate disaster in Afghanistan had 
been due to personalities rather than to policies, to the 
headstrong ambition of Macnaghten and the incompetence of 
Elphinstone. At all events there was a case for stripping- 
Auckland's policy of the mere accidents and errors which 
ruined it and for seeing whether the establishment of a 
strong and friendly Afghanistan must in every set of* 
circumstances be regarded as hazardous or impracticable. 
This was so even th9ugh such writers as Boulgers in the 
'eighties, went too far in the other direction, by arguing 
that the disasters in Afghanistan in 1841-42 were due merely 
to the failure of the military command. 
It may be urged against Lawrence that he never disen- 
tangled or attempted to disentýngle Auckland's ends from his 
means. In one sense Lawrence was a fatalist. War between 
Britain and Russia would either come or would not come; a 
Russian invasion of India would take place or it would not 
take place. If it took place it could best be met and 
broken within the Indien frontier: mere diplomatic activity 
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beyond the frontier would not avert it and, combined with 
military activitys would increase the chances of its success, 
In other wordsq Lawrence, by temperament an adminis- 
trator and not a diplomatiBt, had very little use for the 
weapons of diplomacy. . 
To the argument that the Russian 
advance in Central Asia would cause unrest and disaffection 
in India he opposed a notable and in many ways a noble 
defence, counting not merely on "a compactp highly equipped 
and disciplined army" but on "the contentment, if not the 
attachment of the masses"; in the gradual increase in the 
sense of security, the construction of public workso "in 
husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying 
our resources". 1 Two final criticisms may be offered. A 
modest expenditure of money and a prudent degree of diplomatic 
activity in Afghanistan would not have been a serious drain 
on the finances of India. More important, Lawrence did not 
appreciate the danger that although he himself was not 
tempted to use the weapons of politics end diplomacy to any 
serious extent beyond the north-west frontier his successors, 
or British politicians or the British public, might not 
always be so restrained. Suppose that, viewed from-London 
(and Indian policy was being more and more determined by the 
Bosworth Smith, OP-cit-s Vol-III p. 385. 
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view taken in London) the contrast between British inactivity 
and Russian activity suddenly appeared a source of grave 
peril. Was it not likelyl or at least possible, that there 
would be a precipitate rush from the policy of inactivity to 
the other extreme? Was there a case for a prudent attempt 
to make British influence permanent and substantial in 
Afghanistan; to avert the risk that under the-stress of 
excitement which the degeneration of Russo-British relations 




LORD MAYO AND THE BROADENING OF POLICY 
When Rawlinson'B memorandum reached India it was laid 
by Lawrence before his Council. Their views and his own 
are set out in some detail in Appendix I but a summary of 
them Must be attempted here. That is the easier task 
because there was comparatively little divergence on the 
main issues. The conclusions which emerged were these: 
The Russian advance through Central Asia admittedly 
created difficulties for India and one of these was the 
possibility that it might lead to or foment unrest and 
disaffection. That possibility could not be ignored but 
it could easily be exaggerated. Such unrest was not likely 
to be great because the Russians were feared and hated rather 
than admired. The British had cause for confidence in their 
own strength and the more they improved the lot of their 
Indian subjects by a prudent and economical administration, 
the less reason had they to dread Russia. If the worst 
came to the worst they could meet and defeat the Russian 
forces on Indian territory. 
At the same time, howeverv positive measures to limit 
the danger from Russia were not to be ruled out, Support 
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of and reliance on Persia were not among theses for Persia 
was bound to be the creature of Russia. One major positive 
measure would be agreement with Russia on the respective 
spheres of the two Powers in Central Asia. Such an 
agreement might be reached either-by, negotiation or by 
fixing a line beyond which Russia must not advances on peril 
of a general war. The other measure was the creation of a 
friendly and well-disposed Afghanistan. , This objective, in 
its turn, had its positive and negative implications. it 
implied-a certain degree of support to-the de facto ruler of 
Afghanistan, provided that such a person could be discerned 
and provided that his conduct appeared toýmerit such support. 
It did not imply the presence of a British mission or British 
officerss with or without a contingentv-in Afghanistan; nor 
the, occupation of trans-frontier posts such as Quetta or 
Herat; nor the acquisition of border territories such as 
Kurram and Khost. Such measures would not'only fail to 
advance the desired policy: they would ruin its chance of 
success since they would arouse in the Afghans suspicions of 
conquest-and annexation. 
One very significant feature in these opinions was the 
remarkably high aegree'of'unanimity reached. " This me-ant 
that Lawrence's successor, if he wishea to make any markea 
change in the foreign policy adopted by Lawrence and his two 
immediate predecessorst would-have to encounter the 
(156) 
criticism if not the opposition of his Council; of the men 
who I would normally and naturally be his rightýhand. A new 
Viceroy was unlikely to'do this unless one or both of two 
conditions were fulfilled: unless he had come to India with 
a policy which he was determined to carry out; and unless 
he had the active support of the home government for a new 
departure. 
Neither of these conditions was fulfilled in Lord Mayo. 
He was a moderate Conservative whose Parliamentary career 
had been almost entirely devoted to the affairs of Ireland. 
Both as Chief Secretary and in Opposition he had an honour- 
able recordo especially on the agrarian problem. But 
although he had had some opportunity of studying Indian 
affairs between the time of his appointment and the time he 
sailed he did not pretend to come out to India as an expert 
and there is no evidence that he had formed any deep 
convictions which called for' a change in Indian foreign 
policy. Indeed, his previous lack of acquaintance with 
India and the fact that he had been appointed by a government 
which was in serious difficulties and soon to fall exposed 
himg at first, to considerable criticism. 1 
Sir W. W. Hunter: Life of the Earl of Mayov Vol. jv Chapter---fV- 
(2 vols. 11875). 
-Mayo met Rawlinson on 5th November 1868 
and notedp without comments Rawlinsonts views. At that 
time Mayo was an anxious student of Indian affairs, desirous 
of acquiring all the information he could* not merely or 
chiefly on foreign policy but on irrigation, finance, 
railway buildings land settlement, prisons etc. 
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The policies of successive British governments towards 
Russia., and in particular the efforts to reach agreement on 
a delimitation of spheres will be noted later. It is 
sufficient for the moment to say that there was nothing in 
those policies or those efforts to encourage the new Viceroy 
to effect any drastic alteration in Indian foreign policy. 
Both his Council in India and the Cabinet (soon to be a 
Liberal Cabinet) at home were satisfied with the existing 
policy. 
Mayo landed at Bombay on 20th December 1668 and aBsumed 
office at Calcutta on 12th January 1869. His meeting with 
Sheer Ali at Ambala took place in March of the same year: 
obviouslyq no time was lost. The first interview was held 
on 27th March but Sheer Ali had started from Kabul on 3rd 
February and it was sufficiently evident that the Viceroy, 
in inviting him, conceived himself to be following, as indeed. 
he Wass the policy of his predecessor. 
Mayo,, just before leaving Calcutta for Ambala, had 
stated his views in the following terms: 
"I think any treaty or promise of permanent subsidy 
most unadvisable. At the same time, we must not, 
shut ourselves out altogether from assisting Sheer 
Ali if we find it advantageous BO to do. I am 
convinced that the checking of hostile advances 
by other nations is mainly to be done by pushing 
our commerce northwards. I hope that sensible 
men will not advocate either the extreme line of 
absolute inactionp or the worse alternative of 
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meddling and interfering by subsidies and 
emiSBarieB. The safe course lies in habitual 
watchfulneBB, and friendly intercourse with 
neighbouring states and tribeB". 1 
Sheer Ali, on the other handt entered upon the 
negotiations with much higher expectations and much fewer 
reservations. AccoiZding to a note made on 31st March 1869 
by the Viceroy's interpreterp Captain Greyt of his conver- 
sations with Sheer Ali's confidential MiniBterv 
"The Ameer is prepared to act on what he may see 
is the nature of the friendship the British 
propose to afford him; if, as hitherto, merely 
acknowledging the Ruler of Kabul de facto,., well 
and good; but if prepared to acknowledge and 
support him and the heir he may point out 
(acknowledges that any such must be distinctly 
brought forward nowq the contrary having produced 
the presefit troubles), there is nothing he will 
not accede toll. 2 
The latitude which he allowed himself no doubt permitted 
Sheer Ali to reconcile himself to the very modest gains he 
received from the Ambala Durbar; but he had hoped for far 
more. According to Hunter he wanted a treaty; a fixed 
annual subsidy; assistance in arms or in men "to be given 
1. Hunter, op. cit., Vol. 19 p. 258. 
2. India: Central Asia and Afghanistah to 1877, pp. l.. 2. This 
title covers the State Papersy Foreign Office memoranda, 
correspondence etc., bound as one volume in the Library of King's Collegep Newcastle upon Tyne. Grey notedq however, 
that one reservation had to be made to the Ameer's willing-- 
ness to accede to anything: "he would gladly see an Agent ' 
or Engineer Superintendent in Balkho Herato or anywhere but 
actually in Kabulp which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet". Ibid. Greyts note, however, 'is not 
necessarily to be takeF as accurate. v. Appendix 2. 
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not when the British Government might-think fit'to grantp but 
when he might think it needful to solicit it"; a well- 
defined engagement "laying the British Government under an 
obligation to support the Afghan Government in any emergency; 
and not only that Government generally but that Government 
as vested in himself and his direct descendants, and in no 
others"; finallyt some constructive act of recognition in 
favour of his younger sonp AbýullahJanll. 
The last of these wishes or suggestions was not allowed 
to become a subject of discussion: to the other four Mayo 
firmly declined to accede. What he did offer, and what 
Sheer Ali was obliged to acceptv was "the MOBt open and 
absolute present recognition ... every publi'c evidence of 
friendly disposition, of respect for his character and 
interest in his fortunes ... all the moral support in our 
power and, in addition .. '. money, arms, ammunitiono Native 
artificers ... It. But all these evidences of support were 
governed by the next phraBe,, "whenever we deem it desirable 
so to do". Mayo Bummed up his own view in these words: 
"We must assist him, but we assist him in a way 
that neither entangles us in any, engagements 
which may prove embarrassing hereafterp nor 
weaken his independence". 1 
Hunter, op. cit. 9 Vol. I# pp. 258-259; quoting a minute by Sir John Strachey, 30th April 1872. 
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Mayo hoped (in the events with considerable justification) 
that the impressions which Sheer Ali would gain of the 
strength and prosperity of India, as w611 as the magnificence 
of the ceremonials in which he was treated as an equal# the 
subsidy of Z120,000, the arms and the private presents which 
he received, would compensate him for his failure to gain 
more. 
"Although", Mayo wrote to Sheer Ali at the end of 
the negotiations, "as already intimated to you.. 
the 3ritish Government does not desire to 
interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistang 
yets considering that the bonds of friendship 
between that Government and your Highness have 
been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will 
view with severe displeasure any attempts on the 
part of your rivals to disturb your position as 
ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war. And it 
will further endeavourt from time to time, by 
such means as circumstances may require, to 
strengthen the Government of your Highness, to 
enable you to exercise with equity and with 
Justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to 
your descendants all the dignity and honour of 
which you are the lawful possessor. It is my 
wish, therefore, that your Highness should 
communicate frequently and freely with the 
Government of India and its officers on all 
subjects of public interest; and I can assure 
your Highness that any representations which you 
may make will always be treated with consider- 
ation and respect". 1 
1. Hunter, op. cit., q Vol. j,, pp. 260-261. Mayop through his Foreign Secretary, W. S. Seton-Karr2 was very careful to impress upon the Ameer's Minister that "under no circum- 
stances was the Ameer to expect that British Troops would cross the border to put down civil war or domestic 
contention". v. memorandum of C. GirdleBtong Under Poreign Secretary, 3rd April 1869. India: Central Asia and Afghan- istan to 18779 p. 3. Hanna, op. cit., Vol-Iv pp. 20t 21 argues that Lawrence would have been more generous with money and less generous with fair words than Mayo was. 
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The phrasep "view with severe displeasure"# aroused 
some criticism in England from the more extreme protagonists 
of inaction; but Lawrence was not among the critics. III 
believellp he said in his maiden speech in the House of Lords 
on 19th April 1869v "that Lord Mayo has done no more than 
act on the principles I suggested". In one-sense the 
Ambala Durbar was the high-water mark of Lawrence's policy. 
It had not merely impressed Sheer Ali; it had impressed 
his subjects and almost certainly proved of assistance to 
him in asserting his authority in Afghanistan. And all this 
had been done without the incurring of any permanent commit- 
ments. It may be that Mayo, a younger man than Lawrence 
and without Lawrence's chronic suspicion of the Afghansp was 
better suited to add the final touch than Lawrence himself. 
By 1869 it has become increasingly difficult to discuss 
the Afghan and Central Asian policy of either the British or 
the Indian government without constant and bewildering 
reference to that of the other. This is the more true 
because, as we have seenp Lawrence and his Council looked to 
some agreement with RuBsia for the diminution of the threat 
of Anglo-Russian conflict over Central Asia; and such an 
agreement must form the subject of negotiation by the 
Foreign Office. It mayv neverthelessp be convenient to 
defer the consideration of these negotiations for a little 
longer and to notice. now some other aspects of Mayo's policy 
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and views. - He was gratified by the success of the Arnbala 
meeting. 
"Our influence'12 he wrote in a private letter, 
"has been considerably strengthened, both in 
our own territories and in the States of 
Central ABiap by the Ambala meeting; and if 
we can only persuade people that our policy 
really is non-intervention and peace2 that 
England is at this moment the only non- 
aggressive Power in Asia2 we should stand on 
a pinnacle of power that we have never enjoyed 
before". 
Yet he did not usually believev and he had shown that he did 
not believes in a purely passive or negative policy. The 
rapid advance-of Russia through Central Asia was a facts 
whatever differences there might be about the significance 
to be attached to it. Mayo himself was not an alarmist. 
"We cannot view with any feelings of alarm the adiance in 
Asia of a civilized Christian Powerp and the establishment 
of its influence over wild and-Bavage tribes". He con81d- 
ered that British strength in India had grown faster, however, 
than Russian strength in Asia; "That it is the very feeling 
of power which justifies us in assuming that passive policy 
whichp though it may be occasionally carried too far,,, iB 
right in principle". At the same time he realized that 
Russia had secured a position in Asia which she might usep and 
indeed showed signs of using., to "turn the flank of the 
Eastern QueBtion". He did not believe that any hard-and-fast 
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agreement with Russia on Central Asia was deBirable or 
Practicable. What he apparently had in mind was that while 
Britain and Russia should act independently ( as local circum- 
stances obliged them to do) they should so act in conformity 
with certain agreed principles. These principles did not 
include that of a "neutral zone": it was not possible#-in 
Mayo's opiniong for two such powerful modern States as 
Britain and Russia to maintain such an artificial conception 
aB a belt of territoryp deliberately left uncivilized, 
between their empires. 
His alternative was the maintenancep by deliberate 
actiong of an intemediary belt of independent States. 
"We believe that, as it is for the interests of 
both countries that a wide border of independ- 
ent States should exist between the British 
frontier and the Russian boundaryp it would be 
desirable that Russia should be invited to adopt 
the policy with regard to Khiva and other kindred 
States (Bokhara and Kokand) that we are willing 
to pledge ourselves to adopt towards Kelatq 
Afghanistan and the districts round Yarkend. 
A pledge of mutual non-interference of this kind, 
unratified by treaty, would be alike honourable 
to both nations, and would be better suited to 
the position in which civilized powers Must ever 
stand towards wild and savage tribes than specific 
treaty engagements could ever belt. 1 
The first implication of this argument Was that the British 
position vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Kalat must be the Bqme as 
1. Quoted, Rawlinsonp op. cit. j p. 302 and n. Despatch of 3rd June 1870. 
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that of Russia vis-a-vis Bokhara and Khiva. But why should 
Russia make such a concession? It proved possible for the 
Russians to subjugate Bokhara in 1868 and Xhiva in 1873 
while a British subjugation, not perhaps of Kalat but 
certainly of Afghanistan# was certain to prove far more 
difficult. In fact, when Mayo sent this despatch in 1870, 
Bokhara had been and Khiva was soon to be reduced to a 
position of merely nominal independence. Was Britain to 
reduce Afghanistan to the same level? If she did nott her 
position would necessarily be weaker than that of Russia. 
Was she obliged, thereforep if an Anglo-RuBsian agreement 
on Mayo's terms was not made# or having been made was not 
kept, or was made on the basis of the status ctuo, (which 
favoured Russia), to strengthen her influence in Afghanistan 
until it became equal to that of Russia in Bokhara? 
Mayo did not bring himself so far as to accept that 
conclusion but he seems to have advancedv both in principle 
and in action, some distance towards it. 
"We should establish with our frontier States of 
Kilat, Afghanistanp Yarkandv Nepal and Burmah, 
intimate relations of friendship. We should 
make them feel that although we are all-powerful, 
we desire to support their nationality. That 
when necessity arises we might assist them with 
money and armso and perhaps even in certain 
eventualities with men. We could thtis create 
in them outworks of our Empire, and by assuring 
them that the days of annexation are passed, 
make them know that they have everything to 
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gain and nothing to lose by endeavouring to 
deserve our favour and support. It may take 
years to develop this policy, but if it is 
once established, our Empire will be secure". 1 
On this argument two criticisms fall to be made. The 
countries which Mayo named represented political problems 
for the Indian government which differed widely in their 
complexity. Did he imply that what might be (and as the 
event proved was) possible in respect of Kalat, was possible 
also in respect of Afghanistan? 2 The difficulties in the 
way of his policy are illustrated not only by what happened 
in Kalat but by what happened in respect of Burma - annexed 
in 1886. The subsequent course of events made it clear 
that it was very far from easy to make such frontier states 
at once friendly, strong and independent. If they were 
really independent they might not be friendly; and if they 
were not strong neither their friendliness nor their 
independence was likely to avail much. In the second place, 
1. Hunters op. cit., Vol, Ip pp. 283-284. 
2. In the later stages of the second Afghan War both Colonel 
Charles McGregor, successively Chief of Staff to Roberts 
and Primroses and Mortimer Durandv the Political Officer, 
came to the conclusion that nothing short of annexation 
ors at leasty of military occupations could establish the 
dominant influence 'of Britain on a permanent basis in 
Afghanistan. Lytton's arguments for the disintegration of 
Afghanistan was founded on a similar distrust of the 
lasting effects of presentes subsidiesv good offices etc. 
In one sense, extremes could meet - the extremes of 
complete inaction and annexation. Each had a good deal to 
be said for it but it was natural that most men should seek 
one or other of the middle causes which existed in such 
bewildering variety. 
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could Mayo's object be secured by such negotiations as those 
at Ambala, by a resolute refusal to be drawn into commit- 
ments. Possiblyp in the letter just quoted# he*did go a 
little way beyond the Ambala line;, but not very far. it 
was doubtful whether the governments of the states concerned 
would be much impressed by the knowledge that when necessity 
arose they-might be supported with money and arms 'land 
perhaps even in certain eventualities with men"; according 
as they had endeavoured "to deserve our favour and support". 
It imas not going to be easy to secure allies on such one- 
sided terms. Indeed, it may be argued that while in Europe 
it was possible for one Power, merely. by maintaining its 
independence, to be the "outwork" of another (as the Nether- 
lands has been of Britain)v such a delicate arrangement was 
hardly likely-between the Indian Empire on the one hand and 
the poorp ill-organized Oriental states which Mayo named. 
NevertheleBBt Mayo appears to have believed sincerely 
that his policy was practicable, on the negative basis of 
non-aggression and the positive basis of good offices. it 
remains now to notice some examples of his policy which, if 
it did not differ consciously or deliberately from that of 
Lawrence, came gradually to be far more active over a much 
wider field. 
We have noticed that the Ambala meeting might properly 
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be described as the high-water mark of Lawrence's policy. 
It was not the high-water mark of Mayolsq for whom it 
represented a beginning rather than an end. The remainder 
of his short term of office (he was murdered while on a 
visit to the Andaman IBlands, in February 1872) Mayo worked 
to implement the policy which had been in his mind at Ambala. 
The chief characteristic of these years was not so much the 
decisiveness as the range of his actions. In some instances 
they did no more than scratch the surface for his successors: 
in others they had importance even in his own day. 
Policy towards Kalat fell into the first of these 
classes. The root of the troubles in Kalatv which inevit- 
ably had repercussions upon the contiguous British territory 
of Sind$ lay in the conflict between the Khan and his chiefs. 
It was more than a personal conflict for it raised an 
important constitutional question. Was the Khan, as he 
maintained, an absolute ruler; or was he, as the chiefs 
maintained, merely the head of a confederacy, the subordinate 
members of which possessed rights of their own? Since 1854 
the Goverment of India had held to the first of these 
contentions: it limited itself to such "friendly counsel and 
advice" as was compatible with non-interferenceg and its 
officers were strictly forbidden to cross the frontier. 
In 1868 Lieutenant Sandeman (as he then was) violated 
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this prohibition and the fact that his action was condoned 
showed at least that there was the possibility of a change 
in policy and in 1869 the British Agent, who had been with- 
drawn in 1864, was re-appointed. His presence gave the 
chiefs the opportunity of laying their claims before him. 
These claims met with the support of Colonel (afterwards Sir 
Robert) Phayre, Political Superintendent of Upper Sind but 
were disapproved of by the Chief Commissioner of Sindq Sir 
William Merewether. The conflict of opinion, in which 
Sandeman was active on Phayre's side, led to a conference 
being held at Mittankot in February 1871 when the whole 
question was examined. At this stage Merewether's opinion 
prevailedt although some increase in Sandemants powers and 
the employment. of tribal horsemen to protect trade-routes 
were slight concessions to the advocates of a more active 
policy. 
In the autumn of 1871 civil war in Kalat rose to new 
heights. Phayre described it as "a national uprising against 
Oppression"; Merewether wrote it down as "a local emeute 
encouraged by ... our frontier officers"; but it appeared 
serious enough to the Government of India to lead to the 
despatch of llth January 1871 which suggested mediation in 
the Kalat disputes so as to give the principal chiefs "a due 
share in the goverment of the country,, 
_, 
and an interest in the 
i 
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maintenance of order". Mediation was accepted. Since the 
mediator was Merewether it was not surprising that his 
decision was substantially in favour of'the Khan. He 
declined to suggest any new constitutional arrangements, 
leaving it to the Political Agent to induce the Khan so to 
behave as to win the support of the chiefs. Merewether's 
conclusions were approved by the Indian government 
(by that 
time under Lord Northbrook) on 30th May 1872*1 
1. T. H. Thornton: Sir Robert Sandemanp, pp. 34-60 (1895). It 
may be convenient At this point to summarize the subsequent 
developments in policy towards Kalate Civil war continued 
without interruption after 1872 and the internal disorgan- 
ization led to raids on British territory. Merewether 
advocated the policy of non-interference, varied by 
punitive expeditions when things became too bad: Sandeman 
pressed for effective mediation and was officially allowed 
to cross the frontier in November 1875 to see what 
he 
could do. Merewether purported to recall him but Sandeman 
was upheld by the Foreign Office and Merewether was 
relieved of responsibility for Kalat. Sandeman's first 
mission effected little but he was despatched on a second 
in March 1876. In the course of this he-was able to 
arrange terms between the Khan and the chiefs but he 
realized that this settlement would prove transitory unless 
supported by the continuous supervision of the Indian 
government. The Viceroy, by this time Lord Lyýttonv was 
thus presented with an unavoidable choice between alter- 
natives. He and his Council decided in favour of 
Sandemants policy; being actuated partly by "Possible 
contingencies in Central Asia" and evidence of "foreign 
intrigue" in Kalat. The Treaty of Jacobadad was concluded 
in December 1876. The first three articles renewed the 
treaty of 1854, with the difference that the chiefs as 
well as the Khan were now introduced as parties. By the 
fourth and fifth articles the Political Agency was 
permanently established at the court of the Khan and the 
(Continued foot next page) 
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In respect of Kalat no more than a beginning of the 
"new departure", if thato had been made under Mayo; although 
his good offices in settling the frontier between Persia and 
Kalat in 1871-72 have also to be borne in mind. This 
settlement was a fundamental part of his policy. He had 
been much impressed by Rawlinson's arguments in favour of 
strengthening British influence in Tehran (though he was 
resolutely opposed to the employment of British officers in 
the Persian service): he was still more convinced of the 
nece8sity for that general pacification in which boundary 
settlements were bound to play an important part, 
"It is for the best interests of all the States 
concerned" - he wrote in 1869 - "that steps 
should be taken to define the eastern boundaries 
of the Persian Empire. The condition of things 
that has existed for some years past can only 
serve to engender irritation and alarmp and to 
afford to Persia, and possibly to other Powerso 
a pretext for encroachments or interference with 
(Continued from previous page). 
British government was constituted the final referee in 
disputes between the Khan and the chiefs. Article 6 
provided for the location of British troops in Kalat and 
later articles for the construction of railways and tele- 
graphic communication. A small force of occupation had 
been established in Quetta before the treaty was concluded. 
V. Thornton, op. cit., Chapters VIIIJXvX; Parl. Papers, 1877, 
"Papers relating to the Treaty concluded with the Govern- 
ment of India and the Khan of Kelat on the 8th December 
18761's and particularly Lytton's despatch of 23rd March 
1877 in which policy towards Kalat was related to policy 
towards Central Asia generally and the phrasesp quoted 
abovev about "possible contingencies" and "foreign 
intrigue" appeared. 
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the affairs of countries over which they have 
no right to exercise control. Nor can such 
pretensions be regarded with indifference by 
the British Government in the East whose aim 
it is to see independent and friendly Powers 
established between its own frontiers and the 
regions of Central Asia ... The present 
uncertain state of affairs opens a wide field 
for intrigue and occasions that feeling of 
uncertainty which among Orientals invariably 
gives rise to vague-rumoursi, and to the 
uneasiness which reports about alliances on 
the part of the intermediate States with 
Russia, Turkey or any other European Power., 
will always occasion't. 1 
It was in accord with these principles that Mayo 
extended the range of his action to Eastern Turkestanq where 
a great Moslem rising against the Chinese had resulted by 
1869 in the establishment of the State of Yarkand under Yakub 
Kushbegi. In compliance with the wish of this ruler 
Douglas Forsyth was sent to him on a complimentary mission 
in April 1870. When Forsyth foundt in the existence of 
hostilities in Yarkandp evidence that the ruler's power had. 
not been consolidated he felt obliged by the nature of his 
instructions to return; but his Becond mission led to the 
conclusion of a commercial treaty on 2nd February 1874. 
Much more important, of course2 was Mayo's concern with 
1. Hunter, op. cit. t Vol. It pp. 28&-286. 2. Ibid. j Vol. It pp. 297-305. v. also Wylliel op. cit., pp. 174- '5-4-4(article on "Western China'12 Edinburgh Reviewv April 
- 1868p brought up to date (1874) by his editor). 
(172) 
Afghanistan. One aspect of it was demonstrated when Yakui) 
Khan rose in rebellion against his fatherv Sheer Ali, in 
September 1870 andq after some preliminary failures and a 
period as a refugee in Persian Seistan, captured Herat in 
May 1871. The reconciliation between father and son which 
was effected in September 1871, by the terms of which Yakub 
Khan'wast appointed Governor of Herat, was assisted by the 
good offices of Mayo who realized that the disintegration 
of authority in Afghanistan would be fatal to the objects 
which he was working so painstakingly to bring about. The 
other aspect concerned efforts to determine the frontiers of 
Afghanistan. 
The territory in issue between Persia and Afghanistan 
(apart from Herat) was SeiBtan, an area of some 79000 square 
miles, of which only that in the vicinity of the River 
Helmand and its tributaries was cultivated or cultivatable. 
Seistan had been brought under Persian authority by Nadir 
Shah: after his death it fell more or less under Afghan 
control. In the eighteen-sixtieB Persia had repeatedly 
asked for British assistance against the extension of Afghan 
power in Seistan but all the comfort it received then war, the 
suggestion in 1863 that the Poreign Office "must leave it to 
both parties to make good their possession by force of arms". 
1. Sykes, Afghanistan, Vol. IIp pp. 81-82. 
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This position, the very acme of inactivity, was not likely to 
be maintained in the face of gradually changing opinion and 
in 1870 the British Governmentq acting under the provisions 
of Article 6 of the Treaty of 1857, offered its mediation; 
which was accepted by both parties. 
The duty of mediation was entrusted to-Sir Frederic 
Goldsmid and his mission arrived at Nasratabad in March 1872, 
where they were met by the Persian Commissioner, the Afghan 
Commissioner joining them in the following month. It was 
obvious from the disrespect with which the Persians treated 
Goldsmid that they were resolved to put every possible 
obstacle in his way: the conduct of the Afghansp by 
comparisong had been pacific and reasonable. Sheer Ali had. 
refrained from retaliating against the extension of Persian 
control in Seisian in recent years and even against occasional 
raids into the territory of Kandahar. 
GoldBmid, in hiB award, distinguiBhed between what he 
called I'Seistan Proper" and "Outer Sei6tan". The latter# a 
narrow strip of territory stre tching about 100 miles from 
north to south along the right bank of the Helmand, he awarded 
to Afghanistan; the formers to Persia. Neither party was 
satisfied: the Persians-were angry at being obliged to with- 
draw from the positions which they had secured on the right 
bank, of the Helmand: Sheer Aliv who had hoped for a Bettle- 
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ment, substantially in. his favour (a hope in which Mayo had 
Probably concurred)v was bitterly disappointed. 1 It was 
unfortunate for Anglo-Afghan relations that the Seistan 
awardv intended to form part of Mayo's policy of general 
pacificationt had this unlooked-for effect. 
The last, and in a Bense the most important, aspect of 
Mayo's concerned the negotiations between Britain and Russia, 
over the northern boundary of Afghanistan. These may 
Perhaps be most conveniently dealt with here; though at 
the risk of abstracting them from the wider negotiations, 
between London and St. Petersburg which were going on at the 
same time, and from the anticipated Russian attack on Khiva, 
the preparations for which were known to be going on in 1869. 
The territory in issue would in any event have presented 
h 
considerable difficulty. Thust Badekshan had been acquired 
by Dost Mohammad in 1859 but after his death in 1863 the 
ruler had attempted to throw off Afghan authority and had 
Bought to enlist the support of the Khan of Bokhara in his 
efforts. 2 The Russians throughout the negotiations showed 
an anxiety-to preserve the dominions of the Khan of Bokhara, 
now theirsatellitep and used his alleged claims as a 
1. Ibid. v Vol. IIP PP-91-96- 2. T). porsyth to Sir A. Buchananj 5th November 1869. Parl. 
Pa-nersq 1873. Correspondence respecting Central Asia, 
p. 1-5 (Central Asiap No. 1,1873). Forsyth had been sent from India to take part in the negotiations. 
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bargaining weapon to preclude any Afghan claims on Merv. 1 
They also endeavoured to insist that the boundaries of 
Afghanistan must be taken to include only those territories 
which were, at the time, under the control of Sheer Ali; 
as distinct from those which had been held by Dost Mohammad 
and lost since his death. 
2 As late as 18th December 1872 
Gortchakoff told the British ambassadorv Lord Augustus 
V, 
Loftus, that Badakshan and Wakban were independent states 
and that their junction to AfghaniBtan "would bear the nature 
of an annexation and would disturb existing relations in 
Central Asia,,. 3 Eventually, however, the Russian government 
agreed that these two territories formed part of Afghanistan 
and on 10th January 1873 the Viceroyfs Council expressed. 
their concurrence in the settlement arrived at. 
4 
Starting from the narrow basis of Lawrence's policy, 
Mayo had given it a far wider range and a deeper content. 
One may, indeed, go so far as to say that he had made as much 
of it as could be made. The eulogy pronounced on him by 
Sir John Strachey was deserved: 
"Honestly proclaiming and showing by his acts that 
the sceptre of annexation was laid for ever, he 
-taught our neighbours that they have nothing to 
1. Buchanan to Granvillep 21st Septeiýber 1870. Ibid., p. 51. 2. Brunnof to Granville# 1/13 November 1871. lbid., pp. 54-57. 3. LoftuB to Granvillep l9th December 1872. Ibid,. ppp. 65-66. 4. Ibid. 9 pp. 68-69. 
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fear from Us. By bringing about a common 
understanding between the countries on our 
frontier as to their mutual boundariesp he 
sought to remove every pretext for war and 
aggression. By assisting the rulers of 
these States to strengthen their internal 
government, and by bringing both his own 
personal influence and the moral support of 
the British Government to bear in putting 
down rebellions and revolutionsp he endeav- 
oured to establish firm, JuBtp and merciful 
government. By the encouragement and 
development of trade, he hoped to break down 
the barriers which isolate those countries 
from us, and to createg both within and beyond 
our frontier, a permanent interest in the 
maintenance of good order. By free and 
friendly communication, he desired to remove 
that ignorance as to our policy and that 
jealousy of our intentions which in past 
years have been so fruitful of mischief. 
And, lastly, by endeavouring through frank 
and amicable discussion with the Russian 
Government to secure the adoption on their 
part of a similar policy in the countries on 
the Russian frontier in Asia which are subject 
to Russian influence, it was his hope that he 
would be instrumental in securing some degree 
of peace and prosperity to the exhausted 
countries of Central Asiap and in removing 
the causes of disquietude as to the designs 
of England and Russia, which have been so 
prominent in the public mind in both countries". 
Of Mayo's benevolence there can be no reasonable doubt. 
What remained to be seen was whether his policy and the 
premises of Victorian Liberalism on which he acted could 
stand the strain of very different tendencies, of Russian 
aggression and Afghan disappointment; still morep the strain 
of Anglo-Russian hostility in an acute form in Europe with its 
consequent exacerbation of feeling both in the Britisil 
1. Hunterp O'P-cit-v Vol-I. pp. 306-307. 
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Cabinet ana in the country atlarge. 
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0HAPTER 
FOREIGN OFFICE NEGOTIATIONS# 1869-1874 
Two quotationB may serve to introduce this chapter. 
The first comes from a conversation which Mortimer Durand 
held with Aitchisong head of the. Foreign Department of the 
Indian government, apparently just before Lord Lytton 
succeeded to the viceroyalty in 1876. Durand reported 
Aitchison's views as follows: - 
"His view is that we cannot check the Russian 
advance from this side. He would advocate a 
strong. policy at homep but not any attempt to 
make our influence more directly felt at Kabul. 
He argues that any such attempt defeats its own 
object. The more we court the Amir the more 
his ideas of his own importance will rise, and 
until he feels himself in danger he will make 
no response, When he feels himself in danger 
he will come to us anyhow. Till then we must 
not shove ourselves on him in any way. Aitchison 
quoted as "perfectly just" Lord Lawrence's view 
on the matter. "Whichever power first occupies 
Afghanistan in force is certain sooner or later 
to have all the Afghans against her. He admits 
that we can march through the country as we 
could through Indiat and that we could hold it 
if we had no one else to deal with; but he 
thinks that the attempt to hold a position at 
Herat with 700 miles of enemy's country behind 
us must end in disaBter. Russia's advance 
must be stopped by the ordinary operations of 
European d1plomacyp not by any demonstrations 
in Asia. "Tell her that the moment she reaches 
such a point, we send our fleet into the Black 
Sea and raise her Asiatic subjectst but don! t 
attempt to settle yourself in Heratt for the 
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only result of that is to raise the Afghan 
against you and play Russia's game". 1 
Aitchison obviously took the Russian advance across 
Central Asia seriously but he indicated no role for India 
in arresting it not even the role of "good neighbour" to 
which Mayo aspired. The whole burden of resistance was to 
be thrown upon the Home Government. There was much to be 
said for using Britain's most effective weapong the Royal 
Navy; but, on the other handv there were difficulties in 
the way of Aitchisonts suggestion which he does not seem to 
have beenaware of. Was it politically possible for a 
British government to launch the nation into a major war 
because they knew, or had reason to believev that Russian 
forces had crossed an arbitrary line drawn on a map across 
a desert? Could a country which possessed representative 
and responsible government go to war in defence of a barbaric 
Central Asiatic state, such as Khiva, of which the great 
majority of the electors had certainly never heard? 
The other quotation is from Disraeli's faMOUB speech in 
which he insisted that "the key of India is in London't. He 
did not mean that India itself was to be inactive; he 
contemplated, rather vaguelyy the occupation of some 
advanced position (knowing, perhaps# how a place can 
I. Sir Percy Sykes: Sir Mortimer Durand, P. 84 (1926). 
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symbolize a particular policy for an electorate which 
cannot appreciate the policy itself); but he realized that 
the defence of India rested in the last reBort upon the 
temper of the public mind in Britain. 
An increasing measure, not merely of responsibility but 
of control, was coming to rest on the Home Government in 
respect of Indian foreign policy; and such men as John 
Lawrence and Aitchison were content that it should so rest. 
The results of this development after 1874 fall to be 
considered later: this chapter is concerned with British 
policy under Gladstone's ministry when the Home government 
Was still committed substantially to Lawrence's policy. 
The suggestion that direct negotiations should be opened with 
Russia had been Lawrence's own. 
Previous negotiationsp or discussionsp conducted in 
18651 had not been effective in hinderingg or even in delaying 
1. The Journal de St. Petersbourg of 19th June/lst July. 1865 
drew favourable attention to an address given by Sir 
Roderick Murchison as President of the Royal Geographical 
Society on 22nd May in which he ridiculed the charges of 
aggression made against Russian policy in Asia and 
declared that Russia only sought consolidation by means of 
peacep commerce and industry. This article was supposed 
to emanate from the Russian Foreign Office which was 
strong in such declarations. Earl Russellp in a despatch 
of 31st July 1865 to A-S-Lumley at St. Petersburgp that the 
British government completely shared Murchison's senti- 
ments butt as circumstances might so arise as to give cause 
for anxiety, "friendly explanations .... based on the present state of affairs" might profitably be exchanged. 
(continued foot next page) 
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the Russian advance across Central Asia. On 27th March 
1869, thereforep Lord Clarendony as Foreign Secretary.,, wrote 
to Buchanan pointing out that the Russian advancep while it 
did not alarm the British government, did alarm considerable 
sections of the British and the Indian public. He recom- 
Mended "the recognition of some territory as neutral between 
the possessions of England and Russia". He had, made this 
suggestion to Brunnow, the Russian ambaSBad: or in Londons who 
had produced a despatch of Gortchakoff's of 24th February/ 
I. (Continued from previous page). 
Gortchakoff, when seen by Lumley on 10th Augustq said that 
Russia desired no extension of territory in Central Asia; 
but that he did not himself see what purpose an inter- 
change of declarations could serve. However, it could be 
made but for the aggression of Bokhara against Khokand. 
Russell, in his despatch of 16th September 1865 to Sir 
Andrew Buchanan at St. Petersburg, showed that he still 
hankered after an exchange of declarations; ' but, if he 
could not get it, was "quite ready to believe that legit- 
imate desires for the extension of commerce and the 
security of the Russian frontiers, and no wish for terri- 
torial aggrandizementp guide the proceedings of the Govern- 
ment of Russia". In the same month the Tsar assured 
Buchanan that his empire was sufficiently large and that 
his sole purpose in Central Asia was to encourage commerce 
and civilization- although it was impossible altogether 
to prevent collisions between his troops and the "inhabit- 
ants of those distant and barbarous countries". Gortcha- 
koff, in Decemberp told Buchanan that he believed the 
explanations given would be sufficient to remove any 
misgivings felt in England about the recent Russian 
operations in Turkestan. Appendix No. 1 to Central Asia, 
No. 1, "Correspondence Respecting Central Asiallp Parl. Papers, 
1878, C-2164. The difficulty was that although Gortcha- 
koff's "explanations" might have satisfied Russell in 
1865 they could not cover the rapid extension of Russian territory and influence which followed. 
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7th March which accepted the idea of a neutral zone. This 
was to be formed by the Russian declaration that Afghanistan 
was completely outside her sphere of influence, complemented 
by a similar declaration on the part of the British govern- 
ment. 3- Clarendong having consulted the Council of India, 
replied that. Afghanistan would not make a-suitable neutral 
zone, partly because Its frontiers were ill-definedp and 
abandoning the idea of a neutral zonev suggested the upper 
Oxus as the boundary line "which neither Power should permit 
their forces to cross". 
2 To this Gortchakoff objectedp 
though without making it clear whether he still wanted a 
neutral zone or whether he considered the suggested boundary 
line unsuitable as unfair to Bokhara which, he certainly 
sUggestedl was threatened by Afghanistan. He added thet. 
hope that Britain would use her influence with Sheer Ali to 
keep him "within bounds". 3 
On 2nd September 1869 Clarendon had a long talk with 
Gortchakoff at Heidelbergq in the course of which he pointed 
to the very rapid advance of Rubsia in the last five years 
and reiterated his suggestion of a neutral zone; simply on 
the ground that Russian progress was apt to keep the Indian 
1. Parl. Pa-pers, 1873.. C-704, "Correspondence Regarding Central 
Asia" (Central Asiat No. 2 (1873)9 Nos. 1.2. 
2, Clarendon to Rumboldq 17th April 1869. Ibid. t No. 3. 3. Rumbold to Clarendont 2nd June 1869. Jbid. v No. 7. 
(183) 
Mind in a ferment. As to Sheer Aliq Clarendon said that the 
assistance given to him had no connection with Russian policy 
but was simply intended to assist Britain by maintaining 
Order in Afghanistan. When Clarendon repeated his suggestion 
Of the Oxus as the best line of demarcation Gortchakoff 
countered, as beforep by suggesting that Afghanistan might 
be neutralized. 1 Meanwhile, at St. Petersburg., Forsyth was 
discussing the practicability of Mayo's policy of a range of 
intermediate, independent States. Some of the Russian 
Soldiers and officials with whom Forsyth"talked regarded 
Mayo's scheme as workablev Russia putting influence, on 
Bokhara and Britain upon Afghanistan but the question was 
raised - suppose Bokhara proved recalcitrant to such Russian 
influence. Would Russian action be regarded as aggressive 
by Britain. Forsyth thought it would not, even if pushed 
to the point of the occupation of the whole countrys so long 
as the integrity of Afghanistan was respected. 2 
On 30th November Buchanan saw Gortchakoff again, partly 
about the r=OUrB of a projected RUBsian expedition against 
Xhiva, based on KraBnovodsk as being partly commercial and 
partly intended to serve as a warning to the Khan. Generally 
speakingg according to Gortchakoff, Russia wanted no more 
1. Clarendon to Buchanany 3rd September 1869. 
-Ibid. 9 
No. 11. 2. Forsyth to Buchanan, 2nd November 1869. Ibid. 9 Inclosure in No. 151 Buchanan to Clarendon, 2nd November 1869. 
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territory and the Tsar even talked of retiring from the 
advanced positions already occupied, for instance in Bokhara. 
But when Buchanan sought assurances on this point he was told 
that guarantees from Bokhara must first be obtained. He 
Was by no means satisfied of the pacific intentionB of Russia 
towards Khiva and having received information which led him 
to believe that the conquest of that country was being 
Contemplated and prepared fort called again on Gortchakoff 
On 29th December. Gortchakoff repeated his denialp 
explained the activities at Kradnovodsk by saying that it was- 
becoming an important commercial town and the rumours of a 
Military expedition as originating in a possible project for 
restoring the OXUB to itsformer bed. 2 Buchanan was still 
far from assured but the language of the RUBsian Foreign 
Office continued to be BMOoth and complaisant. When 
Buchanan spoke of the British wish to create on the frontierB 
Of India "a series of influential but not tributary or 
neutralized BtateBllp Gortchakoff's Head of the Asiatic 
In Departmentp Stremooqkoffq remarked, "What you have read is 
Our programme and de'scribes exactly what we desire". 3 By 
the beginning of March, however, Stremooukoff was telling 
Buchanan that the attitude of the Khan of Khivaj despite the 
I- Buchanan to Clarendon,, lst December 1896. Ibid. vNo. 2l. ' 2- Buchanan to Clarendonp 29th December 1869. Ibid. pNo. 25. 3- Buchanan to Clarendon, 8th February 1870. lbid., No. 34. 
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Russian reluctance to go to warv was causing him "uneasiness". 
During the next few weeksy when Buchanan was disturbed 
by the increasing probability of Russian action against 
Xhiva and by reports of Bokharan. raids on Afghanistan he was 
gratified by a communication to the effect that General 
Kauffman had repulsed the offer of Abdur Rahman's influence 
2 in Afghanistan. For the moment the situation was satis- 
factory and Mayo, in Council, expressed on 20th May 18709 his 
Pleasnre at finaing that "the policy of RuSBia ... coincides 
Po entirely with that laid down by uB at Umballa". 3 When 
Lord Augustus Loftus, Buchanan's successory met Gortchakoff 
on 5th March 1872 it was to be told that "happily there was 
nothing going on in the political world". 4 Negotiations 
Over the frontier of Afghanistan were continuedp not without 
difficulties but without insuperable difficulties; and 
Loftus was assured on 4th November that "Russia required 
peace in Central Asia". He took the opportunity to give his 
views on the subject of the proposed neutral zone, which had 
latterly fallen out of discussion. I 
"I replied, that the neutral zoneg as far as I 
understood the ideap merely referred to those 
I. Buchanan to Clarendon, 8th March 1870. lbid. tNo, 40. 2. Buchanan to Clarendon, 19th April 1870. Ibid. pNo, 519 with inclosures. 
3. Jbid. j inclosure in No. 60. 4. The Dil2lomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus (2nd 
series), p. 8 (2 vols. v1894); cited as Loftus. 
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independent States lying between the frontier 
of Afghanistan and the Russian frontiers and 
that this idea would be perfectly represented 
by Bokhara in the north and even# perhapst by 
Afghanistan south of the Oxus. Further than 
this I could see no object in creating a 
neutral zone". 1 
On 19/31 January 1873 Brunnow was instructed to give 
formal Russian recognition to the line of the Afghan frontier 
as suggested by Great Britain. The recognition was delib- 
erately represented as reluctant. 
"The English Cabinet inclucles within them (the 
suggested frontiers) Badakbhan and Wakhan which, 
according to our vieWsp enjoyed a certain 
independence butp considering the difficulty' 
experienced in establishing the facts in all 
their details in those distant partsy consid- 
ering the greater facilities which the British 
Government possesses for collecting precise 
data and, above all, considering our wish not 
to give to this question of detail greater 
importance than is due to it, we do not refuse 
to accept the line of boundary laid down by 
England". 
I 
Arising partly from a critical article in the Morning 
Post of 15th February 1873 the subject was debated in the 
House of Commons. The Prime Ministerp Gladstone, repudiated 
the idea that any "engagement" had been entered into with 
Russia. 
"The engagement referred solely to the moral 
influence possessed by England and Russia in 
the East; Russia engaging to abstain from 
any attempt to exercise it in Afghanistan and 
England engaging to exercise it for a pacific 
purpose". 
1. Loftus to Granvillep 12th November 1872. Central Asiap 
No. 2 (1873). No, 92. 
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In answer to a criticism by one of the leading Conservatives, 
Sir Stafford Northcote, of the use of the expression "neutral 
zonello Gladstone explained that that expressionv used in the 
early stages of the negotiations, had not been meant in a 
formal sense but simply for the sake of convenience. it 
had been merely a general, and somewhat indefiniteg method 
of expressing views entertained on both sides. Laterp those 
views. had been given specific form and the expression did 
not appear in the later despatches and conversatio. ns. The 
negotiations, Gladstone went oný had proceeded on the 
assumption that England and Russia naturally stood in a 
Position of relative superiority to the Asiatic States. A 
certain amount of influence would naturally flow from this 
position. The negotiations and the correspondence referred 
solely to the existence of tha t influence and its geograph- 
ical limits. As concluded, the negotiations included the 
express agreement of Russia to consider Afghanistan outside 
her zone of influence; a settlement of the northern boundary 
of Afghanistan; and an agreement on the part of Britain to 
use her influence (but not physical force) to restrain Sheer 
Ali from aggression. 1 . 
1. Parl-Debates, 3rd series, 15th Marchq 22nd Aprils 15th May 
1873. The Moscow Gazette of 16th May 1873 argued that 
Gladstone's speech had restored complete liberty of action 
to both Powers and that the recent negotiations could only 
be considered as a mere exchange of friendly views. 
Translation in F. O. 65/878. 
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Meanwhile, the Russian intention - at last officially 
disclosed - to advance again'st Khivap had been discussed in 
London between Granville and the Russian emissaryp Count 
Schouvoloff. It was to be carried out, Schouvoloff said, 
in the following spring, the force employed consisting of 
some four-and-a-half battalions. The Tsarv he addedv was 
of opinion that 
"such a question ought not to be a Cause of 
difference between the two Governments# and 
His Imperial Majesty was determined it should 
not be so". I 
6 Granville had replied that if the expedition was under- 
taken and carried out as described Her MajeBtYls Government 
would not remonstrate against it; although it would no doubt 
excite public attention and making the settlement of the 
boundaries of Afghanistan the more important for the purpose 
of keeping the peace in Central Asia. 
On this occasion the Russian expedition against Khiva 
was easily successful. By the treaty concluded on 19/24 
August 1873 the Khan was obliged to renounce "all direct and 
friendly relations with neighbouring Rulers and KhanBII; to 
give special facilities to Russian merchants; to pay an 
indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles (9300pOOO); and to cede to 
Russia the right bank of the Amou Daria. A copy of the 
treaty was forwarded to the Foreign Office on 20th December 
1. P. O. 65/875. Granville to Loftuso 8th January 1873. 
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and on 7th January 1874 Granville reviewed the implications 
of it and the Central Asian question generally in a long 
despatch to Loftus. 
Granville expressed himself as disinclined to examine 
"too minutely" how far the provisions of the treaty were in 
accord with previous explanations Of the Russian government 
about the object of the expedition or to share "the exagger- 
ated apprehensions which have at times been expressed in this 
country as to the danger to British rule in India which may 
arise from the extension Of Russian influence in Central 
Asia". He noted, with sympathyp the difficulties which were 
bound to face Russia, in contact with barbarous peoples. 
"As soon as one territory is subduedv and the 
Population immediately bordering on it are 
reducedo more or less to subjection# fresh 
aggressions are committed by more distant tribes. Presh expeditions against these become necessary and to give these expeditions 
any lasting effectv fresh annexations and 
occupations are required". 
He then went on to note, without comment, certainly without 
any hint of criticisms that the Russians had not fulfilled 
their suggested intention of retiring from SaDiarkand and 
concluded that 
"it would be unwise not to contemplate the 
possibility that considerations of self- defence, or the necessity of punishing acts 
of plunder and hostilityt may eventually 
give occasion for a Russian expedition against the Turkoman tribes", 
(190) 
The Possibility of such an attack on Mervp said Granville, 
had alarmed Sheer Ali. He had been told that Afghanistan 
was "perfectly secure from any hostile designs on the part 
Of Riassia"; but Her Majesty's Government thought it "right 
to state candidly and at once that the independence of 
Afghanistan is regarded by them as a matter of great 
importance to the welfare and security of British India and 
to the tranquillity of Asia". Gortchakoff replied in a 
despatch of 21st Januaryp which was communicated to Granville 
by Brunnow on 17th February 1874 that in his opinion the 
understanding was complete. 
"It rests not only upon the loyalty of the two 
Governments but upon mutual political advant- 
ages which are palpably evident". 
The two governments would "exercise their ascendancY over 
the States placed within the range of their natural influence 
in order to deter them from all aggreeBion't; the Russians 
towards the Khanates and the British towards Afghanistan., 
"So long as they both act together with a 
feeling of mutual confidence and good willi, 
the tranquillity of Central Asia will be 
sufficiently guaranteed against all eventual- 
ities". 1 
In effectp a bargain had been concluded. In return for 
implied British consent to the subjugation of Khiva the 
P A. Papers 1874, C-919. "Correspondence Respecting 
ntral Asia"p Wssia No. 2 (1874)2 Nos. 293. 
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Russians had. recognized Afghanistan as within the British 
_sphere 
. of influence and outside her own. From Granville's 
language the RusBian government was entitled to draw the 
conclusion that Britain would raise no objection to the 
extension of her influence up to the frontiers of Afghan- 
istan as settled in January 1873. But herey at onces was a 
source of danger, Russian influence, as exerted upon Khiva 
or Bokara, was a different thing altogether from British 
influence as exerted upon Afghanistan. In the one case, the 
use of forpe was fundamental; in the other the use of force 
had been explicitly ruled out; for example by Gladstone. 
Another consideration of the highest importance was this: 
in so far as British interests in Central Asial had been 
contracted by Gladstone's government to the maintenance of 
the independence of Afghani8tant that country was bound to 
assume what would be called today a very high degree of 
Priority in British-Indian policy. Consequentlyp a very 
Blight degree of Russian interference in Afghanistan - Stolie- 
tOff's misBionp for example - might produce results Out of all 
proportion to its significance. it was clear, within a very 
short timep that either of two developments was capable of 
impairing the harmony of Anglo-Russian relations -a refusal 
Including, for this purposev Persia. v. Appendix 3 for 
evidence of British acquiescence in the overwhelming 
superiority of Russian influence there. 
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on the part of the British government to disinterest them- 
selves in the Russian domination of Central Asia up to the 
frontier of Afghanistan and a refusal on the part of the 
Russian government to disinterest itself in Afghanistan. 
Danger was the more likely to arise from this source if a 
period of acute Anglo-Russian hostility followed - as it did 
a period when Central Asia was the only -cause of such small 
friction as existed between the two-countries. Such 
agreement as had been reached was not associated with any 
"neutral zone": it depended on the willingness of the two 
governments concerned to observe certain negative rules of 
action; a willingness that could not be depended upon if 
their major interests conflicted elsewhere. Meanwhile, the 
Outcome of these five years' negotiations made an answer to 
one question more urgent - what use would Britain make of 




It is unlikely in the extreme that Gladstone, Clarendon 
or Granville, if they had been askedf would have admitted 
that they contemplated any departure from Lawrence's policy. 
Nevertheless, the position in respect of Central Asia and 
Afghanistan was not, in 1874,, what it had been in 1869. The 
independence of Afghanistan had become or been allowed to 
become an integral part of British interests. The first 
enquiry to make is how far this development had been followed 
by a correspondingly closer development of relations between 
Afghanistan and India. If "inactivity" had been interpreted 
in the literal sense of doing nothing whatsoever there would 
have been no reason for close relations. Butv as we have 
seen, the exponents of "inactivity" haal at the mostp 
confined its operation to India and had expected a good deal 
of activity on the part of the Home Government. Mayop more- 
over, had by the end of his term of office transformed 
Lawrence's policy into something a gfeat deal broader and 
more positive. In other wordsp two lines of thoughtp not 
quite identicalp had converged upon*AfghaniBtan. It was to 
be independent but at the same time it was to be - to some 
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undefined extent -under British influence. 
It would not have been easy for any state to fill the 
role for which Afghanistan was cast; to beg in Mayo's 
words., one of that fringe of "strong,, independent, friendlyp 
though not altogether neutral States"-' For such a country 
as Afghanistan it was the more difficult. it is a possible 
criticism of Mayo that his high-minded policy of pacification 
assumed that the countries with which he dealt were already 
at the more than elementary stage of civilization and inter- 
national intercourse to which he wanted to bring them. 
For whatever reasonsp the fact remained that relations 
between Sheer Ali and the Indian government showed 
. 
no develop- 
ment or consolidation comparable to the increased importance 
of Afghanistan in British-Indian policy. On the contraryp 
they tended to degenerate rather than improve after the 
Amballa Conference orv at least2 after Mayo's death. From 
the British point of viewp one source of donger existedv 
possibly though not necessarilyp in the correspondence 
carried on between Sheer Ali and General Kaufmann,, the 
governor and commander-in-chief of Russian Turkestan. That 
correspondence began, with a letter from Kaufmann to Sheer 
written in March 1870p in which Kaufmann explained the 
Mayo to Frerep 27th May 1869. John Martineau: The Li 




circumstances under which Abdur Rahman had been received at 
Taf>hken& and disclaimed any intention of meddling with 
Afghanistan, for two reasons: Sheer Ali had shown no signs 
of meddling with Bokhara and had given Kaufmann no cause of 
dissatisfaction. Not unnaturally# Sheer Ali was disturbed 
by this letter, with its implied threat of what might happen 
if he were thought to be meddling with Bokhara or giving the 
Russians cause for dissatisfaction; and he sought Mayo's 
advice on the reply he should send. Aitchisony to whom the 
question was referred, regarded Kaufmann's letter as "a most 
insidious onellp containing the implication "that any inter- 
ference by Shere Ali in Bokhara would be ground for Russian 
interference in Afghanistan". He advised a reply to the 
effect that Sheer Ali was guided in his policy by the British 
government and that therefore it would be "most convenient 
and tend most to obviate all misunderstandings if General 
Kaufmann would in future make his views and wishes known to 
his Government in St. Petersburg for communication to the 
Ameer through the British Government". Mayo, howeverp in a 
1. The exact words were, "Je ne desire pas de me diverger de 
vous parceque votre efficacite n1a donne aucun sujet de 
mecontentement". v "Note and Correspondence connected with 
the Mission to CaBul" (private Secretary'B Offices, Simlaq 
12th June 1876); Memorandum on the Correspondence between 
General Von Kaufmann and the Ameer of Cabul,, pp. 1-3. 
India; Central Asia and Afghanistan to 1877, King's College 
Library. 
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minute of 5th June 1870, dissented from Aitchison. He did 
not regard Kaufmann's letter as "so very insidious" and did 
not attach "any very great importance to it". He declined 
to support Aitchison's suggestion that Kaufmann should be 
asked to address Sheer Ali in future via the Russian and 
British governmentss though he thought it "desirable that the 
Ameer Should be made fully aware that should Russia at any 
time assume a more aggressive position than she does now such 
an attitude would not be approved of by the British Govern- 
ment". In Mayo's viewq Kaufmann had probably been instructed 
from St. Petersburg to make generally known in Central Asia 
"the perfect understanding existing between Great Britain and 
Russia in respect of those countries". The Home Government 
concurred in expressing its satisfaction at the , amiable tone" 
of Kaufmann's letter. 
Kaufmann's second letter arrived in Kabul on 3rd March 
1871. It expressed gratification for Sheer Ali's "pacific" 
reply and reiterated the Tsar's desire to live in peace and 
harmony with his neighbours. Sheer Ali passed on the letter 
to the Indian government and requested an accurate translation 
(into Persian). This he was given, with the advice to send 
a friendly reply; which he did. ' 
Is Ibideq p*39 
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On 28th October 1871 Kaufmann sent his third letter. 
He explained the causes which had lea to the military 
operations against Kulja; observed that if Sheer Ali's 
officers would carry out strictly his orders not to interfere 
with Bokhara, friendship between Russia and Afghanistan would 
increase; and congratulated the Ameer on his reconciliation 
with Yakub Khanp adding that his sympathy in this matter had 
been with the father throughout. Aitchison, who received 
the letter in December 1871 from the British agent in Kabult 
was slightly disturbed at what he regarded as the hint that 
Sheer Ali had had more sympathy in his quarrel with Yakub 
Khan from Russia than from Britain. By Aitchison's advice 
the translation which Sheer Ali had asked for Was accompanied 
by a friendly letter from'the Acting Viceroyp Lord Napier. 
1 
Sheer Ali sent a polite reply to Kaufmann and on l9th 
May 1872 sent a copy of his reply to the Viceroy together with 
a fourth letter of Kaufmann's written in February 1872: he 
did not, however, on this occasion ask for a translation or 
the draft of an answer. This fourth letter ofkaufmann's 
dealt with an apparently small point but Aitchison was 
disturbed and in a minute of 29th May 1872 advised that a 
1.11bid. v pp. 3.4. The letter suggested by Aitchison was sent 
on lst May 1872. The slowness of action and communication 
is noticeable. Kaufmann's third letter was dated 28th 
October 1871: Sheer Ali was not instructed how to answer 
it until Ist May 1872. 
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translation and a draft reply be sent to Sheer Ali q though 
he had not asked f or them; and addedy 
"It would be well if by some means this 
correspondence between General Kaufmann 
and the Ameer could be quietly brought 
to a close". 
The new Viceroyp Lord Northbrookv apparently dissented from 
Aitchison's opinion: he directed that Sheer Ali be informed 
of his desire to maintain friendly relations with Afghanistan 
but that no translation or draft reply to Kaufmann be sent. 
1 
Kaufmann's fifth letter was dated 16th June 1872 and 
was received from Sheer Ali, via the Punjab government* on 
31st July. Kaufmann remarked that the interchange of letters 
was both evidence of and an assistance to the growth of good 
feeling between Russia and Afghanistan but there were two 
passages in the letter w14ich might be taken to imply a veiled 
threat. The Ameer was informed that "God willing"j, it was 
hoped that no change would take place regarding the frontier 
between Bokhara and Afghanistan - 
Itfor the slightest change causing displeasure to both parties manifestly destroys the comfort of both". 
1. Ibid, t pp. 4p5. Thomas George (Baring) Ist Earl of North- brook (1826-1904) had held subordinate office in Englandt 
including that of Under-Secretary for Indiat 1859-64. He 
was almost the model mid-Victorian Liberal statesman: 
pacifict economical, with the highest sense of public duty. 
His biographyq Thomas George, Earl of Northbrook (1908)t by 
Bernard Malletp hardly devotes enough space or detail to 
Northbrookts Viceroyalty and is less useful than Hunter's 
book on Mayo or Lady Betty Balfour's on her father# Lord 
Lytton. 
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In the second place, Kaufmam pointed out that the people 
within his charge were 'tall comfortable" and addedv 
"Your wisdom and sagacity will doubtless have 
taught you by the study of history that the 
Great God wishes that King to rule who preserv- 
ing his subjects in comfort maintains friend- 
ship with his neighbours". 
Was there a suggestion here that if Sheer Ali failed to 
provide as much comfort for his subjects as the subjects of 
Russia received at Kaufmann's handBo or failed to maintain 
friendship with his neighbours, the "Great God" might cease 
to wish him to rule? Such, at least# was the interpretation 
put on the letter at Kabul where it was received on 19th July, 
and whence it was sent to India on the following day. In a 
covering letter the agent at Kabul expressed the fears enter- 
tained there. If Bokhara and Khiva fell to Russia 
Itand their frontier is extended without the inter- 
vention of any buffer to the limits of Afghan- 
istan, which mayp indeedp be truly styled the 
frontier of Hindostanp God only knows what line 
of policy or demeanour they will adopt towards 
Afghanistan, and what troubles may be in store 
for the Afghan and English Governments". 
Aitchison, in a minute of 6th August 1872p suggested that 
Sheer Ali should be advised to send a friendly reply and 
informed that the British Government had full confidence in 
the assurances given by Russia. These suggestions were 
adopted bytAitchison's third suggestion - 
"It is a delicate matter to meddle withq but if 
(000) 
General Kaufmann could be got to stop the 
correspondence of which he is so fondq'it 
would be a satisfactory thing" 
- was not acted on, in the reply sent to Sheer Ali on 7th 
September 1872.1 
In the meantime Kaufmann had written two more letters, 
one dated 13th August 1872 to Sheer Ali and the other dated 
15th August to Naib Mohammad Alumq the governor of Balkh. 
There was nothing much in these letters beyond general 
professions of friendship but it was the fact of the letters 
and not their content which disturbed Sheer Ali and, accord- 
ing to the Kabul agent, made him ask why, 
"notwithstanding that the Russian authorities 
are well aware that the Government of Afghan- 
istan is united with the British Government, 
they openly write unsolicited letters for the 
promotion of their friendship with Afghanistan 
and do not relax in the frequency of their 
communications, and now they have commenced to 
send letters to the Governor of Balkh also". 
-The agent at Kabul was instructed on 7th September 1872 to 
tell Sheer Ali that the Indian government saw no reason for 
apprehension in Kaufmann's letters but, ratherv evidence of 
Russian amity. Aitchison notedq however, that the Ameer was 
evidently "very nervous about the continued correspondence". 
In facts Sheer Ali was so apprehensive that on this 
occasion he departed from the Viceroy's advice. He left 
1. lbidep pp. 5-8. 
(201) 
Kaufmannts letter of 16th June 1872 unanswered and in his 
answer (postponed until 28th November 1873) to Kaufmann's 
letter of 13th August 1872 referred to a much earlier letter, 
the first, of 28th March 1870, which he pointedly inter- 
preted as 
"your promise that no Russian officer will inter- 
fere with the affairs of Afghanistanp and that 
no advice or assistance will be given to the 
enemies of the kingdom which will be turned 
against it". 
In reply, Kaufmann's deputy, Kolpakovskip sent on 18th 
December 1873 a letter which contained some remarkable 
passages: 
"I consider it my duty to express to you my satis- 
faction as regards the feelings of friendship and 
devotion which you set forth in your letter 9, we In despatching the same to the High Governor- 
General for his favourable consideration I enter- 
tain the hope that he will not refuse your request... 
continue to follow the same straight road along 
which you have hitherto gonep and you will become 
convinced that it is the right and advantageous 
road as regards both yourself and the welfare of 
Your people". 
This letter, which was forwarded to India in the usual way by 
the Kabul agent, was considered sufficiently interesting and 
the word "request" sufficiently ambiguous for a photographic 
copy to be taken and sent to England for verification of the 
translation. The translation was sent back to Kabul and the 
attention of the Secretary of State for India was drawnp in 
a despatch of lst May 1874p to the tone of KolpakovskitB 
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letter. 1 
At the end of January 1874 Sheer Ali notified Kaufmann 
of his nomination of his son, Abdulla Jang as heir-apparent: 
Kolpakovski, who replied on 25th February mentioned the 
recent marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh to a daughter of 
the Tsar. To Sheer Ali this information brought not the 
gratification it was presumably intended to bring but the 
suspicion that Britain and Russiav so closely alliedy were 
contemplating the partition of Afghanistan. 
2 
In the first week of September 1875 a new departure was 
taken when., in lieu of the previous system of passing letters 
overL the frontier, another letter of Kaufmannts was brought 
to Kabul by a Russian agent or messenger. This letter 
repeated the news of the Anglo-Russian matrimonial alliance 
and aroused further apprehension in the Afghan Durbar. The 
Kabul agents in sending a copy to India (no British advice 
was sought) noted the current belief that 
"This time the Russian Government has made itself 
partner in the protection of Afghanistan. This 
para. is of a new tone. God knows what State 
secrets are concealed in it, 1.3 
Nevertheless Sheer Ali not merely sent a polite reply but 
invited the continuance of the correspondence - "the despatch 
1. Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
2. ibid. p P. 12. 3. Ibid. p PAN 
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of friendly commmications should be considered one of the 
principles of our friendship". This ietter produced a 
speedy reply from Kaufmannp of 27th October 1875, giving# 
"through real friendship". a narrative of his recent 
expedition to Khokand. Sheer Ali, in a fulsome answer of 
3rd February 1876 expressed his hope that "if God pleaBesp 
nothing will interfere with the progress of friendship 
between Russia and Afghanistan" and added that "the favour 
of Your continuing to write to me about your good health is 
requested". 1 
In a minute of 12th August 1876 Lytton gave his view of 
the correspondence between Sheer Ali and Kaufmann. 
"I am also most reluctantly led to the conclusion 
that our previous toleration of a correspondencep 
in which the Russian Generalp not even confining 
his remarks to the foreign interests of Afghan- 
iBtan, has already made very significant reference 
to the internal affairs of that countryp in a 
sense decidedly opposed to the language then held 
towards the Ameer by the Government of India - 
makes it now very difficult for us to remonstrate 
with adequate effect against proceedings which I 
cannot but regard as a gross violation of the 
assurances solemnly given by Prince Gortchakoff to 
Lord Clarendon, and since then frequently renewed 
by the Cabinet of St. Petersburghlt. 71ý, 
In 1870 Sheer Alis almost shivering with apprehensiong 
was Bending the originalB of Kaufmann's letterB to India and 
wondering what sinister motive was behind this unwelcome 
1. lbid. p pp. 14-15. 2. India; Gentral Asia and Afghanistan to 1877. 
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correspondence: in 1875 he was sending only the copies of 
letters, asking for no advice on answering them and solicit- 
ing further letters from Kaufmann. He might be as suspicious 
of Russia as ever - it was difficult for a man 
in his position 
not to be suspicious of everything and everybody - but he was 
obviously anxious to conciliate her. In these five years 
Britain had allowed the very special position which she had 
occupied in respect of Afghanistan in 1870 to go by default: 
she had taken no steps to prevent the infiltration of Russian 
influence. If she desired to exercise no influence upon 
Afghanistan or to stand in a special relation to that countryo 
well and good. But, in fact, one of the outcomes of the 
negotiations concurrently conducted between London and St. 
Petersburg was to give Afghanistan a very considerable 
importance in British policy. Another outcome was to draw 
from Russia the most precise and positive assurances that 
Afghanistan was outside her sphere of influence. 
1 It was 
difficult to believe that this was true in 1876 or not to 
regret that Mayo had not followed Aitchison's advice in 
1870 and insisted on Kaufmann's letters being sent via St. 
Petersburgo London and India; in which case they would 
1. An appendix of declarations made by the Russian government 
in respect of Afghanistan was prepared by F. Henvey.. Under- 
Secretary in the Foreign Department of the Government of 
Indiap dated 23rd July 1876. It is given as Appendix 4. 
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probably not have been sent at all. 
It will have been observed that Sheer Alilq letters to 
Kaufmann and his attitude towards Kaufmann's letters to him 
changed after the end of the year 1873. In January 1874 he 
took the initiative by announcing the nomination of his heir- 
apparent and in September he invited the continuance of the 
correspondence. It would in any event be inherently 
probable that something specific had occurred to account for 
this change but there is, in factp ample evildence both of 
what that was and what its effects were. jLs to the latterp 
Lord Roberts related what Yakub Khan afterwards told him. 
"I had several interesting conversations with Yakub 
Khan, and in discussing with him Shir Ali's reasons 
for breaking with us, he dwelt on the fact that his 
fathert although he did not get all he wished out 
of Lord Mayop was firmly satisfied and content with 
what had been done for himp but when Savyid Nur 
Muhammad returned from Simla in 1873p he became 
thoroughly disgusted, and at once made overtures 
to the Russians, with whom constant intercourse had 
since been kept upto. 2 
On 23rd March 1873 the Indian government learnt that 
Goldsmid's award in the Seistan arbitration had been confirmed 
1. On the other hand, Sheer Ali had been greatly impressed by 
Mayo's personality and it may be that the degeneration in 
Anglo-Afghan relations would not have taken place had Mayo 
lived longer; not so much on account of what he did as on 
account of his impressive personal qualities. 
2. Forty-One 
- 
Years in India, Vol. IIjp . 247 
(2 vols. tl897). 
d cf. RobertsT Notes on the central Asion Questionp p.. 20 
(1877): 
- 
"1 had frequent opportunities when in Afghanistan 
of discussing, with those best able to form an opinion# 
our relations with Sher Ali: -they all pointed to 1873 as 
the date from which the Amir became estranged"j, 
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in London and it immediately proposedo through the Kabul 
agent, to send an official of high rank (McNabby the Commiss- 
ioner of Peshawar) to explain the details of the award to 
Sheer Ali. It would be the envoyfs secondary duty to 
explain the agreement reached with Russia over the northern 
boundary of Afghanistan in the previous January. Sheer Alip 
though he did not elaborate on the objections to the 
reception of a British envoy which (according to the Kabul 
agent) had been discussed in Durbar, preferred, at that 
stage at leastp to receive the information through an envoy 
of his own sent to India. To that course the Indian govern- 
ment agreed and the Afghan envoyp Synd Noor Mohammad Shahy 
arrived in Simlas had his first meeting with Northbrook on 
12th July 1873. Northbrook began by speaking of the 
frontier settlements effected and said (according to the. same 
envoy's statements to Sir Lewis Pelly in February 1877)p 
"It is necessary that the Ameer be informed that 
since the country of Afghanistan is situated between the territories of the English and the 
Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous that the Government of Afghanistan should be 
strong and independent". 
Northbrook was careful to make it plain that British influence 
would only be used in respect of the external and not of the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan but he added that if British 
influence failed to avert aggression from without it was 
probable that Britain would afford Sheer Ali material 
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assistance. The interview closed with the envoy's stating 
the greater reliance of the Afghans upon the British rather 
than upon the Russians and their desire 'for a promise of aid 
against the steadily approaching Russian advance. 
Thereafter the envoy held several meetings with the 
Foreign Secretaryt Aitchisono when the details of the Seistan 
award and of the agreement on the northern boundary of 
Afghanistan were explained to him. He heard of the former 
with distaste which he made no attempt to conceal and of the 
latter with scepticism: he had no faiths he saidy in 
Russian promisest either direct or indirect; only in the 
assurance of British aid. When he was given to understand 
that no such aid had been promised by Mayo or Lawrence he 
declared that if a new agreement were made it would have to 
be much different from the old one. Britain would have to 
declares publiclyp that Russiat or any state under her 
influences, would be regarded as an enemy if guilty of acts 
of aggression against Afghanistan and would have to Supply 
Sheer Ali with arms, money andp if neceSBarys troops; the 
last to be sent along the routes indicated by Sheer Ali and 
withdrawn when the invasion had been repelled. 
On 26th July the envoy had a second interview with 
I 
Northbrook. It is necessary to noticev at this Btagev that 
Northbrook's hands were by no means free. Before the Afghan 
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envoy arrived at Simla Northbrook had cabled., on 27th June, 
to the Duke of Argylls Secretary of State for Indiap arguing 
that it was in the interests of peace that Russia should know 
of British relations with Afghanistan and that circumstances 
might arise which made it incumbent on Britain to afford the 
ruler Of Afghanistan material assistance. This he proposed 
to tell the envoy*. On Ist July, Argyll replied. He did 
not object to the general sense of what Northbrook said 
about Russia, as a communication to be made from the Foreign 
Office to the Russian goverment; but "great caution" was 
necessary "in assuring Amir of material assistance which may 
raise undue and unfounded expectation". In the light'of 
this cable Northbrook had obviously gone as far as he Was 
expected to go) and possibly furtherp in what he said to the 
envoy on 12th july. On 24th July he cabled again to Argyll: 
"Amir of Kabul alarmed at Russian progress; dissatis- fied with general assurances and anxiOUB to know definitely how far he may rely upon our help if 
invad9d. I propose to assure him that if he 
unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all 
external relations, we will help him with moneyl 
arms and troops, if necessary to repel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. 
Answer by telegraph quickly". 
This was less than the envoy had asked of Aitchisonl but it 
1. It is only fair to Northbrook to point out that he went as 
far as Lord Cranbrook was willing to go in 1878. cf. a 
letter of Cranbrook's to Lord Beaconsfieldo 13th September 
1878: "The defence of Afghan territory must be very 
(Continued foot next page) 
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was more than the Home Government were willing to commit 
themselves to. Argyll replied on 26th July. 
"Cabinet think that you should inform Amir that 
we do not at all share his alarm and consider 
there is no cause for it. But you may assure 
him that we shall maintain our settled policy 
in Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in 
external affairs". 
Beyond these instructions Northbrook could not and did 
not go., although he saw the Afghan envoy on two or three 
occasions between 26th July and 30th August and proposed to 
make Sheer Ali a gift of ten lakhs of rupeesy in addition to 
five already promised; five of these ten to be used for 
paying for the 20,000 stand of arms for Which Sheer Ali had 
asked. 
It was sufficiently obvious that no responsible British 
8tatesman would or could give a "guarantee" to any Afghan 
ruler in the sense of promising toidefend his territory in 
all circumstances and to go to war whenever and with whomsO- 
ever he did. Was there a substantial difference between 
what Northbrook suggested - "money., arms and troopst if 
necessary to repel unprovoked aggression" - and What Argyll 
allowedy the maintenance of "our settled policy"? The 
1. (Continued from previous page) 
strictly limited, and the particular boundaries defined. 
All must be founded on his acting on our adviceý for we 
could not be responsible for what he may bring upon himself! 
by independent action". A. B. Gathorne-Hardy: Gothorne 
Hardy, First Earl of Cranbrookv Vol. lIp p. 84 (2 vols. pl9lO)- 
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answer must be that there was, and that it would appear still 
more substantial in the eyes of Sheer Ali. What he feared 
more than anything else was the advance of Russia until her 
frontier marched with that of Afghanistan; a series of 
frontier "incidents1f; 'and then invasion. The "settled 
Policy" of Britain had done nothing to stop the eastward 
advance of Russia and since it was based on what seemed to 
him to be a false assumption, that the good faith of Russia 
could be depended on, it was bound to appear very ill-founded. 
_"Money, 
arms and troopsj if necessary to repel unprovoked 
aggression" would have represented., for Sheer Alip a 
substantial advance upon the "settled policy". The funda- 
mental error of Argyll and the Cabinet arose from a lack of 
imaginationy from the failure to understand the necessities 
of a rulerp none too secure on his own throne and faced with 
the approach of a great Power advancing towards his country 
with giant strides. Such a man, in such a positioný might 
be highly suspicious and highly unreasonable; but if his 
actions were likely to have an important effect-upon British 
interests it would have been prudent to pay more attention to 
his suspicions and to take more pains to convert him to 
reason. 1 
The Simla Conference is recorded in Parl. Papersp 1878-89v 
Vol. 56. The two most important itemsp Northbrook's cable 
of 24th July and Argyll's reply of 26th July'are given 
under No. 482. 
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Whether Sheer Ali was or was not justified in being 
disappointed with the outcome of the Simla Conference it 
very soon became obvious. that he was bitterly disappointed. 
His reply to Northbrook's letter of 6th September 1873 was, 
in its way, a masterpiece of irony; but the irony of a man 
who feels that he has been betrayed. 
"This humble supplicant at the Divine Throne 
renders his thanks to' God., and expresses his 
gratitude thato praised be God the Almightyp 
lasting peace and tranquillity are established 
in all Governments, and doubts and oppositions 
from all sides have been removed; and such 
security has been attained in all kingdoms that 
no one will transgress his own frontiersy and 
nobody will dispute or discuss with anybody 
within their own limits, and the word "enmity" 
no longer is used in State papers and documentso 
and tranquillity and security are enjoyed by all 
nations at large". 
He wanted, he said, no further engagements: he would be 
, 
content if the policy of "Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo" 
continued to be pursued. More significant stillp he did 
not draw on the ten lakhs of rupees at his disposal at Kohat. 
It war. the more unfortunate that the attempt which Sheer 
Ali made to settle the succession led to a further degener- 
ation in Anglo-Afghan relations. In November 1873 he 
nominated his favourite son, Abdullahjan, as heir apparent; 
notifying the Viceroy and Kaufmann of his action. The 
replies he received were very different. That from the 
Government of India-was 
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11aesignealy coucheaq as nearly as circumstances 
admit, in the same language as that in which in 
1858 the Punjab Government were instructed to 
reply to the letter of Dost t1ohamed Khan intim- 
ating the selection of Sher Ali as heir apparent 
If Sheer Ali recollected - and he could scarcely forget - his 
own efforts to establish himself after his father's deatho 
this letter could not be construed as holding out much 
encouragement to Abdulla Jan. Kolpakovkifs reply of 25th 
Pebruary 1874 was in striking contrast. 
"I congratulate you on this selection. Such 
nominations tend to the comfort and tranquillity 
of the kingdom. I wish perpetual succession of 
Your kingdom by you and your heirs and hope that 
after your death Sirdar Abdulla Jan will follow 
your example and make himself an ally and friend 
of the Emperor". 2 
It may be that Kolpakovski meant little or nothing by 
his flowery language; but Sheer Ali was in the mood when 
words could mean a great deal to him. His nomination of 
Abdull&hJan had naturally provoked the anger of Yakub Khan 
whol howevert unable to launch a rebellioný eventually went 
to Kabul under a safe-conduct granted by his father. The 
safe-conduct was forthwith violated and he was immediately 
imprisoned. Upon hearing of this Northbrook instructed the 
Kabul agent to tell the Ameer that "as his friend and well- 
wisher"s he trusted the report of the arrest was untrue and 
1. Lytton to Argyll, 23rd Jan. 1874. Parl. Papers, 1878-79, 
Vol. 46, Z91. 
2.2arl. Paperso 1881. C-2798: Correspondence Respecting Central 
Asia; Central Asia. No. 1 (1881). Inclosure No. 17 in No. l. 
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to urge the necessity of observing the conditions under which 
Yakub Khan had come to Kabul. By so doing Sheer Ali would 
maintain his good name and the friendship of the British 
Government. Sheer Ali strongly resented this intervention 
in an internalt and family, matter and denied that the 
British government had any right to withdraw their friendship 
so long as he was guilty of no violation of his engagements 
to them. 1 
The situation which existed by 1874 can be summarized 
thus: the integrity Afghanistan hadp rightly or wronglyp 
come gradually to be regarded as highly important to British 
interests and it had become part of British policy to act as 
the exclusive protector of Afghanistan in her external 
relations. This meant a marked change from the policy Of 
ten years earlier. The changev howeverp had not been 
accompanied by a corresponding increase of British influence 
in Afghanistan. For a timev indeedp following the Ambala 
Durbar, the personality of Mayo had lent an appearance of 
sol: Ld: Lty, q from the Afghan point of viewo to Anglo-Afghan 
relations. Northbrook suffered in the eyes of Sheer Ali 
from the fact that he was not Mayo - even though the Seistan 
Award,, for Which he was blamedt arose out of Mayo's initiative. 
Britain had done nothing to check the Russian advance eastward: 
1. Parl. Papers, 1878: Afghanistant No. lp pp. 126-127. 
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she had allowed the correspondence begun by Kaufmann to 
continue. The Simla Conference had, compared with that of 
Ambalap been an anti-climax. Sheer Alip for these and 
more personal reasons, had gradually moved towards a 
consideration of two alternatives: that there existed a 
secret Purposep shared by Britain and Russiap for the 
Partition of Afghanistan; and that Britain would fail him 
in the event of Russian aggression. He had notp in 1874, 
made UP his mind between these alternatives; but each of 
them counselled him to make his terms with Russia. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERMENT AND LORD NORTHBROOKf 
- 1874-1876 
In the last week of January 1874 polling began in the 
general election and it soon became evident that there was 
a strong reaction in England towards the Conservative party, 
WhIch eventually secured a majority of 50. On 17th February 
Gladstone resigned and on the 18th Disraeli was COMMiSBioned 
by the Queen to form a government. In his Cabinetv Lord 
Derby was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the 
Marquis of Salisbury Secretary of State for India until Derby 
resigned on 27th March 1878 and Salisbury, succeeding to his 
officeg was himself succeeded at the India Office by Gathorne 
Hardy whop on 3rd May 1878, was raised to the peerage as 
Viscount Cranbrook. For the Bake of convenience it may be 
prop'er to add at this point that Lord Northbrook remained as 
Viceroy of India until April 1876v when he was succeeded by 
Lord Lytton. 
, 
It is tempting to assume that Disraeli's government 
represented so clean a break with Gladstone's that the events 
of 1878v the challenge to Russia over the Treaty of San 
Stefanol the occupation of Cyprus, the Congress of Berlin 
and the invasion of Afghanistang were inherent in its policy 
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from the very beginning of its course. That, howevery is 
an assumption whic4 cannot safely be made. The first shadow 
of the new phase of the Eastern Question was not cast until 
the revolt against Turkish rule which broke out in Herze- 
govina. in July 1875. There followed the British rejection 
of the Berlin memorandum of 13th May 18769 the declaration 
of war on Turkey by Serbia in July 1876 and by Montenegro in 
August, and the publication in September by Gladstone of his 
pamphlet on The Bulgarian Horrors - the massacres of 
Christians by Turkish irregulars which, though they had begun 
in May,, had only come to the general knowledge of Europe in 
the middle of the summer. The abortive Constantinople 
Conference sat from 12th December 1876 to 20th January 1877. 
War between Russia and Turkey began on 24th April 1877# 
Until almost the end of that year the Russians were held UP 
by the gallant defence of Plevna but its surrender on 10th 
December was quickly followed by the Russian capture of Sofia 
on 3rd January 1878, of Philippopolis on 17th January and by 
a major Turkish defeat-at Senova on 9th January: on 20th 
January Adrianople was occupied by Russian troops. On 23rd 
January the Mediterranean squadron was ordered to proceed 
through the Dardanelles to Constantinople and although the 
order was countermanded a vote of Z6,000,000 for military 
preparations was asked for and war fever in England rOBe to 
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its height in the form of "Jingoism". On 23rd March 1878 
the preliminaries of the Treaty of San Stefano were commun- 
icated to the British government: on the 27th the Cabinet 
decided to call out the Reserves and to despatch an Anglo- 
Indian force to occupy strong points in the Levant; on lst 
April Salisbury issued his Circular Notev critiCiBing the 
provisions of the treaty, with the result of enlisting the 
sympathy of Austria-Hungary and Germanyp andq perhaps, of 
leading to the Convention which he and the Russian envoy, 
Schouvaloff, concluded on 30th May: the first session of 
the Berlin Congress was held on 13th June 1878 and the last 
on 13th july. It remains doubtful whether Disraelil ever 
intended to go to war with Russia and certainly the period 
of acute Anglo-Russian friction lasted - so far as the 
respective governments were concerned - only for a few months 
in the winter of 1877-78. Obviously it influenced British 
- policy in rezpect of Afghanistan but it was not long enough 
to account forlthat policy in its entirety. 2 
1. Disraeli was raised to the peerage as Earl of Beaconsfield 
on 12th August 1876 but references to him will be continued 
to be made under his better-known surname. 
2. v Cambridge History of British Foreign Policyp Vol-III9 ýbapter I (II and 111) (1923). The contributorp W. H. Dawsonq 
concludes that "a study of the diplomatic despatches and 
conversations which passed between the Foreign Office and 
the Porte at that time, and of Lord Beaconsfield's concurr- 
ent correspondence with the Queenp his colleagues and his 
friendsp makes it impossible to resist the conclusion that 
all the admonitionsp remonstrances and veiled threats which 
were addressed to Russia on the subject of Constantinople 
were a gigantic piece of bluff". p. 126. 
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With regard to Central Asia and Afghanistan two 
quotations will serve to suggest that British policy as it 
existed in 1878 had not been formed in 1874-75. ItRussia 
Must advance to Merv ultimately", Salisbury wrote to North- 
brook in the summer of 1874, "and we have no power or 
interest to prevent it. Hdrat is quite another matter". 1 
And on Disraeli, as late as May 1875, there is Lord Napier's 
comment, contained in a letter to Prere written on the 28th 
of that month. 
"Mr-Disraeli sees no popular call for more active 
measuresq and things which would have caught his 
eye and fired his fancy twenty years ago fail to 
move him now". 2 
Derby's first concernp after taking office in 1874, was 
directly with Persia and only indirectly with Afghanistan. 
The Foreign Office was concerned with a circular letter sent 
by General Llamakin to the Turkoman chiefso in which he 
claimed appointment as "the supreme authority on the Attrek 
and Goorgan". Loftus was instructed to point out that this 
area was Persian but he got small comfort from de Westmannv 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told him that the 
incident was of little importance in itself and solely 
1. Lady Gwendolen Cecil; life of Robert, Msrýuis of Salisburyp 
Vol. III p. 70 (5 vols., VolB. 1 and 11,1920). 
2. Martineau, Vol. Ij, op. cit. p p. 63. 
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concerned Russia end Persia. ' 
On 12th May 1875 Derby had a long conversationy personal 
rather than officialt with the Russian ambassadorp Schouva- 
loff. 
"Count Schouvaloff then proceeded to explain at 
some length what he described as his Personal 
views on the subject of the extension of Russian 
power in Central Asial as to which it is 
Sufficient to say that they were unfavourable to 
fresh annexations. He asked me whether he was 
right in supposing that there was no inclination 
on the part of England to advýnce farther in the 
direction of the Russian possessionsg unless 
such advance were considered by us necessary for 
defensive purposes, in order to protect our 
actual dominions, I said that his view was 
undoubtedly corrects and thatv so far from 
desiring to annex any part of Afghanistans we 
should deprecate such a result as bringing only 
increased cost and trouble without advantage. 
We wished to be on good terms with the Afghan 
rulers and to exercise a friendly influence over 
his Policy.. but his independence was not likely 
to'be menaced by us. The only case in which I 
could conceive an advance of British troops 
westward as probable was in the event of any 
Russian movement tending to the occupation of 
Merv. I reminded Count Schouvaloff that I had 
warned him some months back of the great 
importance which the Indian Government attached 
to Mervp and of the danger to our relations 
which would ensue if it were meddled with. He 
said that he remembered what I had told him on 
that subjects and had communicated it to his 
Government. 
- 
He quite saw the danger which might 
arise if the two Powers were brought face to face 
in the neighbourhood of Herat. "Was he justified"p 
he asked, "in assuming that our action in this 
matter would depend on that of Russiap that England 
1. Earl. Parera, 1878. C-2164. Correspondence Respecting 
Central Asia: Central Asia# No. I (1878)9 Nos. 20 (copY of 
Llamakin's circular)v 23 (Loftus to Derbyp 17th November 
1874). 
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would not move if Russia did not? " I said 
I thought he might feel saf e on that point: 
we only desired the maintenance of the status 
Quo, and certainly should not be the first to take steps that might be considered aggressive. He said his Government would be perfectly 
satisfied with this expression of intentions from me2 hinting that the language of some of 
our newspapers had created distrust and 
suspicion in Russia". 1 
On 5th April 1875 Gortchakoff sent to Schouvaloff a 
. 
despatch and a long memorandum, which were communicated to 
Derby on Ilth May. The despatch said that 
"His Imperial Majesty has no intention of 
extending the frontiers of Russiat either on the side of Bokhara or on the side of Krasnovodsk 
and of the Attrek. We have no inducement to do 
Boo On the contrary the Emperor deems any 
extension of our frontiers in those parts as being opposed to our own interests. We shall 
cause those frontiers to be respected, and shall 
protect our commerce, we shall punish any act of 
violence or pillage in such manner as to prevent their recurrence, we shall endeavour to extirpate brigandagep and to establish the security of our possessions". 
The despatch concluded by requesting Her Majesty's Government 
to exert their influence on theAmeer of Kabul to dissuade 
him from "any inconsiderate act of a kind to excite or 
encourage the Turkomans". 2 
The memorandum was# in the mainp an attempt to relate 
Russian action in Central Asia to Gortchakoff's circular 
despatch of 1864 and to describe and explain what had happened; 
1. Jbid, f No*26- Derby to Loftusy 19th March 1875. 2. Ibid. j, No. 29. 
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since that time. 
"Unhappily the continually recurring difficult- 
ies, which result from the contact of a 
regularly constituted Power'with semi-savage 
neighbours, soon compelled us to overstep the 
limits which we had voluntarily assigned to 
ourselves". 
Gortchakoff then went on to examine the negotiations over the 
Afghan boundary, insisting on the magnanimity of the Russian 
government in yielding to British obstinacy on that point. 
As regards the expeditions against Khiva and the Turkomanss 
they werep said Gortchakoffq "forced upon us by a state of 
things impossible to foresees and by necessities independent 
of our wishes". Unfortunately, the British government 
appeared to think that such actions were a breach of some 
definite engagements which the Russian government had 
contracted whereas. in fact, there was no such engagements 
either party having "entire liberty of action and judgment 
with respect to measures necessitated for its own security". 
In Gortchakoff's view an understandingl had been reached - 
between Britain and Russiap covering five heads: (1) antag- 
onism between the two countries would be contrary to their 
mutual interests; (2) it was desirable to preserve an inter- 
mediate zone to avert immediate contact; (3) Afghanistan 
1. It is difficult to reconcile Gortchakoff's view that each 
country had preserved entire liberty of action with his 
detailed analysis of the agreement which he held to eXiBt- 
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should constitute this intermediate zone Itif its independ- 
ence were secured on either side from all encroachment; 
(4) that the limits of Afghanistan should be recognized in 
accordance with the line agreed on; (5) Britain would exert 
its influence upon Afghanistan and Russia upon Bokhara and 
Khokand to prevent acts of aggression. Near the end of the 
memorandum was the significant sentencey 
"this understandingp which leaves us complete 
liberty of action over the territory situated 
between our frontiers and those of Afghanistan". 
1 
A copy of the despatch and of the memorandum were sent 
by Derby to Salisbury on 26th May 1875 and Salisbury repliedv 
through his Under-Secretaryp Lord George Hamiltong on 22nd 
June. He dissented from the memorandum on two maiters of 
fact: the idea of the "neutral zonellp which Gortchakoff 
was representing as having been agreed upon under the title 
of "intermediate zone"t had been abandoned in 1869-70; the 
recognition by Russia of the northern frontier of Afghanistan 
was not an act of courtesy but a mere recognition of an 
existing fact. He then went on to deal with the concluding 
part of the memorandum. If the Russian claim to complete 
freedom of action between the Russian frontiers and those of 
Afghanistan were admitted, the admission might lead to 
serious complicationst affecting Indian interests, in respect 
I. 
Ilbid., 
inclosure in No. 29. 
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of Merv. He suggested that "a liberty of action in all 
contingencies 'and in all circumstances" ought to be reserved 
to and by the British government, as full as that claimed by :ý 
Wissia. 1 
The British reply to Gortchakoff's memorandump in the 
form of a shorter memorandump was sent to the charge 
d'affaires in Russia on 25th October 1875. It used 
Salisbury's suggestions regarding the history of the 
negotiations over the neutral zone and the Afghan frontier. 
It did not go quite as far as accepting Salisburyts claim to 
complete liberty of action for Britain but, after mentioning 
"the integrity of Afghan territory", it went on: 
"This is an object to which Her Majestyts Govern- 
ment attach the highest importancep and they must 
reserve to themselves the most complete liberty 
of action under all future contingencies as to 
th6 measures which may, in their opinion be 
necessary to secure itit. 2 
It was obvious that the British and Russian governments were 
ýI 
by no means agreed either in their interpretations of past 
negotiations or in their understanding as to the existing 
1. Ibid., No. 32. 
2. lbid. 9 inclosure in No. 54p Derby to Doria, 25th Oct. 1875. It was significant thatp on the suggestion of the govern- 
ment of India, the Russian government had been formally 
apprised of the provisions of Article 4 of the treaty with 
the ]Khan of Kalat of 14th May 1854 - "Should it be deemed 
necessary to station British troops in any part of the 
territory of Khelatq they shall occupy such positions as 
may be thought advisable by the British authorities". Ibid. NO. 43. Derby to Doriap 15th Sept. 1875, with inclosure. 
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poBition. The Russian goverrzaent claimed complete liberty 
of action up to the frontiers of Afghanistan, as defined in 
1873; though it agreed to respect the integrity of Afghan- 
istan, The British government, starting from the integrity 
of Afghanistan, claimed complete liberty of action to sustain 
that integrity. This might conceivably mean action beyond 
the Afghan frontiers - with the risk of a collision with 
Russia in the area in which she claimed liberty of action. 
Gortchakoff, howeverp in a despatch of 3/15 February 1876, 
which was communicated to Derby on 25th Februaryt glossed 
over the differences and contented himself by dismissing the 
scheme for an intermediate zone as "unpractical" and "agree- 
ing" that "while retaining entire freedom of action",, the two 
Powers should try to avoid any immediate contact with each 
other and any collision between the Asiatic States placed 
within their respective circles of influence. 1 It was 
evident that the British government was beginning to take a 
stronger line but that did not prevent Disraeli making an 
important speech in May 1876 in which he said that the under- 
standing between the British and Russian governments had never- 
been more complete; an announcement which was hailed with 
pleasure by sections of the Russian Press not usually disposed 
to look with: %vour on Britain. 2 
1. Ibid. p No. 62. 2. Ibid. y No-68. Loftus to Derby, 12th May, 1876. 
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It is now time to turn to Salisbury. We have seen that 
whereas in the summer of 1874 he had attached no importance 
to the possible occupation of Merv by Russia he was takingr 
by June 1875, a grave view of such a possibility. Between 
those two dates he had made up his mind that a British 
resident ought to be placed in Herat or Kandahar; ruling 
out Kabul as "too fanatical to be quite safe". In an 
explanatory letter to Disraeli of 2nd January 1675 he 
complained that he was "getting uneasy as to our lack of 
information from Afghanistan". "It is very uncomfortable 
to think that for all we know Russia may have covered the 
country with intrigue... We have only a native agent who 
virites exactly what the Ameer tells him. Consequently we 
know nothing". Having obtained Disraeli's approvalp 
Salisbury pressed his suggestion upon Northbrook in a number 
of private letters. On 19th February 1875 he wrote, 
"Our position with respect to Afghanistan is so 
anomalous that some steps must soon be taken to 
set it right. It is the only Power on the face 
of the earth that, professing to be friendlyp 
will not admit a representative in its territory 
from us. The evil is not merely a formal one. 
It has the effect of placing upon our frontier a 
thick covert2 behind which any amount of hostile 
intrigue and conspiracy may be masked. I agree 
with you in thinking that a Russian advance upon 
India is a chimera. But I am by no means sure 
that an attempt to throw the Afghans upon us is 
80 improbable". 
Another letter of 23rd April 1875 warned Northbrook that 
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"We must not be seduced into solving a difficult 
question by the attractive alternative of doing 
nothing ... We cannot leave the keys of the gate in the hands of a warder of more than doubtful 
integrity, who insistsý as an indispensable 
condition of his service, that his movements 
shall not be observed". 1 
Before we examine Northbrook's reaction to Salisbury's 
proposal it is necessary to notice some of the influences 
which were certainly beginning to work upon Salisbury at 
this period. Among the members of the Council of Indiap a 
consultative and not an executive bodyy were Sir Bartle 
Freres an ex-Governor of Bombayp and Sir Henry Rawlinsont 
whose viewsq down to 1868, we have described. Freres who 
had supported the proposals of Jacob and Green for the 
, occupation of Quetta, on 12th June 1874 wrote to Sir John 
Kaye of the India Office repeating the plea for the 
1. Cecilp op. cit., Vol. jjv pp. 71-72. Selisburyt particularly 
at this stage of his career, had little use for the judg- 
ment even of his own senior staff and it must have irked 
him beyond endurance to be dependent for information about 
what was happening in Afghanistan upon a native agent. 
As well as that, Salisbury's relations with Northbrook 
were not good. Lady Gwendolen Cecil says that her father 
believed in "constant and intimate communication ... and 
found Lord Northbrook difficult to get into touch with in 
thiB respect. Op. cit. v Vol. IIO p. 
66. Mallet sees the 
difficulty as constitutional rather than personal, arising 
from the determination of Northbrook to defend what he 
regarded as the proper authority of the Viceroy against 
interference from home. "I take it"t Northbrook wrote on 
25th February 1876., "that a Governor-General gets a high 
salary for the sake of doing his duty and a very important 
part of it seems to me that he should tell the truth to 
the Secretary of State when he thinks a wrong thing is 
going to be done". Op. cit., pp. 112-114. 
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occupation of Quetta; recormending that British agencies 
should be established in Afghanistan (with or without the 
Ameer's consent); and suggesting that a beginning be made 
by establishing a mission at Herat. ' This letter, from the 
argument of which Lord Lawrence strongly dissentedp was 
communicated privately by Salisbury to Northbrook. Frere 
replied in a second letter of llth January 1875. It is 
likely to be more than coincidence that this same month of 
January saw Salisbury's letter to Disraeli of the 2nd and 
his instructions to Northbrook on the 22nd to proceed with 
the establishment of a British agent at Herat wherev he saidt 
Sheer Ali had agreed to receive one. 
The other influence was the still weightier one of 
Rawlinson whop having added a final chapter on "The Later 
Phases of the Central Asian Question" to his previous 
articles and memorandap published the whole under the title 
of England and Russia in the East,. - In his preface.. dated 
January 18759 Rawlinson explained that the essential feature 
of the last chapter and, indeed, of the whole bookp was the 
principle that 
"if Russia should overstep certain limits in her 
approach to Indiag she must be checked by an 
armed resistance, even at the risk of producing 
war between the two countries. Heratp which 
has justly been named the "key to India" muBtp 
1. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 491. 
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in my view,. be secured against Russian occupation 
at all hazards, even though it should be necessary to march a force from India for its protection" 
In his carefully-argued and well-documented final chapter 
RawlinBon put forward the view that the continuous advance 
of Russia towards India was certain and her occupation of 
Merv inevitable. From Merv the route to Herat was easy and 
"Russia in possession of Herat would have a grip( on the 
throat of India'#. At the very least her position there 
would oblige Britain to increase her frontier forces by 
20., 000 men. "So long as she Russia held aloof from Mervo 
we should hold aloof from Herat; but if she deliberately 
threw down the gauntlet, she must expect it to be taken up". 
By taking up the gauntletv Rawlinson meant the sending of an 
expeditionary force of 100000 men (the majority of them 
Europeans)) of whom 59000 would garrison Herat; 3POOO 
Kandahar; 19000 Quetta and Peshin; the remainder holding 
the line Of Communications between Kandahar and Herat. It 
was quite conceivable that Sheer Alip if his present ill- 
humour were dissipated, might welcome such a force: in any 
event most of the inhabitants of western Afghenistan would 
do so and in the military sense the expedition would be no 
more then a promenade. 
Salisbury's despatch of 22nd january 1875 Was received 
in India in the middle of February. Northbrook replied by 
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cable on 18th February to the effect that he believed the 
time and circumstances were unsuitable for doing what 
Salisbury had instructed should be done; that there were no 
records in the Foreign Department to show that Sheer Ali had 
ever agreed to have a British agent at Herat or elsewhere; 
and that his refusal to have one now was no proof of disloyal 
intentions on his part. We have noticed the further 
arguments which Salisbury adduced in the following months. 
In the meantime Northbrook had set on foot two inveBtigationsp', 
one into Sheer Ali's attitude at Ambalea on the question of 
a resident British agent in Afghanistan and the other into 
the effect of appointing such agents, their probable useful- 
1 ness and the efficacy of the existing system. Having 
1. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjabp the commissioner of 
Peshawar, the Commissioner ot Amritsarp the acting 
Commissioner of DeAeUAty the acting Deputy-Commissioner of 
Peshawar (Cavagnari) and the Secretary to the Punjab 
Government were consulted on the following points: 
Would Sheer Ali willingly consent to the appointment of 
resident British agents at Heratv Kandahar or elsewhere?; 
. 
(2) Would the presence of such agents be advantageous to 
the British government?; (3) Were they satisfied with the 
sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence Bent by the 
native agent at Kabul? To the first question a unanimous 
answer, in the negative, was returned. On the second there 
was virtual unanimity, to the effect that such an agentp 
foi, ced on the Ameer without his consento could effect 
little or no good. On the third question there was a good 
deal of variety of opinion but more doubt about the 
sufficiency of the agent's information than about its 
accuracy. The investigation into Sheer Ali's attitude at 
Amballa in 1869 (M. Appendix 2) revealed a conflict of 
testimony: it certainly was not proved that he had consented 
to receive a British agent elsewhere than at Kabul. Hannay 
OP-cit.,, Vol. I. pp. 57-93, quoting Parl. Papers 1878p Afghan- i8tan No, l (1878). 
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collected his informationg and with the support of his 
Council., Norýhbrook gave his considered answer to Salisbury 
in a_ private letter of 20th May 1875. 
"We settled yesterday the opinion we have to give 
-as 
to the agency at Herat. Af ter a full exam- 
ination of what took place at Umballain 1869 we 
do not think it can be fairly said that the Ameer 
ever accepted the proposal of a British officer 
at Herat. We think moreover that he may have 
reasons for objecting to the proposition quite 
consistent with loyalty to the British Govern- 
ment. All those best qualified to form an 
opinion say that the Ameer strongly objects to 
the presence of British officers in Afghanistan, 
'and this view is confirmed by his proceedings 
since I have been in India. We think it would 
, 
be very desirable to place an officer at Herat 
if it can be arranged with the cordial consent 
of the Ameer, but that, if done against his will 
under pressure, the officer will have no real 
power of being of use and his presence is as 
likely as not to occasion a break some day 
between us and Afghanistan. Unless therefore 
it is the desire of the Government at home to 
change the policy with regard to Afghanistang 
and to show less desire to keep on cordial terms 
than has hitherto been thought advisablep we 
cannot recommend a formal announcement to the 
Ameer that we desire the establishment of a 
British Agent at Herat". 1 
The argument between Salisbury and Northbrook was 
continued throughout the following months. Northbrook held 
to his opinion that 
"to do anything to force him the Ameer to receive 
agents of ours in his country against his will 
is likely to have an opposite effect to that 
which you desire, and to subject us to the risk 
1. Mallet, op. cit., p. 102. 
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of another unnecessary and costly war in 
Afghanistan before many years are over". 1 
It'was, not that Northbrook was by any means an out-and-out 
pacif i st. "There is", he wrote to Malletv the permanent 
Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office on 29th January 1875, 
1. _.., II "a point upon which I would fights and I should let the 
RUS , sians understand this very clearly". 
2 Salisbury, howevers, 
had -an answer to this kind of argument. He had become 
convinced that there existed an undoubted conflict between 
- 
the declared policy of the Russian government and the actual 
conduct of its frontier officials. Whether the goverrment 
meant what it said or whether it was merely using smooth 
words to cloak the activities of its agentsp there was need 
for accurate and speedy information. 
I 
"The case is quite conceivable , 
in which Her 
Majesty's Government may be ablev by early 
diplomatic actiont to arrest proceedings on 
the frontier which a few weeks, or even days 
later, will have passed beyond the power even 
of the government of St. Petersburg to control". 
The despatch of 10th November 18753 in which this sentence 
occurs contained definite instructions that Salisbury's 
proposals should be carried out. They were not, howeverv to 
be carried out by Northbrook. On 12th September 1875 he had 
a'sked to be relieved of office in the following spring; on 
1. Northbrook to Salisburyp 30th September 1875. Malletv 
op. cit. p p. 105. 2. Ibid., p. 101. C- %%Ci 0 
3. Parl-Paloers 1878-79, Vol. 569,, -147. 
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the ground that there was no paramount public duty in the 
way of his fulfilling his private duty in going home. He 
_7 
reiterated his request on 7th January 1876 and although his 
disagreement with the Home Government over the question of 
British agents in Afghanistan no doubt contributed to his 
unwillingness to remain it is inaccurate to say that he 
"resigned rather than obey" Salisbury's instructions on this 
point. 
I. As is said in the Cambridge History of Indis. 9 Vol. VIpp*415. The agency was not the only matter on which Salisbury and 
Northbrook had differed. Their contest over the cotton 




LORD LYTTONtS VICEROYALTY: (I) TO THE PESHAWAR CONVERMOE 
-was not easy to find a successor to Northbrook and 
although Disraeli had felt, on 8th June 1875, that "somehow 
or other Northbrook's reign" would soon terminate,, he 
considered,, in October, that it was unfortunate that North- 
brook_'did not wish to fulfil his term. He was perhaps the 
more inclined to this opinion because q at that time q he seems 
to have ýeen impresseds, not so much with Northbrook himself 
a_s with his arguments. 
.:: I am quite prepared" - he wrote to Salisbury for acting with energy and promptitude in the 
direction of Herat, if we could only come to a bona fide understanding with Afghanistan. But 
can we? If a movement on our partp wh. is only to secure our Empire, but to preserve their 
independence, is actually used by Russia to 
create ill-feeling between us and Afghan(ista)n, 
that would be a deplorable result". 
Salisbury had been obliged to argue his case carefully. 
"The dilemma is simply this. It concerns us 
much to have an agent in Afghanistan. We want 
to guide the Ameer and to watch; for there is 
the double danger that he may play us false, orp 
remaining true, may blunder into operations which 
will bring him into collision with Russia. it 
would also be a great security for peace if we 
were able to keep the Czar, who wishes for peacep 
informed of the intrigues of his frontier 
officerst who do not. But on the other hand it 
is of great importance -I quite admit it - not to irritate the Ameer. But this is a sort of 
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ý--difficulty which the Indian Government has 
had constantly to meet. Diplomacy has been 
a real power in Indian history - because of 
the moral ascendancy which British officers 
have acquired over the Princes at whose Courts 
they were placed. I do not propose to send 
aý'Mission to Afghanistan against the Ameer's 
. wishes; but I propose to tell the Government 
of India to make the Ameer wish it. it 
-,, _cannott 
of course, be done straight off - by 
return of post; but by the exercise of tact 
in the Choice of the moment and the argument 
If eel sure that it can be done. The Ameer 
is genuinely frightened of the Russians; and 
every advance they make will make him more 
pliable, until their power on the frontier 
seems to him so great, and he is so convinced 
of our timidityp that he thinks safer to tie 
himself to them than to us". 1 
In the same letter Salisbury expressed some alarm at 
Disraeli's wish to nominate the Earl of Powisp an excellent 
b; u: t undistinguished country gentlemanp as Northbrook's 
succepsor. Powisp however, declined; so did Disraeli'B 
'61d friendt Lord John Manners; so did Lord Carnarvon. In 
the end, with Salisbury's approval# the post was offered to 
and accepted by Lord-Lytton. Lyttony the son of Bulwer- 
Lytton the novelist, was himself a poet by inclination and 
a diplomat by profession: when he was offered the Viceroyalty 
he was forty-five years of age and had been serving as 
1. W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle: The Life of Benjamin Disrsel 
Earl of Besconsfield (6 vols. ). The volumes used here are 
Vols. V and VI (1920) by G. F. Buckle. Disraeli's letter of 
15th October 1875 is printed in Vol. Vp pp. 433-434 and 
Salisbury's of 31st October at p. 434. Salisbury's 
argument was not a weak one but it would have been more 
forceful in 1869 than in 1875. 
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Minister at Lisbon since 1872. His appointment has been 
criticized on the ground that he was unacquainted with India 
but that is a criticism which appliedi, in the first place., 
to. a, good many Viceroys who subsequently proved their worth; 
to-IMayop for example. Where Lytton differed from most 
Viceroys was in the fact that he had received no training in 
administrative duties in subordinate office at home. He was 
a-diplomat - and Salisbury had said that diplomacy was a real 
power in Indian history. 
- Salisbury evidently snatched at the opportunity which 
the appointment of a new Viceroy gave him to state his Policy 
in detailt and Lytton took out with him to India a very full 
pet of instructions. He was to begin by opening communic- 
ations with Sheer Ali through the Commissioner of Peshawar 
and then to send a mission to Kabul by way of Quetta'; unless 
the Ameer raised insurmountable objectionsy in which case the 
Mission would only go to Kalat and the whole line of policy 
respecting Afghanistan might have to be re-considered. 
Salisbury did not blind himself to the difficulties which the 
envoy would encounter if he got to Kabull - the hopes of Sheer 
1. It would be unfair to suggest either that Salisbury thought 
that his policy contained no difficulties or that he 
courted war with Russia or Afghanistan. He believed that it was the diplomat's duty to make such arrangements as 
would prevent a war arising from a popular panic. cf. his 
letter to Northbrook, 14th Jan. 1876: "I have no fear of 
(Continued foot next page) 
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Ali which it would be impossible for him to satisfy and the 
fears which it would be dangerous to confirm. He thought 
that the Ameer would probably ask for three things: a fixed 
and augmented subsidy; a more decided recognition of 
AbdullahJan as heir-apparent; and "an explicit pledge., by 
treaty or otherwisep of material support in case of foreign 
aggression". The first of these questions was only of 
"secondary magnitude" and Lytton would decide according to 
circumstances; possibly by augmenting the subsidy without 
making it permanent. On the second, there could be no harm 
in a "frank recognition of a de facto order in the ruccersion 
established by a de facto Government". The third was more 
difficult. Even if no assurances were given to the Ameerp 
Britain would be bound in her own interests to repel the 
invasion of Afghanistan by a foreign Power. Indeedo North- 
brook had said as much at the Simla Conference; unfortunately 
without carrying conviction to Sheer Ali. 
"Her Majesty's Government are therefore prepared 
to sanction and support any more definite 
declaration which may in your judgment secure 
to their unaltered policy the advantages of which 
it has hitherto been deprived by an. apparent 
doubt of its sincerity. But they must reserve 
to themselves entire freedom of judgment as to 
the character of circumstances involving the 
1. (Continued from previous page). 
our being tempted to move troops into Afghanistan unless 
further onward steps of Russia should s' ome day drive 
people here into a panic. But the more inactive we are 
now, the more we increase the danger of that panialle 
Cecilp a-cit., Vol. II, pp. 72-73. 
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obligation of material support to the Amirý 
ýa -'it must be distinctly understood that nd 
only in some clear case of unprovoked 
-aggression would such an obligation arise 
It -Woiald seem, from this paragraph, that Lytton was empoweredý, 
far as making a treaty for the defence of Afghan- 
i stan'. although its provisions would only be brought into 
effect on the decision of the British government. In 
return., the Ameer must afford every reasonable facility for 
'jýrecautionary measures - access for British agents to the 
frontier positions and adequate means for confidential 
communication. 
'%`-'"Territories ultimately dependent upon British 
Power for their defence must not be closed to 
those of the Queen's officers or subjects who 
may be duly authorized to enter them". 
The alienation of Sheer Ali's confidence in the British 
government could not be dismissed as impossible: in that 
event.. "no time must be lost in reconsidering from a new 
point of view the policy to be pursued in reference to 
Afghanistan". l 
Before he left for India Lytton had a conversation with 
Schouvaloff, who suggested that it would be useful if some 
means were found of establishing direct communication between 
the Viceroy'and General Kaufmann. The suggestion had 
1. Lady Betty Balfour: The History of Lord Lytton's Indian 
Administration, 1876 to 1880y pp. 88-93 (1899). 
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apparently originated with Kaufmann,, who had complained of 
British intrigues with Yhokand# but it was supported by 
Gortchakoff. Lytton declined to consider its on the ground 
that any such co=mmications would have to pass through 
Af ghani stan. When Schouvaloff said that Kaufmann had 
already prepared a complimentary letter to Lyttons to be 
forwarded through Afghanistan, Lytton asked him what. means 
:,, ". iý' 
Kaufmann had f or sending a letter to Sheer Ali and what 
guarantee he had that it would be forwarded. Schouvaloffp 
who seemed, to Lytton "a little embarrassed by the queBtionllp 
replied, 
'Z' I ýý 
ý 
111, suppose that we must have,, just as you haveg 
safe and easy means of private communication 
with Shir Ali. But I don't know what they 6re. 
That is Kaufmann's affair". 1 
Lytton, as a result of this conversationy came to two 
conclusions: that Russia was aiming at a partition of 
Jkfghanistan with Britain; and that the continuance of 
Kaufmann's correspondence with Sheer Ali was undesirable. 
"The Russian Government" - he wrote to Salisbury 
on 26th February 1876 - IIhaB established those 
means of directy convenient and safe communication 
which Shir Ali refuses to us, although we openly 
subsidize His Highness. At the same time the 
Russian Chancellor holds us responsible# as a 
matter of course, for the exercise of an authority 
over the Amir which we neither possess nor know 
how to acquire... I cannot conceive a situation 
1. Balfour, OP-cit., pp. 33-39. 
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more fundamentally false or more imminently 
perilous". 
When Lytton left England on Ist March it was with the 
strongest conviction that the Ameer must be induced to 
receive a British agent. Indeed it is possible that he 
,; 13, ý, ,-- 
now regarded this matter as. more important or at least more 
urgent than Salisbury did. Salisbury was not in an extreme 
hurry. In a letter to Lytton of 22nd August 1876 he 
contemplated the possible failure of the Kabul mission and 
suggested that it might be wise to give "great prominence 
I J. -, 0, 
and''emphasis to the Khelat mission". And again, on 24th 
February 1877j, he wrote, of Sheer Ali, 
"If he refuses, no harm has been done. A strong 
position has been secured in Beloochistang and 
, 
after a few months' reflection the Amir will see 
that it is not in his interest to deprive himself 
of the prestige of our support"62 
Although Lytton was to be much occupied in the winter 
following his arrival with the proclamation of the Queen's 
1, Ibid, v pp. 39-40. 2. Cecil, op. cit. 0 Vol. II, pp. 74-75. The reference 
to Baluch- 
istan, of course, is to the treaty with the Khan and 
Sbrdars of Kalato concluded at Jacobabad in December 1876, 
Sandeman had started on his second mission before Lytton 
reached India and Lytton, who thought that all frontier 
questions should be treated as parts of a single whole, 
asked Northbrook to recall him. Fortunatelyp Northbrook 
refused to do so. Lytton sent his military secretary, 
Colonel (afterwards Sir George) Colley to get in touch with 
Sandeman and, reassured by his reportp adopted Sandeman's 
Policy. Lytton's original idea had been that Sir Lewis 
Pellyo the officer whom he had designated as the envoy to 
Kabulo should also conduct the negotiations at Kalat. 
Balfourp OP. cit., pp. 94-105; Thornton, op-cit., pp. 76-87. 
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new title as Empress of India and with the great Delhi 
assemblage of December 1876-January 18779 he lost no time in 
JLnitiating his Afghan policy. He proposed that the first 
mission., under Sir Lewis Pellyp should be one of pure 
courtesy., to 'open the way for future negotiations. The 
Iettýr, containing this proposal was delivered to Sheer Ali 
by a Moslem officers Ressaldar-Major Khanan Khanp one of the 
ýjic6royls'A. D. Clss on 17th May. Sheer Ali's reply of 22nd 
liýY-reached Peshawar on Ist June. It wasp in effects a 
refusal to recei, ýe the proposed mission. All questions 
affecting the two Statesp he saidp had been sufficiently 
discussed in 1873: if "any new parleys" were necessary they 
had beBt be conducted by an envoy of the Ameer coming to 
India. 
It was known to the Government of India that Sheer Ali 
and his advisers understood perfectly well that the mission 
was only to be the prelude to further negotiations and# if 
possiblep to the establishment of a British mission in 
Afghanistan. The native agent at Kabul.. writing on 22nd May 
to the commissioner-of Peshawar, set out three reasons which 
had influenced Sheer Ali to decline the British mission. He 
could-not guarantee the safety of the British officers; if 
the mission made an important proposal which he was obliged 
to decline the result would be a breach of Anglo-Afghan 
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the : rriendship; and - most important of all admission of 
a British Mission would be followed by a Russian demand for 
&'like concession. 
"In other wordst their way too would be opened; 
and in the opening of that road there is good 
neither to the State of Kabul nor to the 
, _--, -'English 
Government". 1 
Sheer Ali's reply was put into Lytton's hands on 5th 
June., the question was then considered by the Viceroy in 
99uncil, when Salisbury's instructions were produced. With 
the Support of a majority of the Councilo in Lady Betty 
Balfour's wordss orp perhapsp more exactly, with the 
acquiesence (in some cases the reluctant acquiesence) of a 
number of the Councilp a second letter to Sheer Ali was 
drafted and despatched on Sth July 1876. Sir Henry Norman 
was doubtful about sending the second letter but was 
influenced by Lytton's opinion that it was in accord with 
Salisbury's instructions of 28th February. Sir William Muir 
agreed with hims both on this point and on the inexpediency 
of withdrawing the native agent from Kabul. Sir Arthur 
Hobhouse thought that the instructions "portended war" but 
was satisfied with Lytton's acceptance of amendments to the 
1. Balfour, QP-. cit,., pp. 53-57. India: Central Asia and 
Afghanistanto 1877, "Notes on the Steps taken by the 
Viceroy to carry out the Proposed Mission to Cabul", 
including Pelly's memorandum to Khanan Khanp 2nd May 1876; 
text of letter delivered by Khanan Khan; report of agent 
in Kabul. 21st May, 22nd May; Sheer Alits replyp 22nd May. 
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original draft of the second I. etter. 1 
ýThere werep in fact, two letters; both from the 
Comissioner of Peshawarp one to Sheer Ali and the other to 
the native agent. Sheer Ali was told that his reluctance I 
to, ýreceive a British mission was 'much to be regretted" and 
that his proposal to send an envoy to India could not be 
accepted when he had declined to receive the British envoy. 
The, letter to the native agent dealt with the three points i 
which Sheer Ali had had in mind as objections. Danger to 
the British officers sent would be averted by the fact that 
the Ameer could choose the place of their reception. The 
Ameer's fear of discord was "quite groundless" and it was 
impossible for the British government to protect the independ- 
ence and integrity of Afghanistan "under conditions quite 
incompatible with the ordinary intercourse between friendly 
Courts". As to the third objection: Russia had given 
pledges not to interfere either directly or indirectly in 
the affairs of Afghanistan and therefore the admission of a 
British envoy could not necessitate the admission of a Russian 
envoy. The letter concluded with a grave warning. 
"If the Ameer, after deliberately weighing all the 
considerations now connended to his serious 
attention, still declines to receive the Viceroy's 
Envoyý the responsibility of the result will rest 
entirely on the Government of Afghanistan, which 
I.. India; Central Asia and Afghanistan to 1877. 
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"Will have thereby isolated itself from the 
alliance of that Power which is Most disposedp 
and best ablev to befriend it". 1 
-, It, is difficult to resist the conclusion that Lytton 
was hurrying on these negotiations at a faster pace and 
perhaps in a harsher tone than Salisbury contemplated. His 
Iýi nd at this time can be seen fairly well in the light of the 
r 
available evidence. In a private letter he told Salisbury 
that Sheer Ali looked upon the active Powers Russiag as more 
formidable than the passive Powers Britain; and if he had 
to off end one of the two it was Britain that he was the least 
ý1 11 ý.., 
af raid of offending. 
"The -Government of a great empire. whicho in a 
matter closely concerning its own interestsp 
suffers itself to be addressed with impunity 
by a weak barbarian chief who is under accum- 
ulated obligations to its protection and for- 
bearance in terms of contemptuous disregardp 
cannot be surprised if its self-respect and 
powers of self-assertion are under-rated by 
such a correspondent". 2 
in 
a long and closely-reasoned Minute of Juneq evidently 
prepared with the doubts of Worman,, Hobhouse and Muir in 
mind., Lytton had set out to present the definitive Case for 
his policy. He began by criticizing the "waiting policy". 
1. Ibid. 
2. Balfour., . op. cit.., p. 60. -No 
date is assigned to the letter 
but it does provide evidence of Lytton's highly sensitive 
dignity -a quality natural.., perhapsp to a man who had 
spent his life in cultivated European capitals and was now 
for the first time brought into touch with a weak, half- 
civilized but intractable oriental Power. 
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-"A Policy of waiting is., by the essential nature 
Of its a policy destined and intended to mergep 
at some period in the course of events, into a 
Policy of action, or at least of attainment ... it behoves us to consider whether the inadequate 
result of our waiting be due to our not having 
yet waited long enough, or to our having already 
waited too long". 
He had no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the 
waiting had been too long. It had "not been productive of 
a single result which" was not "eminently unsatisfactory"; 
the Ameer, cordial in 1869t was now indifferent. Certainly's 
if he were attacked by Russia he would accept British 
assistance on British terms. 
"But that is precisely the contingency which it 
is our interest to prevent. The alliance of 
the Amir will have lost much of the value we may 
even still accord to it whent instead of enabling 
Us to make better provision for the defence of 
our territory, it obliges us to rush# unpreparedp 
to the rescue of his". 
SupPose., on the contraryp that Russia did not immediately 
attack Afghanistan: she could use the interval to establish 
a dominating political influence at Kabul. Stillp if there 
were only Afghanistan to be considered in isolation it might 
be necessaryo considering past experiencess to put up with 
the churlishness of Sheer Ali. The situationp however# was 
different from what it was when the "waiting policy"t with 
some justificationp was first applied. The neighbour to be 
feared now was not Afghanistan but Russia. The Russian 
power in Central Asia could not# and would not despite 
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Russian professions, remain stationary; and if Sheer Ali 
did,. not gravitate - towards Britain he must gravitate towards 
Russia. 
"He is practically free to negotiate with Russia 1- as he pleases; Me are practically unable to 
,, -, negotiate with him. Such a position is not 
only undignified; it is, in our present circUm- 
stancesp positively dangerous". 
Could it be bettereds since it was now "not a question of. 
letting well alone but of letting bad alone"? A permanent 
British mission at Kabul was not Lytton's object. He did 
not, desire the British envoy to make a single proposal to the 
Ameer; only to listen to the Ameer's proposals andf as far 
as they had been foreseenp answer them decisively. 
' 
At the same time Lytton was having a precis of the 
correspondence between Sheer Ali and Kaufmann prepared, as 
well as the statement of Russian acknowledgments of Afghan 
independence which forms Appendix 4. When these were ready 
he circulated them to his Council with a minute of his own# 
dated 8th July 1876. In that minute he argued that while 
the Tsar's influence was in favour of peace and against 
indefinite extension of the Russian Asiatic possessiona it 
was only a temporary influencep dependent on the life of one 
man: the -national and military aspirations were on the 
1. Balfour, op. cit., pp. 65-77. 
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other hand,, permanentq exuberant and indicative of a strong 
tendency to become more and more intenselt. The possession 
of Afghanistan would give the Russians a potent purchase over 
India. 
"A Russian attack upon India is notq in my opiniong 
an imminent probability. I fully believe that 
it'will never occur so long as we are at peace with 
Russia in Europe; but it would doubtless form part 
Of Russian tactics if the British Government were 
compelledo in defence of its interests in Europep 
to 90 to war with the Goverment of Russia ... It is ... a contingency against which the British Government is bound to make timely preparation". 1 
Lytton then went on to notice the Kaufmann correspondence# 
the previous toleration of which (aB we have Been) he 
considered regrettable, 
On 3rd September 1876 Sheer Ali's reply to the letter of 
8th July reached Simla. It contained a proposal that the 
native agent in Kabul should report to his own governmento 
"expound to them the state of affairs at Kabul and hear from 
them all their desires and pr*oJects". To thist since it was 
not unreasonable in itself and was not an explicit refusal to 
receive a British envoyp Lytton agreed. The agent, Atta 
Mohammad Khanp reached Simla on 6th October 1876.2 
At this point it may be convenient to notice a despatch 
on the subject of the Kaufmann correspondence which was sent 
1. India: Central Asia and Afghanistan to 1877. 
2o TBalfourt op. cit., pp. 80-81. 
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"We now desire to submit" - it ran - "for the 
consideration of Her Majesty's Governmento 
that the time has now arrived when it is 
expedient that the attention of the Russian 
Government should be seriously called to the 
'fact of this correspondence# and that steps 
should be taken by Her Majesty's Government to 
prevent a continuance of proceedings which we 
cannot but regard as altogether inconsistent 
with the assurances given by Prince Gortchakow 
to Lord Clarendon in 1869, and since then 
frequently renewed by the Cabinet of St. Peters- 
burgh., that Afghanistan is regarded as 'entirely 
beyond the sphere of Russian influence' ... The 
communications with His Highness# now syBtemat- 
ically carried on by the Russian military 
authorities in Central Asiap are plainly irrecon- 
cileable with the above-mentioned assurances". 
The despatch also drew attention to the factj reported by the 
Kabul agento that in addition to the original Russian 
rnessenger or agent who had brought Kaufmann's letter in the 
autumn of the previous year and who still remained in Kabul 
a second had arrived in Afghanistan via Balkh in AuguBt-1 
1. Central Asiap No. 1 (1878). Inclosure I in No. 78. This 
despatch was communicated by Derby to Lof tus on 24th Oct 
(No. 80). Loftus- saw de Giers of the Russian Foreign Office 
who described the correspondence as "apochryphal". but 
promised to consult Kaufmann. On 15th Noveml), er Loftus saw 
Gortchakoff who denied that Russia was contemplating an 
expedition against Merv and that there was any Russian 
agent in Afghanistan and described Kaufmann's last letter 
to Sheer Ali as merely complimentary (No. 86). On 17th 
November Loftus saw de Giers who denied that Kaufmann had 
any intention of entering into political communication 
with the Ameer and told Loftus of a rumour of a projected 
Afghan exTedition against Merv (No. 87). on let December 
de Giers told Loftus that the Russian government had no 
(Continued foot next page). 
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ýP, ;- At -Simla, 9 Atta Mohammad had two interviews with the 
Viceroy and also saw and was questioned by Pelly and Colonel 
Burnev the Viceroy's private secretary. He described Sheer 
Ali-ýas disappointed at the results of the Simla Conference 
of 1873 from which he had hoped to receive a definite treaty 
of -ý alliance; a guarantee that he would receive arms and 
money -in the event of external aggression; a disclaimer of 
any. 'intention on the part of Britain to support a pretender; 
and a permanent subsidy. one very interesting thing that 
Atta Mohammad told Lytton was that the reluctance of Sheer 
Ali to a dmit British agents arose less from fear that they 
would be in danger than from fear that they would attract 
allegiance from him and become the resort for all dissidents 
1. (Continued from previous page). 
knowledge of the correspondence but had sought information 
from Kaufmann (Inclosure in No. 92). On 16th December 
Loftus sent to Derby (No. 83) a note from de Giers of the 
15th, enclosing a letter from Kaufmann of 9th November. 
In this letter Kaufmann said that his correspondence with 
Sheer Ali had been "limited to exchanges of civility" and 
"pure courtesy" and had had the Tsar's approval. Salisbury, 
to whom Kaufmann's reply was communicated in the fourth 
week of Decembery replied on 27th January 1877 (No. 97) to 
the effect that he did not accept Kaufmann's description 
of the correspondence and that, in any eventp correspond- 
ence so open to misconstruction ought to be discontinued. 
Derby instructed Loftus in almost Salisbury's exact words 
on 7th February 1877 (No. 99) and Loftus wrote to de Giers 
in this sense on 22nd February (No. 101). In his reply of 
_5th 
Marcht forwarded to Derby by Loftus on 7th March (No. 
103) de Giers stuck to his description of the correspond- 
ence as that of "pure courtesy". 
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with grievances. In a conversation with Captain Gray# 
Atta Mohammad described the present requirements of Sheer 
Ali---as the negative one that no Englishman should reside in 
Afghanistan or, at least in Kabulp and the positive ones of 
recognition and support of AbdullahJan as heir-apparentp 
,. ý support with money and troops against all external 
aggression; a permanent subsidy; an offensive and defensive 
alliance. In his own remarks to Atta Mohammado Lytton did 
not'mince matterB. 
-',, -"The Ameer had apparently come to the conclusion that, having nothing to hope from usp andp at 
_cýthe same timep nothing to fear, he may safely stand aloof from the British Government; 
confident that in the event of external attack 
we shall be obliged to help him for the protection 
of our own interestsv even if we are under no 
contract of obligation to do so ... But the 
moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a 
friendly and firmly allied statep what is there 
to prevent us from providing for the security of 
our own frontier by an understanding with Russiap 
which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan 
out of the map altogether. If the Ameer does 
not desire to come to a speedy understanding with 
ust Russia does; and she desires it at his 
expense ... The Viceroy then said that if the Ameer remained our friend the military power could 
be spread round him as a ring of iron andp if be 
became our enemy, it could break him as a reed tThistp said His Excellencys 'is the man who 
pretends to hold the balance between England and 
Russiap independent of either. His position is 
rather that of an earthen pipkin between two iron 
pots". 1 





Iýý" -1 - -Nevertheless. Lytton told Atta Mohammad that# on certain 
conditions, he was prepared to enter into an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Sheer Ali; to support him with men, 
arms'-and money in the event of unprovoked aggression and to 
assist him in fortifying his frontiers; to recognize Abdulla - 
Jan-as his successor; and to provide a yearly subsidy. The 
conditions were that Sheer Ali should refrain from provoking 
his',. neighbours and hold no external relations without British 
knowledgey decline all comunications with Russia and refer 
Russian agents to the Indian Government; that British agents 
should -reside at Herat or elsewhere on the frontier; that a 
mixed Anglo-Afghan Commission should demarcate the Afghan 
frontier; and that arrangements should be made for the f ree 
dev . elopment of trade and, if possiblev for the establishment 
of-telegraphic communication. Lytton consented to forego 
the establishment of a permanent British Mission an Kabul on 
condition that Sheer Ali deputed an envoy to him and received 
special missions when requested: he made it plainp howeverl 
that the establishment of a British agent on the frontier was 
a pre-requisite to the negotiations on which he invited Sheer 
Ali to embark. Lytton believed that he was now offering to 
Sheer Ali everything which he had wanted in 1869 and 
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1873.1 
Atta Mohammad left Simla on 14th October 1876 and 
reached Kabul on lst November, only to find official business 
dislocated by an outbreak of cholerap which gave Sheer Ali a 
reason or an excuse to decline to transact business. About 
22nd November a series of discussions on Lyttonts proposals 
began., however,, between Sheer Ali and his advisers. The se 
continued until 4th December when Atta Mohammad was received 
and told that the Durbar had unanimously recommended that the 
British proposals be declined. 2 Atta Mohammad was aware 
that Lyttonts condition that British officers be stationed 
on the frontiers was the stumbling-block: he argued the 
seriousness of the refusal with Sheer Ali andy in a renewal 
of, the discussion on the morning of 5th Decemberl felt that 
Sheer Ali was inclined to yield. More discussions in Durbar 
19'' Balfour, OP. cit., pp. 81-85. The draft treaty which was to have been discussed at Peshawar is printed in Parl-ParerB (Afghanistan No. I) 1878-79, Vol. 564"'". 182-192; and given I I-pp as Appendix 51 below. Pelly had been disposed to question 
the Wisdom of making the establishment of a British agency 
even in Herat a pre-requisite but Lytton insisted on that 
and advised Pelly to ask for the establishment of agencies 
at Kandahar and Balkh also; though as a bargaining point 
Which might be waived. Lytton to Pellyy 17th October 1876. India: Central Asia-and Afghanistan to 1877. Lytton was 
also extremely anxious that Sheer Ali should attend the 
Delhi Durbar on Ist January 1877. 2. India-: Cent al Asia and Afghanistan to 1877. McNabb (Commissioner of Peshawar) to Lyttong 19th NoVe1876; McNabb to Foreign Secretary, Ist Dec. 1876; Atta Mohammad 
to McNabb 23rd Nov. 1876,4th Dec. 1876. 
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f ollowed. 1 On Ilth December Atta Mohammad reported that he 
had been told privately,, by members of the Durbarp that 
',. 'yielding to necessity and in view of the continuance of the 
friendshiP existing between the two Governmentsy the location 
of , 
British officers on the border may be approved of; but 
some condition in regard to their residence must be fixed 
for-the future". 2 This was confirmedt but Sheer Ali 
insisted on sending repýresentatives of his ownp with Atta 
Moharmnad, to discuss with the Indian government the precise 
conditions attaching to the residence of British agents. 
Atta Mohammad believed that the four points on which the 
Afghan representatives would try to insist were: (1) if the 
British Residents were injured in person or propertY, Afghan 
customs as to compensation and punishment should be followed; 
(2) the duties of the Residents should be strictly defined 
and no interference with internal Afghan affairs should be 
allowed to him; (3) If Russian agents entered Afghanistan, 
the British themselves must undertake to stop them; (4) If 
British assistance fell short of Afghan expectations-the 
Afghans must be allowed to decline it . while allowing the 
agencies to be continued. 3 
1. Ibid.., Atta Mohammad to McNabb# 5th Dec. 1876. 
2. lbid. 9 Atta Mohammad to McNabbp Ilth Dec. 1876. 3. Ibid., Atta Mohammad to McNabb, 21st Dec.; McNabb to 
Foreign Secretary, 26th Dec. 1876. 
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Eventually the meeting., known as the Peshawar 
Conference, was arranged and opened on 30th January 1877; 
Pellyp with Dr. Bellew as his secretary, representing the 
-Government of India and Syud Noor Mohammad Shah (who had 
; attended at Simla in 1873) and the Mir Akhor Ahmed Shah 
, representing Sheer Ali. Since the Conference proved 
, entirely abortive it will be unnecessary to set out its 
history in the fullest detail. 
'It began badly. on 28th'January 1877p before the 
meetings were formally openedv Bellew went to see Noor 
MO1i8=8: d Shah and found him in what seems to have been a 
,- 
highly exasperated state, so that Bellew reported him as 
saying that, 
Amir now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the 
good faith and sincerity of the British Govern- 
ment, and he has many reasons for this mistrust". 
Noor Mohammad-then went on to elaborate those reasons,, some 
I of-them trivial. But prospects of any agreement seemed black 
, when he asked,, 
"Now, why'all this pressing to send British officers 
to Afghanistan? It has roused the suspicion of 
the Amir*. $ and his suspicion is confirmed by the 
arbitrary acts of your Governmentp and he is now 
convinced that to allow British officers to reside 
in his country will be to relinquish his authority... "l 
At the first formal meeting on 30th January Pellý said that 
1. Ibid.,, Pelly to Lyttonp 29th January 1877. 
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. 
Lytton had concludedý from the fact of Sheer Ali having 
deputed envoys.. that the sine qua non condition "that British 
officers may reside on the Frontiers of Afghanistan for the 
purpose of watching external events" had been accepted. 
On -this pointp Pelly said., he himself had no discretionary 
authority at all. ' on lBt February Pelly. took 4 drive with 
Noor Mohammad in the hope of having some useful private 
conversation but nothing important was said then and meetings 
during the following few days produced nothing. Pelly came 
to"the conclusion that the anti-English party had prevailed 
at'-Kabul during Noor Mohammad's absencev that his instructions 
2 had been altered and that he had written for more. From 
time to time Noor Mohammad Shah threatened to embark upon a 
history of Anglo-Afghan relations from 1855 - "We are now 
sitting in conferencellp Pelly noted on 8th February, "and the 
Envoy is pouring out his review of the past". During this 
time Noor Mohammad was frequently ill: Dr. Bellew, visiting 
him on one occasion, found him interested in the Near Eastern 
question and curious to know why Russia was allowed to retain 
her ambassador at Constantinople while Ruspians were fighting 
against Turkey in the Serbian army. "The review of the past", 
begun on 8th Pebruary, was continued on the 10th and on the 
1. Ibid-9 Pelly to Lytton, 30th Januarypl877. 
2. lbid. p Pelly to Lyttonp 6th February91877. 
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Pelly thought that Noor Mohammad was trying to show 
that the Ameer-was not dissatisfied with the results of the 
I- 869 'and 1873 meetings but with other thingss such as the 
British -interest in Yakub K, han and the result of the Seistan 
award. - It was on the 12th that Noor Mohammad at last raised, 
directly with Pelly the matter of the British agencies; but 
it was only to put forward the'objections already made on 
the Afghan side. On the 15th Pelly said that the diffic- 
ulties which had arisen in the past were largely due to the 
want Of Itfrequentv cordial and confidential comunications"; 
that the Viceroy was now willing to afford Sheer Ali open and 
active support against interference from withoutg insisting 
only on having those facilities - such as British agencies 
'ýhich were necessary to enable him to fulfil his objects. 
On the 19th, the meetings having again been interrupted by 
Noor Mohammad's illnesso Pelly asked-for a definite reply to 
ihe question - was the Viceroy's sine qua non condition 
acceptable or not? The Afghan envoy again embarked on a 
long historical disquisitionp the object of which was 
apparently to'show that Sheer Ali was satisfied with the 
existing engagements between the two governmentsp wanted no 
more and therefore saw no necessity for the presence of 
British agents. Pelly took this as a rejection of the sine 
qua non condition. This was the last of the formal meetingst 
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Noor Mohammad being by this time too ill to attend any more. 
1 
-On 3rd March 1877 Lytton wrote to Pelly at length. He 
noti ced., with regret but with dignity, Sheer Ali's refusal 
to. admit British agents -a course, he said, 
"which the 
British Government has no desire to force on his unwilling 
acceptance". What puzzled Lytton was what Sheer Ali wanted. 
He seemed dissatisfied with what was done in the past and 
equally dissatisfied with the proposals now put before him; 
heJhad, no counter-proposals; and it appeared that no basis 
for further negotiations existed. 
"If the Ameer has made up his mind that he has no 
reason to desire a definite alliance with the 
British Government on the above-mentioned basis# 
it only remains for the Envoy to say so plainly 
and without hesitation". 
In: case., however, that Sheer Ali believed that Britain was 
bound to defend him against any foreign or domestic enemy it 
was as well that the envoy should be reminded that the only 
treatyýsubsisting, that of 1855 (the 1857 treaty having 
lapsed as "contracted for a special and limited purpose") 12 
contained no obligation of this sort at all. 
"It would appear ... that His Highness now no longer desires our alliance and protection. 
The British Government does not press its 
alliance and protection upon those who neither 
seek nor appreciate them. This being the case# 
1. Ibid.,, Pelly to Lytton, 8plOpl2pl5plgthý February 1877. 
2. This, of course, was only LYttonts view: it is not 
necessarily confirmed by a reading of the 1857 treaty. 
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it only remains for the Viceroy to withdraw, 
at once, the offers made to the Ameer in'the 
month of October last ... This Government ; repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the 
'Ameer-and his dynasty ... but at the same time it will scrupulously continue, as heretoforep 
to respect the Ameer's independence and authority 
-throughout those territories which,, up to the' '-present, it has recognized as being in the 
jawful possession of His Highness 
,, 
Lytton's letter was, in effect, the epitaph of the 
conference. Noor Mohammad was by this time mortally ill- 
Pelly from time to time informed Lytton of his condition but 
most of his attention was directed to investigating charges 
,f 
disloyalty on the part of Atta Mohammad and the widespread 
, _rumours. 
that Sheer Ali was organizing a Jehad in conjunction 
with the Akoond of Swat. ' On 15th March, presumably for the 
sake of complying with the formalitiesp Pelly wrote to Noor 
Mohammad in terms of Lytton's letter of the 3rd. On the 14 
26th Noor Mohammad died and on the 30th Lytton instructed 
Pelly to close the conference and fix a date for leaving 
Peshawar as soon as conveniently possible "in order to shew 
that we are in earnest and avoid further entanglement".. 
1. On the other hando there were also rumours that the AkhUnd 




LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY: (II) THE GENESIS OF THE SECOND 
AFGHAN WAR 
The position of Britain vis-vis Afghanistan, after the 
failure of the Peshawar Conference, was a curious one. On 
the one handt Lytton had told Sheer Ali that Britain 
repudiated all liability-on behalf of him and his dynasty. 
On the other, the maintenance of the independence and integrity 
Of Afghanistan remained a declared object of British policy 
and when a Russian force under Llamakin Was reported as 
operating against the Tekke Turkomans and likely to move on 
to the occupation of Merv, Derby instructed Loftus to protest 
against the operations; partlyp on the ground that they were 
bound to cause apprehension in Afghanistan-' But, as against 
this, Lytton recalled Atta Mohammad from Kabulp thus leaving 
India and Afghanistan without even semi-official means Of 
communication. He relied, instead, for Afghan intelligence 
on Cavagnaris now Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawarv and in a. 
letter to Cavagnari of 19th May 1877 he sketched the attitude 
which he wished to see adopted towards Sheer Ali. 
1. Derby to Loftus, 13th June 1877. Central Asia, No-I (1878)p 
No. 112. The Russians countered with a story of a Turkish 
envoy who had been allowed to pass through India to preach 
a holy war against the Russians to the Moslems of Central 
Asia. LOftus to Derby, 12th Sept. 1877. Ibid. p No. 123. 
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'Ali"feel sure you will be careful to abstain from 
, _any-word 
or sign which, if reported to the Amirp 
would convey to his mind the impression that we 
care three straws about what he may now do or not 
dop or that we have the least desire to re-open 
ýnegotiationB with him. I doubt if our present 
relations with His Highness will ever be satis- 
factory; but the only chance of improving them 
is to let him first thoroughly realize the 
. 
difficulties of the position in which he has now 
placed himself 11 ... A few monthss possibly a few 
, weeks will, I think, suffice to show him that he 
. 
is not strong enough to play this game success- 
fully. I trust that we shall never allow Afghan- 
istan to fall into the hands of any other Power. 
But between Afghanistan and the present Ameer 
-there is a practical distinction. We can get 
on without Sheer Ali; he cannot get on without 
use Ere long he must either go to shipwreck 
. altogether, or else return to his old moorings 
on the Peshawar side in a temper chastened by 
sharp experience. In the former case our hands 
will be completely free to deal with the new 
situation which will then arise. In the latter 
case we shall be able to replace both the Amir 
and ourselves in what is our truep and should 
always be our permanent, relative position towards 
each other. The wrecks come to shore; the shore 
does not go to the wrecks". 1 
There were, howeverv not - s. r, Lytton thought - two, but 
three alternatives open to Sheer Ali. The third was alliancep 
or at least a much closer relation with, Russia. How far such 
an- alliance was practicable would depend far more on what was 
thought at St. Petersburg than on what was thought at Kabul. 
Unless European affairs were in a condition when war seemed 
imminent it was unlikely in the extreme that Russia would take 
a step in complete violation of her repeated declarations that 
I. Balfour., 
_pp. cit.,, pp. 
161-162. 
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Afghý6: nistan was outside her sphere of influence. In the 
Meantiriies Lytton was busy enough for the remainder of 1877 in 
trying ; to re-cast policy towards the frontier tribes and in 
deý61in_g with the Madras famine. 
'It will be remembered that the Russo-Turkish War begat in 
I 
April'1877. Salisbury was not unduly alarmed. 
-111 cannot" - he wrote to Lytton-on 27th April 1877 - "go very far with those who dread the Russians. 
Except the size of the patch they occupy on the map, 
there is nothing about their history or their actual 
condition to explain the abject terror which deprives 
so many Anglo-Indians and so many of our military 
party here of their natural sleep". 1 
In'June he wrote to Lytton at length about the implications 
for India of an Anglo-Russian War; which he considered 
possible but not probable. If Lytton believed the soldiers, 
nothing was safe. It was not that they were wrong about 
Ru'ssia's ultimate objectives but that they were "crowding up 
into the next_ few years - or less - events which will take a 
generation to complete". In any eventp where could they be 
stopped? Threatening messages from the Foreign Office to 
St-Petersburg-were useless. And what was the good of fixing 
ix line somewhere, at Merv, for inBtancey which the Russians 
must not cross - on pain of being attacked by a British force 
hundreds of miles from its base? "The suggestion seems to me 
visionary". If a line had to be drawn it must be drawn nearer 
1. Cecil, op. cit., Vol. IIy p. 142. 
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India. 
"Directly real danger is di6cerniblep Candahar ought to 
be in our hands". It might well have been asked why, if this 
comparatively simple step was all that was needed, Salisbury 
had troubled to launch Lytton into those intricate and 
unsuccessful negotiations for British agencies in Afghanistan. 
His defence would presiLmably have been found in the next 
sentence. "The awkward result of the Lawrentian policy is 
that we may, at the moment when it least suits us, have to 
deal both with the Amir and the Russians"61 Despite this 
awkwardness$ Salisbury kept his headt advised (on lith June 
1877) the use of large-scale maps - "says, on the scale of the 
Ordnance Map of England"; and lamented (on 6th July) that 
"you must either disbelieve altogether in the existence of 
the Russians or yoýi must believe that they will be at Candahar 
next year". 2 
In respect of India Salisbury steeredt not apologetically 
but authoritativelys a middle course. He warned Lytton that 
he. must walk warily on the matter of the North-West frontierp 
in view of the opinion held by retired Anglo-Indians. The 
"Quettiles" were at the moment in a minority. 
"If I had foreseen the complications which the Russian 
1. Salisbury to Lytton, 22nd June 1877. Cecilq o32. cit., Vol. 1j, 
pp. 153-164. 
2. Ibid., pp. 155-1562 159. 
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war would produce ... I should have advised you to locate your Khelat escort at some place not 
far from Quetta - but which was not Quetta. it is a name to conjure with - and its precise 
virtue is to make respectable elderly gentlemen 
go very mad". 
Earlier in the same month of October 1877 he has told Lytton 
that 
"Lord Lawrence occupies the same position in the 
Anglo-Indian world which a month ago Thiers 
occupied in France - the shadow of a great name under which a motley assemblage of wild follies 
and respectable truisms are trustfully lying down together". 1 
On the other handl although he was willing to support Lytton 
over Quetta, he was utterly opposed to the suggestion from 
India of immediate action in Central Asia. He besought 
Lytton., on 3rd August 1877p to make sure that "the muskets do 
not go off of themselves" and warned him "not to leave the 
military men the chance of becoming practically the arbiters 
whether there should be peace or war".. He made it perfectly 
clear that his authority must be considered dominantp in the 
last resort, over Lytton's. 
"Whichever is abstractly right" he wrote on 10th 
August - "the English feeling must govern ... At all events, I hope you will not stir a soldier beyond the frontier (treating Khelat as within it) 
without obtaining our view on the matter". 2 
It remains a matter for speculation as to what would have 
. 1. Ibid.., Salisbury to Lyttonv 22nd June-25th October 1877. 3ecils op. cit., vol. IIp pp. 159-160. 
2. Ibid-y Vol. II, pp. 157-158. 
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happened had Salisbury remained at the India office: as it 
was, he was replaced by Cranbrook and went to the Foreign 
Office on Derby's resignation. in March 1878. It had long been 
a current supposition that if Russia were involved or likely to 
be involved in, war against Britain in Europe she would attempt 
a diversion against India through Central Asia. This proved 
to be correct in principle but the vast distances to be covered 
and the slowness of communication made co-ordination of Russian 
action in Europe and Asia a problem of the greatest difficulty. 
The critical moment in Europe was at the end of March 1878. 
The orders which were. to result in Stolietoff's mission may 
have been given then. On 13th May 18781 the Government Agent 
at Peshawar reported the wish of the Russians to conclude a 
treaty with Afghanistan but it was not until some time in June 
that Kaufmann wrote his fateful letter to Sheer Ali. 
"Be it-known to you that in týese days the relations between the British Government and ours with regard 
to your kingdom require deep consideration. AB I 
am unable to communicate my opinion to you verbally I have deputed my agentv Major-General Stolieteff ... He will inform you of all that is hidden in my 
mind ... The, advantages of a close alliance with the RUsSian Government will be permanently evident". 
2 
This intention on the part of Kaufmann became known to the 
Indian Government almost at once - possibly before formal 
1. Central Asia, No. I (1878). Inclosure 4 in No. 143. 
2. Parl. Papers, 1881. C-2798: 
_Central 
Asia, No-I (1881). 
Inclosure 30 in No. l. This letter was among the papers 
discovered after the capture of Kabul. 
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intimation was made to Sheer Ali. An unofficial communication 
from Peshawar gave the news on 5th June and on the 16th 
Cavagnari reported Russian preparations for moving 809000 
troopst some via Khiva and the rest via, Tashkent towards the 
Afghan frontier. He noted the rumour that the Russians 
denied that they were dependent upon Sheer Ali and were 
cultivating Abdur Rahman. It was on-13th June - the day when 
the Berlin Congress met - that Stolietoff left Tashken? l and on 
22nd July that he entered Kabul. The news of his entry was 
sent to the Indian Government at least as early as 3rd August 
and was supplemented by constant reports from Cavagnari's well- 
organized intelligence service. 1 
On 8th April Lytton had written a long letter to 
Cranbrook. 2 He was sure, he saidt that in the event of war 
with Russiap Britain would not have the alliance of Afghanistan. 
Sheer Ali's policy would be to play off Russia against Britain, 
but as he was "not only a savage ... but a savage with a touch 
of insanity" and a hatred of Britain he might well begin 
operations against India. British military action against 
Russia from India could not be offensive but 
"we ought at once to commence such preparations as 
will enable us, in case of needo to punish promptly 
1. Central Asia, No. 1 (1878). Inclosures 3 and 4 in No. 144. 
The identity of the Russian envoy was not known in India 
at this time. 
2. Balfour, op. cit., pp. 243-247. 
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any act of aggression by the Amir of Kabul". 
Surveying the wider problemt Lytton appeared to welcome the 
proBpect of war. 
"So long as peace lasts we cannot use the sword 
and our diplomacy is impotent. The declaration 
of warv therefore, would be an opportunityp which 
may never recur if we neglect it, for India to 
make safe all those outworks of her empire which 
Must otherwise fall, sooner or laterv into the 
hands or under the influence of Russia ... One last word. I am persuaded that the policy of 
building up in Afghanistan a strong and independ- 
ent State, over which we can exercise absolutely 
no controlo has been proved by experience to be 
a mistake". 
He concluded by sketching a scheme for the disintegration of 
Afghanistanp- with a dependent prince ruling a Western Afghan 
kingdom including Herat, Balkhq Merv and Kandahar and a 
IL British station in the Kuridm Valley. In those circumstances 
it would be a matter of no importance what happened at Kabul. 
In another letter to Cranbrook of 3rd AugUBt Lytton gave 
it as his opinion that there were only three - courses of action 
now open, They werep in order of merit, (1) to secureo by 
hope or fear, such an alliance with the present Amir as would 
effectually and permanently exclude Russian influence from 
Afghanistan; (2) to withdraw all countenance from the Amir, 
to break up the Afghan kingdom and to put a dependent sovereign 
in the place of Sheer Ali; (3) to conquer and hold as much 
Afghan territory as would be necessary for the permanent 
maintenance of the North-West frontier. A passage which 
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follows makes it perfectly clear that Lytton wqs not in the 
least alarmed about what Russia or the Russian envoy in Kabul 
could do at the moment: what he was anxious to do was to make 
the most of the opportunity which Russian action and Sheer 
Ali 's acquiescence presented him with. 
"The conclusion of peace in Europe has f reed our 
hands and destroyed# at the same timep all hopes 
on his part of complications to us, or active 
assistance to himself, from Russia". 
In pursuance of the first of the three possible policies he 
had outlined Lytton proposed to send a mission to Sheer Ali 
under Sir Neville Chamberlain. If the mission were not 
received or proved abortive it would be necessary to "upset 
Sher Ali or pare his claws". 1 
The first official news which the Home Government received 
of the probable visit of a Russian envoy to Kabul was contained 
in a telegram from Lytton to Cranbrookv dated 7th June. it 
expressly said that the news required verification and probably 
for this reason it was not until 24th June that it was passed 
on to the Poreign Office. Salisburyo on the 26thv directed 
Loftus to ascertain if there was any truth in the report. 
1. Balfour, op. cit, v pp. 249-261. In another letter to Cranbrook 
of 17th August Lytton emphasized the point of "opportunity" 
e. g. "I believe it to be quite possible to retrieve the whole 
situation ... Nay mores I think the present opportunity, Which is probably our lasts is a very favourable one for 
doing this". Later in the same letter he spoke of seizing 
"the present fortunate and favourable opportunity". 
Gathorne-Hardys op. cit. s Vol. IIv pp, 85-96. 
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Loftus, replying on 3rd July, reported a conversation on the 
previous day with de Giers, Head of the Asiatic Department. 
oie'ý, Giers had said that 
I- --"there had been a moment when war appeared to be 
almost imminent and ... under those circumstances 
no doubt the military Commanders conceived it to 
be their duty to take such measures as might be 
necessary and serviceable to their country". 1 
But he denied that any such mission "had been or was intended 
to be sent to Cabul either by the Imperial Government or by 
General Kaufmann". 
On 3rd August the Cabinet gave telegraphic approval to 
Lytton's proposal to send a British mission to Kabul. On the 
14th the cýarge d'affaires in St. Petersburgo Plunkettp had a 
talk with de Giers who told himp 
"Everything has been stopped. The political as 
well as the military precautions which we thought 
ourselves justified in taking against you - every- 
thing has been stopped". 2 
This despatch of Plunkett's was received on 19th AugUBtt the 
day on which Salisbury addressed another despatch to him asking 
him to point out to Gortchakoff that the despatch of a Russian 
mission, backed by armed forces,, to Kabul would be inconsistent 
with Russian declarations and requesting that if such a mission 
3 had been sent it should be at once withdrawn. Plunkett only 
received this despatch of the 19th on 26th August: he at once 
1. Central Asia, No. 1 (1878). Nos. 136 (with inclosure)9 138,140. 





wrote to de Giers but de Giers was just on the point of leaving 
or had just left St. Petersburg and did not reply until 8th 
September when he admitted that, owing to "political conditions" 
the Russian "dispositions" regarding Central Asia had been 
altered: they were now restored to their former state; the 
mission to yabul was "of a provisional nature and one of simple 
courtesy". Plunkett sent de Giers' letter, with a covering 
despatcho on 13th September to Salisburyv who received it on 
the 18th. 1 
Cranbrook, though he had asked on 13th August for a 
Foreign Office remonstrance to be sent to St. Petersburgp had 
never been informed if it had been sent or what answerp if any, 
had been received. He himself was shooting in Ross and bound 
for Balmoral when he received a letter from Disraeli which 
told him of the diplomatic communications going on, followed 
by a telegram from Salisbury asking that the mission to Kabul 
be delaye d until an answer had been received from de Giers. 
In a letter written to Disraeli, probably on 15th Septemberp 
Cranbrook said that he was sorry that Lytton had "so 
ostentatiously proclaimed his intentions". The missiong he 
was convinced., must be sents though its instructions would be 
modified and, because of Salisbury's telegramp orders had been 
sent to arrest it for the moment. He concluded by sketching 
Ibid., Nos. 158 (with enclosure), 162 (with enclosure). 
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the terms výhich he thought the Ameer should be offered -a 
subsidy, "very qualified'recognition of his successor" and a 
very strictly limited defence of defined Afghan territory, 
conditional upon Sheer Ali acting on British advice. Disraeli,, 
writing again on 17th September, said that he agreed with 
Iýyttonls general policyt having always deplored masterly 
inactivity., and thought that there should be no delay in 
I sending the mission. 1 
There was, even less delay than Disraeli imaginedy for 
iytton had disregarded the telegram of 13th September. 
Chamberlain had arrived at Peshawar, ready to startv on 12th 
September and Lytton was unwilling to keep him "waiting 
indefinitely" on the Afghan frontierv in a position which "we 
could not possibly accept with either dignity or safety". 
As for the expected telegramp 
"It was perfectly obvious that no cor=unication from 
St. Petersburg ... could have the smallest practical 
effect upon the previously recognized necessity for 
the mission we were sending to the Amir". 
It might necessitate a modification of Chamberlain's instruct- 
ions but that could be carried out long before he reached 
Kabul. Lytton did go so far as to delay the advance of the 
mission for a few days but, hearing no more from Cranbrook 
Gathorne-Hardy,, op. cit. t vol. IIp pp. 82-83t 96-97. The telegram sent to Lytton on 13th September ran, "Official 
reply to remonstrance from St. Petersburg on way to London. 




did not return from Scotland until Ist October) he 
started Chamberlain's mission on 21st September. On the same 
day it was refused passage by the small Afghan force at Ali 
MusJid and returned to Peshawar. 1 
It was inevitable that the news of Lytton's action should 
provoke serious criticism; especially as he was considered to 
have sent the mission by the most provocative routep that 
through the Khyber., when it could just as easily have been 
S. ent through the Bolan and the less fanatical country to 
Kandahar. Salisbury wanted to avoid further collision with 
Russia, at least until Russian forces had withdrawn from 
Turkey and the Treaty of Berlin was in a fair way to being 
executed. He hoped that no attempt would be made to force 
the Khyber or take Kabul. As something must be done he 
suggested a march on Kandahart which would probably be 
unmolested, with the intention of retaining it pemanently. 
2 
Disraeli's own attitude was apt to vary from day to day. 
On 26th September, in a letter to Cranbrookv he criticized 
Lytton strongly for his disobedience. As for the next stept 
it would be a perilous business to force the Khyber and take 
Kabul; but Kandahar might be occupied and retained with ease. 
To Salisbury he expressed the view on 3rd October (when 
1. Balfour, op. cit., pp. 270-281. 
2. Cecilt op. cit. p vol. III pp. 341-342. 
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announcing that he had reluctantly called a Cabinet) that 
Lytton's writings were "admirable both in theirýgrasp and 
detail" and that his policy was perfectly fitted to a state 
of affairs in which Russia was Britaints assailant. 
"But Russia is not our assailant. She has sneaked 
out of her hostile positionp with Bincerityp in my 
mind, but scarcely with dignity, and if Lytton had 
only been quiet and obeyed my orderp, I have no 
doubt thatv under the advice of Russia, Shere Ali 
would have been equally prudent". 
T he matter could not be lef t where it was but action ought to 
be moderate. 
"It is not a casus belli,., after the withdrawal of 
Russiap and if we had been quiet we need have done 
nothing ... I think it is a case for tmaterial 
guarantee". 1 
Lyttonj on the other hand, asked permission to issue, a 
manifesto setting out the cause of offence and fixing the 
responsibility on Sheer Ali; expelling the Afghan troops from 
-C the Rhyber Pass; occupying the Kurum Valley; and advancing 
from Quetta towards Kandahar. 2 These were the proposals which 
the Cabinet considered on 25th October in what Disraeli called 
"one of the most remarkable meetings" he remembered. Cranbrook 
began by advocating the adoption of the measures asked for by 
1. G. E. Buckle., op. cit., Vol. Vlp pp, 381-383. If Disraeli had 
read Lytton's letters with as much care as admiration he 
would have understood that the withdrawal or non-withdrawal 
of the Russian mission from Kabul (Stolietoff was back in 
Tashkendby 2lBt September) was quite irrelevant in Lytton's 
eyes. 
2. Balfourp op. cit., pp. 291-292. 
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Lytton. Cairnst the Lord Chancellor, took the other side. 
Lytton's manifesto would, in effect, be a declaration of war 
without a casus belli. Sheer Ali had been reluctant to 
receive the Russian mission: when all the members had left 
(some had remained after Stolietoff's departure) he would 
probably have received a British mission. Sir Stafford 
Northcote, the leader of the House of Commons, and Crossp the 
Home Secretarys expressed themselves as in entire agreement 
with Cairns. Salisbury attacked Lytton for thinking only of 
India and, by its means, dictating the foreign policy of the 
government in Europe and Turkey. The Viceroy, he said, had 
twice disobeyed precise orders - in sending the mission when 
told to wait and in sending it by the Khyber - andt unless 
curbedv would bring-about "some terrible disaster". Cranbrook 
replied at this point, arguing that the casus belli was the 
aggregate of hostile incidents on the part of Sheer Ali and 
thenp silence falling, Disraeli gave his opinion. 
A demonstration of powerv he said, was necessary but he 
did not wish to call Parliament to sanction a war unless the 
casus belli was unimpeachable. The Chancellor had said that 
Lytton's projected manifesto was equivalent to a declaration 
t 
of war., A better course, then, was to occupy the Kilram Valley, 
explaining that this waB not an act of war but merely the 
taking of a 'material guarantee'. This course was approved 
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by the Duke of Richmondq by Salisburyp Cairns., Northcote and 
Cross. But Cranbrookf a strong man, dissented. His own 
opinion was for wars which he believed to be inevitable sooner 
or later: the taking of a 'material guarantee' was a half- 
measure for which he would not be responsible. Rather than 
take such a course he would be prepared to wait until larger 
forces could be collected. ýtAfter this extraordinary state- 
mentits as Disraeli termed its "there seemed only one course 
to take". The military preparations were ordered to be 
continued on a larger scale while, in order to strengthen the 
case for Parliaments another message (which was to be submitted 
to the Cabinet before transmission) was to be sent to Sheer 
Ali. 1 
The "message" in question was the ultimatum which was sent 
on 2nd November 1878. It-demandedp as the "last opportunity 
of averting the calamities of warp the full and plain accept- 
ance not later than 20th Novemberp of the following terms: a 
full and suitable apology in writing by Sheer Alip tendered on 
British territory by an officer of suitable rank; the estab- 
liBhment of a permanent British mission in Afghanistan; an 
undertaking that no injury should be done to the tribes who 
acted as guides to Chamberlain's mission. 2 On 4th November 
1. Disraeli to Queen Victoriap 26th Oct. 1878. Bucklep op. cit., Vol. VII pp*386-388. 
2. Balfourp op. cit., pp. 292-294. 
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1878 Kaufmann had written to the wretched Sheer Ali advising 
him to make peace with the English if they offered it. Sheer 
Alip replying on 20th'November, said that the British Govern- 
ment would never withdraw their enmity and would listen to no 
overtures for reconciliation* He sent no reply to the 
ultimatum. At 10 p. m. on the same dayl 20th November 1878, 
Lytton, being informed that no reply had come in, gave orders 
for the three British columns to advance next morning. He 
himself wrote to Cranbrook next day, "Jacta. est aleaVt2 
Parl. Pa-pers. Central Asia (No. 1) 1881. Inclosures No, 39 
and 40 in No, l. 




Salisbury once said, of the exponents of "masterly 
1nactivity" that the disasters of 1842 had entered like iron 
: Lnto their souls. Yet# forty years after the beginning of 
the first Afghan War., British troops- were once more engaged 
: Ln hostile operations on Afghan soil. Superficially at least 
there were many likenesses between the two wars. Each 
consisted of three Parts: a comparatively easy advance to the 
desired objectives; an Afghan revolt; the crushing of that 
revolts followed by*the withdrawal of the victorious British 
forces. The murder of Burnes and Macnaghten was paralleled 
by. the murder of Cavagnari and his companions. In the back- 
grounds in each case, was-the threat from Russia; and in each 
case the crisis of that threat, the siege of Herat and the 
danger of war over the Eastern Questions was past before 
hostilities were begun. Each war ended in a way which seemedp 
at the outset, highly improbable: with the establishment of 
the authority of an exiles Dost Mohammad In the one cases Abdur 
Rahman in the other. There were even personal similarities*. 
like Macnaghten, if not like Auckland, Lytton had a taste for 
manifestos and proclamations. 
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There were differences toot of course. Lytton was a 
greater man than Auckland and a more honest man than 
Macnaghten. No comparison between Roberts and Elphinstone 
would be worth making. Nevertheless, the similarities 
between the two wars are so many that it is tempting to assume 
that the judgments which apply to the one apply also to the 
other; thatq as Auckland was wrongg so was Lytton; that 
Wisdom, by contrastq was exemplified only in the policy 
associated with the name of John Lawrence. 
An historical problem, however, unlike an arithmetical 
problems has no "answer" which is not merely "right" but is 
the only "right" one. Auckland's fundamental error was not 
so much an error of means (bad as the means were) but of ends. * 
the situation in his day did not demand the action he took; 
the Problem could safely have been ignored. In the days of 
Salisbury and Lytton that was no longer true. With the 
Russian advance across Central Asiaq Anglo-Afghan relations 
presented serious difficulties which no responsible statesman 
could ignore. This is not to suggest that Lyttonts policy was 
necessarily or even probably "right"; but some attempt to deal 
with the Afghan problem was "right". 
To say this is not to condemn the policies of such men as 
. John Lawrence. It was not necessary for Lawrence to do morev 
in his day, than he did in respect of Afghanistan. That does 
i 
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not means howevers that his policy was perfect; in comparison, 
says with the imperfections of Lytton'-s it was adequate for the 
time being. But it was in itself'a source of future danger 
because it came to be viewed as the only "right" solution not 
merely for the problem as it exi sted in Lawrence's own day but 
as it existed at any time. Action attraCtB criticisms 
especially if it is accompanied, as it was in Lyttons with a 
tendency to rhetorical explanation. But inaction is not 
necessarily a virtue and it may be that if the British 
Position in respect of Afghanistan had not been allowed to 
degenerate under Gladstone up to 1874 Salisbury and Lytton 
would not have felt obliged to try to restore it so hurriedly. 
The writer of a thesis on such a subject as thisp covering so 
many years, is alternately annoyed by complacency and shocked 
by impetuosity. Only qccasionally does he see such a 
satisfactorily complete piece of work as Sandeman's in 
Baluchistan. He is more likely to see blind adherence to a 
Policy and the rejection of all criticism; a lack of 
co-ordination between the Home and the Indian Government; or 
party spirit swaying the destinies of India. Such a man as 
John Lawrence, who was an administrator and not a diplomat, in 
days when an administrator and not a diplomat was needed, was 
fortunate. Yet it was not so fortunate for Britain or India, 
or# indeedp for Afghanistan that an aura of sanctity came to 
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surround Lawrence's policy. Taking the long list of 
governor s-general and Viceroyst of Presidents of the Board Of 
Control and Secretaries of State as a wholep it may be that 
the best were those whose policies were adequate in their own 
day but yet were not so firmly set or so publicized as to 
become political myths. 
(279) 
APPENDIXI 
Rawlinson's memorandum was forwarded to the Government 
of India by Sir Stafford Northcote I Secretary of State I 
without enclosing his own remarks or those of Her Majesty's 
Government. The Viceroy accordingly collected the opinions 
of various members of his Council and other responsible 
officers and after subjoining his own remarks despatched them 
to the Secretary of State for India, by that time the Duke of 
Argyll. It is desirable, so that the reader may understand 
the attitude of the Indian Government of that dayt to give 
these opinions in some detail. 
(a) Minute by R. H. Davies, 27th December 1868. 
In the opening lines of his minute Davies criticised the 
memorandum as being inconsistent with itself; for while 
Rawlinson dismissed the idea of an invasion of Indiag he 
nevertheless hinted at the possibility of a descent of 50,000 
Persian Surbazs supported by Russian troops. 1 
Davies argued that it would be foolish to interfere with 
Afghanistan. Past experience bore testimony to this. Nor 
was he very hopeful about the Persian question and he pointed 
out that when Persia went to war in 1832 with Turkeyp in 1826 
with Russia, in 1832,1836 and 1837 against Heratp she in each 
I. Afghanistan No. l., Parl. Psper6,1878-79, Vol. 56., C-21909 p. 78. 
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instance did so contrary to the remonstrance of the British 
Minister, and in the case of Mohammad Shahq commenced 
hostilities immediately after the British Government had aided 
the accession to the throne. Davies asked if there was any 
new hope of the efforts and expeditions being more effective. 
"Shall we find" he asked, "less slippery material to work 
with, - instruments more reliable than Dost Mohammad and the 
Kandahar brothers, or the Vainglorious Shah's by-gone? "l 
He further stated that the position of Russia in Central 
Asia. in no way leBsened the enormous difficulties of the route 
to Kabul by Bamian or to Kashmir by the Karakuram. In the 
case of Persia, RUSBia "has been any time during the Post. 
thirty years as well able as she is now to aid Persia in the 
siege of Herat. She has refrained from doing so. She 
refrained even at the time of the S01 MutinY"- 
2 
Davies urged upon the Viceroy the inpolicY of any further 
advance or interference in countries beyond the frontier of 
Indiay while the internal condition of India itself required 
attention. He regretted that there was no bridge on the Indus 
at Attok nor was there any communication system with Kohat and 
no place of refuge to the Khyber to fall back upon. "Surely 
any funds we have to spare" he saidt "might better be devoted 
1. ibid. ý p. 78. 2. 
ýIbi-d. v p. 
79. 
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to the tardy reparation of these deficiencies than engulfed 
in the profitless abyss of Afghan revolutions". 
1 Such 
measures, he thought, were the best way of checking any 
encroachment and creating confidence in the hearts of the 
natives and respect for British power in the eyes of Russia 
and Persia. 
In conclusion he stated - 
"To conclude, I-regret that I cannot regard Sir 
H-Rawlinson's proposals otherwise than as an 
entire renewal of the policy of 18389 which 
nearly ruined the Empire, and the effects of 
which we are still to get over". 2 
(b) Minute by W. H. Norman, Sth December 1868. 
(Norman had served on the frontier from the first 
Occupation of Peshawar in March 1849 till 1855 and again in 
part of 1856. During nearly the whole of this period he was 
principal staff officer to the troops and thoroughly 
acquainted with the problems of the frontier. ) 
Norman did not share in the "exaggerated" fears of Russian 
advance-and condemned the method advocated by the followers of 
the forward policy as leading to disaster. He was firmly 
convinced that the occupation of Herat would not end in itself 
but 
"To occupy Herat involves occupying many other places# 
1. Ibid. t p. 79. 2. ! bid., p. 79. 
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and also would render it necessary to keep other 
troops in readiness at all times to support those 
in advance". 1 
Tallalapad Nor did he believe that the occupation of Quetta. or Z 
would materially alter British positions and thus serve as a 
check on further Russian advance. 
"The occupation of Quetta or Jallalabads, or both, 
could exercise no more sensible influence on 
Russian alliance than does the existing occupation 
of Peshawar or. jacobabad. If political necessity 
arises,, both can be occupied with rapidityp but 
there Is no political necessity whatever, and to 
carry out the measures without strong reasons 
seem to me most inexpedient". 2 
Norman was averse to the idea of having an envoy at Kabul 
and a contingent of native troops at that place. Speaking of 
the two proposals he expressed his opinion thus - 
"The presence of either would be likely to dreg US 
into difficultiesp and would in no way strengthen 
us or aid us in checking Russian advances". 3 
Norman shared the views of Lawrence that it would be 
inexpedient to place British officers with the Persian army on 
the grounds that 
"the presence of British Officers would not be 
able to influence the course of Persian policY 
and the British Government would be forced to 
dismiss those officers at the pleasure of the 
Persian Government (in the event of Persia siding 
with Russia)11.4 
1. lbid. 0 PAN 2. ibid. p P. 71. 3. ibid. p p. l. 4. Ibid., p. 11 
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He objected to the proposal for the occupation of Kurram 
(advocated by H. B. Lumsden) - such a measure in his opinion was 
expensive and likely to irritate the Ameer. 
"That Kurram. is a few marches nearer to Kabul than 
any of our present garrisons, seems to me an 
argument of no force. Circumstances are not 
likely to require us to move to Kabul so suddenly 
that a difference of a few days will be any 
importance but ifo contrary to all reasonable 
expectations, such circumstances aid arisep the 
force we could ordinarily keep at Kurram would 
not be strong enough to move up to Kabul for any 
useful purpose without re-inforcements joining 
from Peshawar, while troops from Peshawar itselfp 
replaced rapidly from Rawalpindi and Zehlemp 
could in respectable strength reach Kabul direct, 
at least as soon as they could by joining the 
Kurram troop, and proceeding to Kabul by that 
route" .1 
It was much better, in Normants opiniong to strengthen 
the existing frontiert keeping troops in readiness and within 
easy reach., rather than throwing them away unnecessarily in 
advanced position surrounded by hostile and warlike tribes. 
"If Russia presses on so seriously to menace UB2 we 
should be in a position-to go to war with unwasted 
resources. I will say nothing of all that we 
might do against Russia elsewhere than in Indiap but 
we would collect 70,000 or 80)000 good troops on 
our frontier, andt if necessary, advance into Afghan- 
istan with a force likely to be superior in numberv 
equipment, and condition to any Russian force we can 
contemplate on being brought there". 2 
Commenting on the argument of some who had pointed out 
that the increase of Russian influence would cause diBsatis- 
1. Ibid., p., 11 
2. Ibid. p p. -1 
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faction within India itself and make the task of an invader 
easyv he stated that, in the Sikh warBp British-Indian troops 
hads after two months of severe fightingp failed to drive 
them outs but there was no sign of any disorder or dissatis- 
faction among the natives. 
"Surely there is no reason to. suppose that the 
natives of our provinces would srýathise more 
with the Russians than with SikM'. 
Norman was averse to any kind of interference with 
Afghanistan and mingling up with the tribes whom he thought 
were difficult to control. 
(c) Minute of G. N. Taylor (first Ordinary Member)p 12th 
December 1868. 
From this minute it would appear that the Government of 
India had contemplated aid to Sheer Ali before Rawlinson's 
memorandum reached them. 
"The measures which were in contemplation before the 
Government left Simla, and which His Excellency 
still recommends should be carried out when the 
proper time arrives, have for their object to 
strengthen the position of Sheer Ali and to place 
our relations with reigning Ameers on a firm and 
solid basis. Such measures wills I believes 
conduce to results so obviously desirable and 
forcibly advocated by Sir H. Rawlinson - the 
consolidation of-a strong and friendly Government 
in Afghanistan". 2 
(d) Minute of the Commander-in-Chief (Sir W. R. Mansfield) 
27th December 1868. 
"I think the argument is complete against a British 
1. lbid., p. tit 
2. Ibid..., p. r14 
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occupation of Quetta, as an advance on Afghan- 
istans unless a real casus belli should arise 
in our relations with that country". 1 
But., on relations with Afghanistanp 
"I hold very stronglyt that those relations should 
not be left to chance, or to be determined accord- 
ing to a distrustful or hostile attitude on our 
partp but that we should encourage diplomatic 
intercourse with the Court of Kabulp andq while 
testifying something like a genial sympathy towards 
the Government de facto, we should by political 
pressure and the practical testimony of our own 
good offices, bring about a reciprocity of good 
feeling towards ourselves". 2 
And the attitude to the de facto Governmenty 
"But I think it is obvious that such a policy Of 
passiveness should be limited by the pressing 
necessity of actual Civil War, and that so soon 
as we are able to assign something like firmness 
and stability to the de focto Govermnentp we 
should not only speak to it with civilityp but 
we should-give it moral, and even material 
support". 3 
Mansfield put great stress on the necessity for the 
pacification of the tribes and to make them understand that 
they could either be friends or enemies. At the same time 
he urged the Government to keep watch on the movements Of 
RuPsiat strengthen itself within its own limits and endeavour 
to arrive at a definite conclusion with RUBBia as regards 
Central Asia. For the rest he assured the Government of India 
that it had no reason to fear any power in the world. 
1. Ibid., 'p. 75. 
2. Ibid, q p. 75. 3. lbiýj-., p. 75. 
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"We are simply invincible in that country against 
all of the powers in the world, provided only we 
are true to ourselves. If we choose to commit 
ourselves to a policy of aggression, we can go 
and establish ourselves where we like. If, on 
the other hand, being guided by a true and sound 
policy, we restrict our ambitions and fortify 
ourselves by the continuance of good Government 
and careful attention to the efficiency of our 
military establishments, without extravagance on 
-the one hand,, or unwise cheapness on the other, 
we not only do that which is best for the Gre-at 
Empire committed to our charge, but we comply 
with the conditions requisite for security and 
freedom from political anxiety. Reasoning from 
this point of view, I would repeat that we are 
bound to organise our Asiatic communications 
with Russia on a proper diplomatic and consular 
footing". 1 
Mansfield would welcome any proposal having for its 
objects the improvement of the country at large - improvements 
of the means of communication, improving the lot of the 
Indians and bringing them security, peace and prosperity. He 
could not see any reason why some people advocated the throwing 
away of men and money in advanced, barren and fruitless 
Positiono while there was need for them inside India. He 
concluded his minute with the following remarks - "It appears 
then finally to me that the whole of Indo-Asiatic policy 
requires revision, but in a sense opposite to that outlined 
by Sir H. Rawlinson't. 2 
"Then I would put aside jealousy and antagonism towards 
1. Tbid., p. 75. 
2. Ibid., p. tIJ5. 
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other provinces, but would frame all our measures on a basis 
of international communications of peaceful character, of 
confidence instead of distrustp suspicion and ignorance". 
1 
(e) Minute by Sir Donald )AcLeodv Lieutenant Governor of 
the Punjab, 10th October 1868. 
As regards Rawlinson's argument that the rapid advance 
of Russia might have an adverse effect on the minds of the 
inhabitants of Northern India, McLeod stated that the best 
information and intelligence showed that throughout Central 
Asia the steps of Russia were watched with suspicion and 
hatredý and the more intelligent and best informed of the 
people of India regarded them as unscrupulous and aggressive. 
Rawlinson had stated that the Afghans considered thýmselve'B 
to have a national feud with the British. On this McLeod 
remarked - 
"I believe they now fully appreciate the uniform 
civility and protection which their traders and 
travellers experience in our territory, and the 
bearing of Ameer Sheer Ali Khanp since he has 
regained the throne of Kabult certaihly shows 
anything but-a disinclination to be on friendly 
terms with us so far as he has hitherto pronounced 
himself". 2 
McLeod shared the opinion of Lawrence that every step 
that Russia took in advancing her frontiers would have the 
effect of'increasing her difficulties, and in due course of 
time would expose to the light the aggressive character of 
1. Ibid., P. M. 
2. lbid. 0 p. 41 
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her policy and thereby C&UBe a reaction in ABiS of public 
opinion against her movement. 
He strongly condemned those newspaperBp whether English 
or vernacular, and such writers as misrepresented the 
relations between Russia and Great Britain, spoiling the 
Public mind and ultimately leading to animosity between the 
two Powers. 
He deprecated the idea that Russia might play on the 
cupidity of the tribes in a joint descent on the plains of 
Hindustan. But if such an emergency ever arosep the 
population of India would realise their interest and stand 
firm with the British in India against the common enemy. 
As regards Afghanistan and the queBtion of aiding the 
de f8. cto rulers McLeod stated, 
"while deprecating any rash interference in the 
Civil Btrifes-of Afghanistan, I believe that 
both consideration of good policy as regardB our 
own interestt and of friendliness of those of 
Afghanistan, require that we should assist and 
show our sympathy with the rightful ruler# when 
satisfied that he is the most acceptable of 
existing candidates to his nation generallyp and 
this may, I think, be emphatically stated at the 
present time in respect to Sher Ali". 1 
Speaking of the proposal for the occupation of Quettat 
McLeod stated 
"I by no means adv ocate the occupation of Quetta 
1. lbid. v p. 4q 
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on a strategic military positiony however 
advantageous the position may be deemed by some 
from a political point of view. Sir Henry 
Rawlinson admits that we should not be justified 
in taking the step if we should thereby run the 
risk of the loss of our friendly intercourse 
with either ]Kabul or Balooshistan. And as I 
feel fully convinced that it would cause extreme 
suspicion and uneasiness on the part of the 
former at all events, I would deprecate all 
thi; 4mgh this or any analogous scheme for obtain- 
ing a footing in foreign territory until it shall 
be absolutely forced upon us by aggression and by 
the Occurrence of a state of things not now 
existing". 1 
Minute by the Hon. Sir Richard Temple, 8th December 1868. 
Sir Richard Temple was of the opinion that although Great 
Britain had no right to question what Russia was doing in 
Bokharav she had a right-to askv for her own interests and 
safety, that she abstained from all interference in Afghan- 
istan and Yarkand. He said that as Great Britain Was on 
friendly terms with Russia, the best course was to make 
diplomatic representations to Russia on the subject. At the 
same time the native courts of Afghanistan and Yarkand should 
be informed that the Indian Government respected their 
independence and as well would help maintain that independence. 
Apart from that he did not favour any allianceBp offensive and 
defensive or guaranteeing the ruler of the day against the 
wishes of his subjects. 
1. Ibid. v p. qq. 
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He welcomed the idea of sending native agents to the 
courts of Afghanistan and Yarkand on the ground that these 
agents excited no jealousy. But he was strongly averse to 
the appointing of British officers. 
"I deprecate the sending of a single British officer 
or a single British soldier into Afghanistany in 
time of peace at all events". 1 
He observed that the study of British political affairs 
in Asia generally and on-the North West frontier of India in 
particular was impressing him with a sense of the onward 
tendency - so long as some rigid boundB were observe. d it was 
Just possible to check that tendency. But once those bounds 
were overpassed the tendency became irresistable* If British 
agents crossed the Afghan border., troops would follow in their 
train. If one part of Afghanistan was occupied the occupation 
would spread to other parts until the whole was occupied or 
some tremendous consequence occurred. 2 
He was against the formation of an Afghan contingent. 
"The formation of an Afghan contingent is beset with 
difficulties. If it is to be paid for by us even 
through the agency of the Ameer, the payment will 
be irregular; then a series of disputes would arise 
with the Ameer, and the trouble in this respect, BO 
well known at Hyder Abad and elsewhere in India, 
would be repeated at Kabul. If it is to be paid 
for by the British Government through a British 
officer, then it will be regarded by the Ameer as 
a body of foreign troops, and jealousy or disquietude 
rMst follow ... 113 
1. Ibid.., p. 68. 
2. Ibid. # p. 60 3. Ibid., p. gq 
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As regardB the proposal to induce the Ameer to lease the 
I Districts of Kurram and Khost (advocated by Lumsden) Sir 
Richard Temple remarked - 
t'As to the leasing of the districts of Khost and 
Kurram from the Ameerv - firstly he would never 
consent to lease them to us2 or if he did consent 
in words, in his heart he must necessarily be 
dissenting. Similarly the people would regard 
our position there as an invasion of their 
country. We know but too well how they have 
regarded such steps in the past; why should 
they regard this in any other way? "l 
Of the proposed occupation of Quettag Temple spoke on 
the following lines. 
"There would be a cause of fear to Kelat, and it 
would be regarded as a menace by Kandahar. Here 
again we should have the disadvantage of inspiring 
the Afghans with distrust till the war with Russia 
comes, and when that does come we shall be obliged 
to move on from our advanced post at Quettap instead 
of selecting our own ground near the mouth of the 
Boolan PaBB". 2 
Sir Richard Temple's second objection to the occupation of 
Quetta was that such a project would require extra troops to 
be raised - hence an increase in the number of the native 
troopsv which the Government of India had decided not to 
increase beyond a certain limit. 
(g) Memorandum by Lord Lawrence, 4th January 1869. 
In his memorandum, Sir Henry Rawlinson had pointed out 
1. Ibid., p. 6q. 
2. lbid. v p. 69. 
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with much confidence that the Afghan Civil War would not have 
assumed that tangible shape if from the beginning, the 
Go vernment of India had, contrary to the will of Dost Mohammad 
Khan to leave the Afghans alone to settle their quarrelsy 
given immediate moral and material support to Sheer Ali Khan. 
But Lawrence repudiated that belief and argued that the 
misfortunes which came over Sheer Ali wsw due to his own 
defective character and misrule. Moreover it was not an easy 
task to select'with success any chief out of the whole lot. 
As to-the danger arising from Russian action in Central Asia: 
"No one, of course can deny that the advance of 
Russia in Central Asia is a matter which may 
gravely affect the interest of England in India. 
No person can doubt, I admit# that the approach 
of Russia towards our North7'Nestern frontier in 
India may involve us in great difficulties ... Ill 
The first step to counteract that danger was "to endeavour 
to maintain a thoroughly friendly power between India and the 
Russian possession in Central Asia". This would have the 
effect of creating a barrier against further encroachments, as 
well as preventing the two big Empires from becoming limitrophed. 
To attain this desirable end it was necessary to show goodwill 
to. the Afghans, and to endeavour to convince them that the 
Government of India had no wish for further aggrandisement; 
1. 
ýIb 
i d. v P. 6 1. 
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to help them to consolidate their power and refrain from 
interfering in their affairs. Lawrence however, could not 
speak with any degree of certainty about the attainment of 
that desirable end, but stated that there was great danger, 
"that some of the necessary measures which Sir H. Rawlinson 
recommends towards securing that object may lead to the 
Opposite result". 1 His own policy was not to attempt much 
beyond the frontier of India. The next measure was to 
r W reconcile the people of India to the ruler of the day; to 
-11 
give them the beat Government in our power, to improve the 
conditions of the country which need immense developmentt 
rather than pursue a policy which reckless of the consequencep 
was all and all for advance. 
The other measure which Lawrence thought might be useful, 
was to come to some understanding with the cabinet of St. 
Petersburgh. But if all these failed the Government of India 
should clearly state to Russia that beyond a certain liMit she 
was not permitted to advance. Lawrence declared this policy 
thus 
"We might also endeavour to come to some mutual 
agreement, and to , an 
understanding with Russiap 
and failing that, we might give that power to 
understand that an advance towards Indiap beyond 
a certain pointp would entail on her war, in all 
parts of the world, with England". 3 
1. Ibid.., p. 6: L. 
2. Ibid. 1, p. Cl 3. Ibidl. 0 p. 6: L. 
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He admitted that Russia had made great advances in Central 
Asia and might Y. Mw-KeaJe still more. But he Could not see 
any reason why the British-Indian Government should openly 
question or impede this Russian advance so long as it did not 
affect British interests. He was quite optimistic about 
danger from Russia and expressed his hopes that the danger 
some anticipated might not arise but even if it dtd ariser he 
still was not prepared to meet that danger by active measures 
on the part of the Indian Government in Afghanistan. This 
stepp he believed, would lead eventually to the occupation of 
Afghanistan as was the case in 1838. 
"Possibly the danger which some anticipate may never 
arise, but admitting that it may, any serious 
attempt to restrain Russia's advance by active 
measures on our part in Afghanistan would seem to 
me certainly to lead to a policy resulting in our 
eventual occupation of that countryp as was the 
case in 183811.1 
He stated that most people would deprecate this result and 
would affirm that this would be the last object they desired. 
But the real pointo he thought, wasp whether an interference in 
Afghanistan, however moderate and limited in character in the 
first instance, was or was not, likely to lead to such a result? 
Lawrence's answer was in the positive sense. For he was 
convinced that the occupation of certain parts of Afghanistan 
such as Herat or Kandahar were not ends in themselves but means 
I* Ibidof p*61* 
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to an end - the occupation of the whole country. 
While the difficulties which the vicinity of Russia 
might have upon India had been presented in vivid and graphical 
terms, Sir H. Rawlinson had certainly forgotten about Russia's 
own difficulties resulting from such a gigantic project. 
The Government of India had after all a choice of difficulties. 
The first choice%4asto accept the slight political unrest and 
disturbance which might be expected from the close proximity 
Of Russia and the second, of course, was to be ready for the 
difficulties arising out of the advance into Afghanistan and 
the best and prudent course was to examine and determine on 
which side the difficulties preponderated. 1 Butp he askedo 
"Would not Russian difficulties increase in proportion 
as she enlarged her borders? If danger and compli- 
cations may be anticipated from the approach of 
Russia to our North Western frontier in Indiag will 
not Russia likewise be met by similar difficulties in her possessions in Central Asia?, 12 
Sir Henry Rawlinson had recommended (a) the transfer of 
the Persian Mission to the control of the Secretary of State 
for India and the appointment of British officers in the Persianý 
army (b) the occupation of Quetta if it was not looked upon 
with suspicion by the Afghans (c) subsidising and strengthening 
of Sheer Ali. Lawrence himself was in favour of the transfer 
of the Persian Mission to the India Office, if that arrangement 
1. Ibid.., p, 6-t 
2. ! bid., pp. 61-619'. 
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was permanent, but he was entirely averse to the propoBal for 
the appointment of British officers to the Persian army on the 
ground that, in the. first instance it was an extra. burden on 
India's revenues and secondly that it would not strengthen 
British influence in Persia. Persiav he remarkedp was so 
weak from various causes that she was practicallY under the 
control of Russia and utterly unable to resist the influence 
of that power. 
Lawrence was convinced that - 
"in any great struggle connecting Afghanistang 
Persia would certainly follow the behests of 
Russia, even though unwilling on some grounds 
to do so". 1 
As to the occupation of Quettap Lawrence was'emphatically 
averse to such a step on moral, political and military grounds. 
He made it clear that such a project would be not without 
inviting the hostility and suspicion of the Afghans and 
ýhe 
Bal(LI)chis. "it would assuredly be looked on by the Afghans 
as the forerunner of our advance to Kandaharp and,, perhapso to 
Herat'# .2 
Lawrence was not very sure if the force at Quettay unless 
very large, would be able to stand on its own 
'land unless that force were largey and composed of 
a considerable proportion of British troopsp 
1. Ibid. 0 p. 
6%. 
2. Tbid. x p. 63. 
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placed in a strong fortified positionp it would, 
in the event of a formidable invasiong be likely 
to be cut off. Under such circumstances we 
should have to occupy Sind". 1 
Lawrence then turned to the question of the formation of 
a contingent for service of Afghanistan. He asked whether 
the British Officers, with a native contingentp at a distance 
from any material support in the shape of British troopst 
would be able to exercise their influence on the soldiers. 
He was of the opinion that a contingent composed purely of 
native soldiers would be "a dangerous force to our own 
representatives at Kabul, and a source of distrust and 
irritation to the rulers of the country". 2 
Moreover, argued Lawrences the contingenty if paid 
directly by a British officers would be regarded by the Ameer 
as a body of foreign troops. The Ameer's enemies would try 
to tamper with them, in order to employ them to subvert his 
power. Under such circumstances the Ameer would regard the 
British agent as his rival rather than as a friend. 3 
Lawrence thought it highly impolitic to do more than 
generally renew the engagements of 1857 between the British 
Government and that of Afghanistan and he would on no account 
recommend that the Indian Government should accede to a 
request, which it was felt the Ameer would makep for an 
1. Ibid., p. 63. 
2. fbid. v p. Z; 3. Ibid., p. ýý 
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offensive and defensive alliance. At the same time he 
declared that he would not consent to any engagements which 
might imply responsibility on the part of the British Govern- 
ment for the maintenance of the Ameer's authority. Nor was 
he ready to promise an annual subsidy for a term of years. 
This would have had the effect of binding the Indian Govern- 
ment, which was Lawrence's object to avoid. He was, however, 
ready to give the Ameer a certain annual subsidy (10 to 12 
lakhs of rupees) for so long as the Indian Government were 
satisfied with his conduct towards them. But for all this 
Lawrence was not for attaching any condition beyond general 
fidelity in his (Ameer) relations towards the Indian Govern- 
ment, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1857. At 
the same time the Ameer was to be led to understand that those 
conditions were essential to the subsidy. 1 
The conditions were not merely professions of amity to 
the British Government and courtesy to native agent accredited 
to the court, but an earnest endeavour on the part of the Ameer 
to exercise such a control over the tribes, subject to 
authorityp as, to prevent them from making raids on British- 
Indian territory. 2 
To sum up his strong aversion to any extension of the 
1. Ibid. p p. 66. 2. Ibid. 9 p. 6ý- 
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territory, under whatever pretencev Sir John Lawrence 
remarked - 
"If any change in our Western frontier is desirable 
it is to reduction rather than extension of its 
limits that I should look. It is altogether a 
mistake to suppose that the occupation of Jalla- 
labad would strengthen our position. Whatever 
might be the first impression in the minds of the 
people at such extension of our frontier, the move 
being a false one, the defects would soon become 
apparent. It would greatly enhance-our present 
difficulties. It would at once entail a consid- 
erable addition to our troopst British and native, 
while it would revive in the minds of the Afghans 
the fear of our encroachmentp which is now partially 
at rest". 1 
Vie now come to the joint opinion of the Goverment of 
India on the subject. There was no dissent recorded. 
In their despatch to the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of 
State for India, the Government of India expressed in the most 
clear terms their entire rejection of the proposal contained 
in the memorandum of Sir Henry Rawlinson forwardedp under Sir 
S. Northcote's instructionsp in Kaye's letter of 21st August 
1868. The Government of India could not see any reason for 
any departure from the then existing policy. - They were 
convinced that the translations into actions of any of the 
proposals given by Sir HrRawlinson would have brought results 
opposite to those desired. The Government of India, thereforev 
1. Ibid. 9 p. (oq. 
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could not be persuaded to depart from the settled policy they 
had been pursuing towards the frontier states. 
"A careful perusal of the memorandum forwarded to us, 
and a further discussion of the subject in all its 
bearings, has not led us to recommend any substantial 
alteration in the course of policy to be adopted on 
the frontier, or beyond it. On the contrary, the 
closer and more constant the attention which the 
subject receives at our handBI the more settled is 
our conviction that any serious departure from the 
principles which we have already enunciated, would 
be the cause of grave political and financial 
embarrassments and would probably involve us in 
doubtful undertakings, the issue or duration of 
which statesmen could hardly venture to predict". 
1 
"We object to any active interference in the affairs 
Of Afghanistan by the deputations of a British 
officer with or without a contingent, or by the 
forcible or amicable occupation of any post or 
tract in that country. beyond our own frontier, 
inasmuch as we think such a measure wouldv under 
present circumstances, engender irritation, defiance, 
and hatred in the minds of the Afghans, without in 
the least strengthening our power either for attack 
or defence". 2 
The Goverment of India believed that the object which it 
had at heart, in common with all interested in Indiap might be 
best attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on its 
own frontier, and by giving all care and spending all resources 
for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which they 
could exercise an effective and immediate control. 
In addition the Government of India recommended certain 
measures to the Secretary of State for India. The first was 
1. "Causes of the Afghan War" 1879 (London) p. 19- 2. Ibid., p. 20. 
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to endeavour to come to some understanding with Russia as 




In 1875 the Viceroys then Lord Northbrooks being 
concerned with the question of sending European agents to 
Afghanistan, caused an enquiry to be made about the attitude 
which Sheer Ali had shown towards this possibility at Ambala 
in 1869. ihe most Important evidence on one side came from 
Grey who had acted as the viceroy's interpreter and who (as 
quoted above) described Sheer Ali's attitude as fOllOWB: 
"He ... would construct forts on his own part or 
under our superintendence, and admit European 
garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an 
Agent or a European Superintendent in Balkho 
Herat or anywhere but actually in Cabult which 
might lead to, the supposition of his being a 
puppet 
Grey had derived this view from conversations between Seton- 
Karr, the Foreign Secretary, ýand Sheer Ali's chief Ministerv 
Noor Mohanmad. ' Seton-Karr himselfv howeverp had no recollec- 
tion of, Sheer Ali having waived objections to receiving 
European agents in AfghaniBtant outside Kabul. Girdlestone 
(Beton-Karr's Under Secretary) and Colonel Burne (who had been 
Mayo's military secretary) supported Grey. 
The point is not very important in itself. It may be 
that Sheer Ali would have gone so far as allowing European 
agents to enter Afghanistan as the price for what he wanted. 
There is no evidence that he was prepared to do so for what 
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Mayo offered him. An Afghan rulerp whose authority at this 
time was so much decentralized, was bound to reckon with the 
possibility that a British agent stationedp for instancep at 
Herat, would fall under the influence of the governor of Herat 
and tend to misrepresent the government at Kabul. What is 
perhaps most significant is the anxiety of the Indian govern- 




RUSSO-PERSIAN RELATIONS 1669-1875 
As in the case of the Khanats of Central Asia the 
predatory habits of the tribes served as an excuse for 
Russian intervention and ultimate absorption of those regions, 
so also in the case of. Persia the incursions and inroads of 
the Turkomans,, both on Persian and Russian territoryp coupled 
with the sheer impotency of the Persian Government to protect 
its own frontierss provided Russia with a good excuse in her 
campaign of encroachments on the northern frontiers of Persia. 
Still worse was the uncertainty and confusion over the 
Perso-Turkoman boundary. In 18341 Arrowsmith published a 
map to illustrate Burnes' travels in Persia and he placed the 
Persian boundary to the north of the River Attrek. In 1841 
a map was published in Berlin by C. Zimmermann in which the 
Persian boundary was placed some distance above the Attrek. 
This was nothing different from Sansen's Atlas published in 
1700 which placed the boundary at the same place. In 1863 
Murray published a map to describe Vamberyts travels in Persia. 
In this map the Rivers Attrek and Goorjan are given to Turkoman 
and the Kara Su is described as forming the northern boundary 
of Persia near the Caspian. 
I 
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In 1869, an understanding was come to between the Persian 
goverrunent and the Russian government regarding the. Attrek. 
This understanding was based on an explanation and assurances 
requested by the Shah from Begerp the Russian Minister in 
Teheran; an explanation of the purpose for which the Russians 
had built a fort at Krasnovodsk and an assurance they (the 
Russians) should undertake to bui Id no more forts at the 
confluence of the Attrek and the Goorjanp and should undertake 
not to interfere with the affairs of the Turkoman and with 
Persian territory, Beger, in December 1869y after communi- 
cating with his government informed the Persian government that 
the T8al-Ilrecognises the authority and sovereignty of Persia 
up to the banks of the Attrek river" and had "no intentions to 
construct any forts". 1 The Russian government further 
explained that their occupation of Asharodha was meant to 
protect the caravan from the inroads of the Turkomans. The 
Persian government accordingly informed the Governor of 
Asterabad that the Russians were not to cross the Attrek which 
was Persiang while on the other side of the Attrek the Russians 
were at liberty to build whatever they liked. 2 
It also became evident that the Persian government had 
1. F. 0.65j Vol. 991 (inclosure in Thomson's No. 10 of 29th Jan. 
2.. Ibid., Thomson's No. 21,7th Feb. 1870.1873). 
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agreed to act in concert with the Russians to punish the 
Turkoman and the Asterabad agent reported to Dickson that the 
Asterabad Governor was instructed that the Attrek was to be 
the Persian boundary line with Russia and that the Russians 
would punish the Turkomans for their depredations into Persian 
territory. 1 
But later on it was learnt that the arrangements come to 
in 1869 could only have reference to the territory bordering 
on the Caspian sea and the whole course of the Attrek was not 
accepted by the Persian government as the northern boundary 
of PerBia. 2 
In 1873v certain articles appeared in the English press 
and more especially in the Morning Post suggesting that a 
secret treaty had been signed between Russia and Persia by 
which the latter had ceded to the former the valley of the 
Attrek. This was, however,, denied officially by the Persian 
minister in London. The Persian Prime Minister informed 
Thomson (Secretary of the Legation) that in 1869 when the 
Russians were about to occupy Krasnovodsk on the Caspianp an 
official declaration was issued by the Russian minister at 
Teheran announcing that the sovereign "rights of Persia to 
territory extending as far as the Attrek" was recognised by 
1. 
, 
Ibid. p Dickson's No. 13,18th May, 1872. 2. Ibid., Lord A. Loftus' No. 52,5th Feb. 1873. 
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the Russians". 1 
I On the 5th February 1873 Lord A. Loftus reported that 
M-de Stremoounhoffs the Director of the Asiatic Department 
of the Russian Foreign Offices had denied the eXiBtence of 
any secret treaty between Russia and Persia, supporting his 
statement by claiming that in the past a sort of understanding 
had come to pass between the dovernments of Great Britain and 
Russia to respect Persian int6grity and territorial sovereignty. 
Stremoounhoff further stated 'that confusion existed over the 
boundary line and very frequently the Turkoman had taken 
advantage of it in making raids on the Persian territory. To 
put a stop to these acts of bftgandage on the part of the 
Turkomant a proposal to make the Attrek the northern boundary 
of'Persia, instead of Kuja Su (which was further to the south) 
was made to the Persian goverriment. The Persian territory 
consequently had increased rather than decreased. For the 
purpose of watching the movements of the Turkoman a Russian 
encampment was established at*Chikishlar at the corner of the 
I 
Caspian sea. 
Just about this time, the Persian government began to 
view with suspicion the movements of Russia along the course 
of the Attrek. Intelligence of the intention of the Russians 
to occupy Kizil-Armaal Barani and Baorma caused the Persian 
1. Ibid., (incloBure in Thomson's No. 10 of 29th Jan. 1873. ) 
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Minister in London to express his Government's anxiety on the 
subject and to enquire whether the time had not yet come for 
recognising the integrity of Persia as well as Afghanistan. 
Granville informed the Persian Minister that an understanding 
between England and Russia of 1834 existed upon the subject of 
the independence of Persia. This understanding had been 
confirmed by Lord Palmerston in 1838. 
The Persian government could not seriously and openly 
I 
remonstrate against Russian activities and thus expose itself 
to the full burst of Russian anger* Indeedv its fears were 
at times cancelled by hopes that Russia would become its 
protector. This vacillation is characteristic of all those 
weak countries who seek foreign protection. The Russians on 
I 
their part by one excuse or another were busy in their schemes 
of encroachment on the Persian territory. When the British 
press revealed its suspicion of Russia in her dealings with 
Persiag Stremoounhoff bitterly complained to Loftus of the 
continual distrust and suspicion with which Russia was charged. 1 
But nevertheless on 10th March 1873 a detachment of the Russian 
troops crossed the Attrek and attacked the Yemot Turkoman 
within 8 miles of Asterabad. When the Persian government 
asked for an explanationp it was told that the action in 
question was one of necessity and could not be avoided as it 
1. Ibid. j Loftus's No. 92f 5th March 1873. 
(309) 
had left the Persian frontier unguarded and the Russian 
authorities felt it their duty to punish the Turkoman. it 
was stated# howeverv that the act was not one of aggression 
and Russia renewed her assurance that she fully recogniBed 
Attrek as the northern boundary of Persia. 
1 
It nMBt be here observed that so far the negotiations 
passed between Persia and Russia had chiefly referred to that 
portion of the Persian territory which abutted on the Caspian 
sea. Although Russia had always asserted the Attrek as the 
northern boundary of Persiag the Persian government itself 
had claimed that the Attrek was the boundary of Persia as far 
as its mouth on the Caspian was concernedq but not as consti- 
tuting in its entire length the northern boundary of Persia. 
The Shah of Persia while at St. Petersburg (May 1873) most 
emphatically declared to Gortchakoff that Persia had only 
agreed to the mouth of the Attrek as forming the northern 
boundary of Persia and not the whole course of that river. 
2 
But as has been said beforet Persia's impotency had 
reached such a stage that she could not do anything without 
Russia and had b ecome a mere tool in the hands of that power. 
1. Ibid,, q Loftus's No. 147,5th April 1873, No. 150,16th April 18739 No, 157p 23rd April 1873 and Thomson's No. 30,16th 
March 1873. See also the letter of the Russian Minister at 
Teheran to the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairsp 13th 
April 1875. F-0-65p Vol. 878. 
2. F. O. 65, Vol. 991v Loftus's No. 213,27th May 1873. 
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While Malcalm Khan was lamenting and pouring out his grief to 
Lord Derby (8th April 1874) at the RUBsian activities in 
Central Asia, the Persian Government as far back as October, 
1873, was renewing its proposals to the Russian government for 
a joint military action against the Turkoman in the neighbour- 
hood of Attrek. 1 I 
The Russian Government having gradually assumed the right 
to punish the Turkoman took a bolder step when General Lamakin 
landed with a number of soldiers at a place called-Shah Kadem 
eight stages from Asterabad and issued a circular to the Yemot 
Turkoman telling them that from the Goorjan river (which is 
three miles from Asterabad) as far as Khivaq belonged to 
Russia. The contents of the circular were to call upon the 
Turkoman to adopt peaceful habits and refrain from molesting 
Russian trade* The political significance of this distinct 
step was 'the asBumption by Russia of authority over the 
Turkoman and over the Attrek and Goorjan. 
On 6th November 1874, Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, 
directed LoftuS2 to call the attention of the Russian govern- 
ment to General Lamakin's circular in which he had styled 
himself as the commander over the Turkoman, and to point out 
that the territory between the Attrek and Goorjan unquestionably 
1. Ibid., Loftus's No. 429,24th November 1877 to Lord Derby. 
2. P. O. 65, Vol. 904. 
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belonged to Persia, so that the interference of Lamakin's 
could not be justified. 1 
In the absence of Gortchakoffy Loftus sought an interview 
with de Westman, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairsp who 
informed him that the circular of General Lamakin had been the 
subject of prolonged correspondence between the Persian and 
Russian governments and that the explanations given by Russia 
had been considered by Persia as perfectly satisfactory. De 
Westman added that General Lamakin had generalised the tribes 
instead of applying the proper names to them. The whole 
circumstancep he statedv was due to wrong translationB which 
had been happily and satisfactorily rectified by the Persian 
government. Having stated thisp de Westman said that he was 
astonished that the British government should ask for an 
explanation regarding an incident which did not concern them. 
Ifp he sa idq there was any room for protest it was for Persia 
to do so and not for the British government. He cited the 
case of Kashgar as an example of an independent state separated 
from India. Although information of an unsatisfactory nature 
regarding the late Mission of Forsyth had been reaching the 
Imperial Government, it had refrained from asking the British 
Government for explanations because it considered it not its 
business to do 80.2 
1. Central Asia No. 1 (1878) pp. 20,21. 
2. F-0.659 Vol. 904# Loftus to Derby, 17th November 1874. 
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On 10th September 1874, Thomson reported that General 
Lamakin with 600 men and two guns had gone to occupy Karakala 
on the Attrek. The British government naturally felt some 
anxiety at this movement of the Russian troops as they 
_ considered 
the occupation of any strategic point on the Attrek 
as a first step towards the occupation of Merv, and the begin- 
'ning of constant intrigues in Afghanistan. on 12th December 
1874t Thomson telegraphed from Teheran suggesting moral support 
for Persia in her protest against the Russian movements. The 
Foreign Office# realising that past experience had shown that 
no reliance could be placed on the Persian government in 
matters affecting Russial and that the Persian frontiers were 
ill-defined and confusedp informed Thomson that "As regards 
the present advance of the Russians to Karakalap H. M. Government 
fear that, in the present ill-defined state of the Russian 
frontierp Persia would not be justified in protesting against 
this act, and still less would H. M. Government have the right 
to interfere". 1 
Meanwhile, the Russian government-adopted a conciliatory 
policy towards the Turkomans to secure their confidence and 
prepare the way for their complete absorption. This policy 
brought favourable results and in some cases the Turkoman not 
only showed submission but inclination to assist the Russian 
lo P-0-65ý Vol. 991p Derby to Thomsong January 1875. 
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troops. In the summer of 1875, the Russians were reported 
(11th August 1875) to have landed building material at Kizzil 
Sou for the purpose of constructing a fort at Bezat-Hajee on 
the Attrek about 90 miles east of Harsan Kooli. About the 
same times General Lamakin started from Krosnovodsk on the so- 
called scientific exploration of the ancient bed of the Oxus 
and on 21st July he passed Kizal Arwad to attack the Tekke 
Turkoman. In September 18750 the Journal de St. Petersburjzh 
announced that the Akhal Tekke tribe submitted to the Russian 
rule. 1 
On the 26th December 1874, the Russia Ministerat Teheran 
was sent a note by the Persian Minister for Foreign AffairBI 
regarding the line of the Attreks The Russian Minister had 
repudiated the Persian claim to exercise authority over the 
tribes and the Persian Minister reminded him that "the arrange- 
ment of 1869 was sudden and telegraphic, the heads of the 
matters were stated, but details were not-entered into. it 
does not follow that because all the old established rights 
of Persia were not inserted therein they should be made a 
subject for doubt and refutation". 
The Russian Minister replied on 5th March 18759 rejecting 
the repeated complaints of the Persian government. He stated 
1. Ibid., Loftus to Derbyt 2nd September 1875. 
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that the arrangement of 1869, though it was a telegraphic 
(communication)t was nevertheless an arrangement concluded 
after long diSCUBBiong and both governments considered it as 
perfectly clear and sufficient. 1 
The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on 7th 
March 1875 stating that action such as Lamakin's address to 
the Turkoman tribes was done in direct opposition to that very 
arrangement of 18692 and further if the Russian Minister 
referred to his own letter No, 82 of 21 Ramzan 1286 which after 
3rd Dec. 1869 
the telegraphic reply from the Imperial Minister for Foreign 
Affairs,, he had addressed to the Persian Foreign Departmentp 
he would perceive "that the essential and high object of the 
Persian Government has been, and is stillp the maintenance of 
their ancient sovereign rights over the Turkoman tribes". 2 
1. F. 0.65j V01.927. 
2. F. 0,651 V01.927. 
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APPHNDIX 
RUSSIAN DECLARATIONS IN RESPECT TO AFGHANISTAN: 23 JULY 1876 
1. Gortchakoff to Brunnow$ 24 February/7 March 1869. 
I'Vous pouvez done, Mon C er Baron$ re-iterer au 
Principal Secrdtaire d'Vtat de S. M. B. l1assurance 
positive que S. M. Impe'riale consid'ýre l'AfghaniBtan 
comme entidrement en dehors de la sphere ou la 
RusA peut atre appelge a exercer son influence. 
Aucune intervention ou interf9rence quelconque 
contraire a llind6endance de cet 
itat n1entre 
dans sea intentions". 
2. Loftus to Granville, 28 January 1874. 
"As regards Afghanistanp His Highness (Prince 
Gortchakoff) repeated to me that the Imperial 
Government considered that kingdom to be beyond 
the sphere of their political action and that# happen what mightg in the internal state of that 
country, the Imperial Government would not interfere". 
Gortchakoff to Brunnow: connunicated by Brunnow to 
Granville, 17 February 1874. 
I'Vai reit4re a Lord A. Loftus Vassurance p sitive P 
que le Cabinet ImpArial : persiste a conBiderer 
l'Afghanistan comme entidrement en dehors de sa 
sphýre dlaction". 
4. Gortchakoff to Schouvalov, 5 April 1874. 
IlDanB sa depeche responsive en date du 2lBt ýanvierq 
1874, Son Altesse le Prince Gortchakov r6itera 
llassurance positive que le Gouvernement Imp4rial 
persistait a considdrer ý'Afghanistan comme entiAre- 
ment en dehorB de sa sphere d'action". 
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5. Gortchakoff to Schouvalovp 3/15 February 1876. 
I'Vqiillez dire a S. E. dtordre de notre Auguste 
MaItre que nous adhgronB enti'rement aux con- e 
clusions d'apres leBquelles en maintenantp de 
part et d'autrep Varrangement convenu quant aux 
limiteB de l'Afgtianistans qui demenrerait en 
dehors de la spfigre dtaction de la Russbp les 
deux Cabinets consideraient comme closes les 
ýLiscussions reconnues peu pratiques relatives 
a la zone neutre et ý la zone interm4diqire". 
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APPENDIX 
.1 DRAFT TREATY FOR THE PESHAWAR CONFERENCE. 
The principal articles are the following: - 
Article 2. "Between the British Government and that of the 
Ameer, Sheer Ali Khan ruler of Afghanistang his heirs and 
successors, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship. 
I 
The friends of the one government shall be the friends of the 
other; and the enemies of the one government shall be the 
enemies of the other". 
Article 3. "In the event of the territories now possessed by 
His Highness the Ameer, Sheer-Ali Khan,, being invaded by a 
foreign enemy, the British Government will aid His Highness in 
the defence of those territories with men and materials of war; 
it being clearly understood and hereby provided, that the 
conduct of the Ameer and his goverment shallp at the same time, 
be in strict conformity with the declarations contained in the 
above Article 2; and that His Highness shall have refrained 
from all provocation of aggression on, or interference with 
those states and territories beyond his present frontierBp save 
with the knowledge and consent of the British Government". 
c -2.1 q0 
v. Parl. Papers 1878-79 (Afghanistans No. l)v Vol. 561,., pp. 182-192. 
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Article 4, "In accordance withýthis understandingg His 
Highness the Ameer agrees to conduct his relations with 
for6ign states in harmony with the policy of the British 
Government". 
Article 5. -"For the better protection of the Afghan frontier 
it is hereby agreed that the British Government shall on its 
part depute, accredited British-Agents to-reside at. Herat, and 
such other places in Afghanistan as may be mutually determined 
by the-High Contracting powers;. and that the-Ruler of Afghan- 
istan shall on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court 
of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and at such other 
places'in British India as may-be-similarly agreed upon". 
Article 9, ". In proof of its desire to see the Government of 
Hie-Highness Sheer'Ali Khan-consolidated# and undisturbed by 
domestic trouble, the British, Government hereby-agrees to - 
acknowledge whomsoever Hisý, Highnessq may nominateýas his heir- 
apparent and to discountenance the pretensions of any rival 
claimant to the throne". 
Article 10. "The British Government. 9, its Officers end Agents, 
will, aB'heretofore, abstain-from all interference. in the 
domestic administration and internal affairs of Afghanistan; 
except-in so-far as their assistance may, at any time, be 
requiredq and invoked, by the Ameer, his heirsq and successorst 
to avert from that country the calamities of a civil warp and 
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protect the peaceful interests which this treaty is intended 
to establish and promote. 
In that cases the British Government will afford to the 
Government of Afghanistan such support, moral and materials 
as mays in its opinion, and in general accordance with the 
foregoing declarations be necessary for the assistance of the 
Ameer, his heirs, and successorso in protecting equitable 
authorityp national contentment, and settled orders from 
disturbance by the personal ambition of unlawful competitors 
for powertt. 
Article 11 and 12 provided for the selections maintenance and 
guarding of trade routes and the fixing of tariffs by a joint 
Commission. 
Article 13. "His Highness the Ameer Sheer Ali Khan furthermore 
engages, on behalf of himselfg his heirs, and successorss to 
support the British Government in checking and suppressing the 
trade in slaves and to prohibit the practice of kidnapping, or 
seizings Human Beings within his dominions for the purpose of 
selling them into bondage". 
Article 14. "For the further support of His Highness the Ameer 
in the permanent maintenance of his authorityp and the efficient 
fulfilment of the engagements undertaken by His Highness on 
behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, in accordance 
with this Treaty, the British Government agrees, on condition 
(320) 
of a faithful performance of the obligations herewith 
contracted, to pay His Highnesso his heirs and successors... 
The following points were made in an accompanying Aide 
Memoires 
Article 3. "Invaded by a foreign enemy" to include European 
as well-as Asiatic enemies. 
Article 4. The Ameer to abstain from "discussion of politicalp 
internationalg or state matters with any Foreign Governmentp 
save in friendly concert with the British Governmentp to Whom 
His Highness will unreservedly communicate all correspondence# 
or overturesp of this nature". 
Articles 5 and 6. Unless and until mutually arranged, only a 
Native Agent need reside at Kabul City. Whenever, in the 
Viceroy's opiniong it may be necessary to communicate direct 
with the Ameer on matters of an important or confidential 
characterv a special British Envoy to be deputed on a temporary 
mission to the Ameer's court. Principal duty of the British 
Agent or Agents shall be to watch events outside the frontiers 
of Afghanistang and to supply timely information to the British 
and Afghan Governments of any political intrigues. or dangers, 
threatening the peace, stability or integrity of the Afghan 
dominions. 
Article 8. No British subjects to enter Afghanistan without 
the authoritative and written permission of their Government 
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"based on a mutual and cordial understanding between the two 
Governments". 
Article 10. The British Goverment not desiring in any way to 
change its settled policy of non-interference with the internal 
affairs, or independence of Afghanistang will only afford 
material assistance to the Ameer, his heirs etc. 0 at their 
express request; that request to be accompanied by adequate 
and timely information and the British Goverment to be "the 
sole judge of the manner, time and expediency of furnishing 
such assistance". 
Article 14. The BritishGovernment to pay to the Ameer 20 
lakhs of rupees on the ratification of the present treaty and 
afterwards an annual sum of 12 lakhB of rupees in addition to 
such other material assistance in officers, men or money as 
may be from time to time deemed beneficial for the interests 
of the two Governments. 
An interesting comparison with this draft treaty is that 
printed in Parl. Papers, Central Asia, No. 1 (1881), inclosure 
32 in No, 19 under the titlet "Treaty between the Russian 
Government and Ameer Shere Ali Khan# written from memory by 
Mirza. Muharnmud Nubbee". This latter provided for (1) Russian 
recognition of any person nominated by Sheer Ali as heir- 
apparent; Abdulla Khan having died; (2) Russian Governments, 
if asked for assistance by Ameer on account of attack by a 
(322) 
foreign enemy upon Afghanistan., to repel such enemy "either 
by means of advice or such other means as it may consider 
proper"; (3) Ameer not to wage war with any foreign Power 
without consultation with and permission from Russian Govern- 
ment; (4) Ameer to report "in a friendly manner" to the 
Russian Government what goes on in his kingdom; (5) Ameer to 
colmnunicate "every wish and important affair" to General 
Kaufmann; (6) Russian protection for Afghan merchants trading 
and residing in Russian territory; (7) Provision for Afghans 
to be sent to Russia to learn trades etc., and for their good 
treatment while there. 
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